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ABSTRACT
THE END OF THE LINE: THE NATURE AND POLITICS OF RESILIENCE IN GALVESTON,
NORFOLK, AND NEW YORK CITY
William John Fleming
Richard Weller

In the briny aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina (2005), Ike (2008), Sandy (2012), and
Matthew (2016), community leaders along the East and Gulf Coasts of the United
States are contemplating a radical shift in the planning, design, and management of
their coastal zones. Breaking with a century-long tradition of coastal grey infrastructure
planning, many of those communities--along with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE)--are shifting their attention and their investments away from conventional
forms coastal infrastructure and towards "nature-based strategies", or non-structural
forms of coastal protection. But why do some communities opt for a softer, greener
coast while others double-down on their investments in grey infrastructure? How do the
nature-based strategies under consideration compare, performatively, to the more
conventional forms of coastal protection? Using a comparative case study research
design, I posit that three forces explain how and why Galveston, Norfolk, New York City
and other communities along the East and Gulf Coasts develop their approach to
coastal protection. The first is a product of each community's engineering legacy, or the
historical approach to flood protection that developed during the 19th and 20 centuries
and the culture that organized around those forms. The second is function of resilience
politics, or the value judgements about who gets to stay and who must retreat, who is
worthy of protection and who is not along the American coast. The final is a product of
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who leads the political coalition behind each community's resilience planning--with a
particular focus on the differences between design-led and engineering or planning-led
efforts. This dissertation advances the theory and practice of coastal planning and
design and provides a framework for action along the Gulf and East Coasts of the U.S.
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CHAPTER 1 — The End: The Nature of Coasts and Coastlines in an
Era of Resilience
“An arbitrary political line may divide the north…from the
south…but there is no such line in nature.”1
Frederick Law Olmsted – the progenitor of landscape architecture and American
city planning – opened his first literary work, The Cotton Kingdom, with this
poignant observation. Of course, Olmsted’s words held a different meaning then
than I am implying now. Penned over the course of his journey through a roiling
South – one moving rapidly towards the brink of Civil War – Olmsted’s axiom was
meant to refute the premise of subjugation oft-invoked by antebellum
Southerners in regard to the Union. Put another way, Olmsted wrote of the
unnaturalness that such a conflict might engender. He wrote, at times defiantly,
against the social, ecological, and economic cleavages that any such linear
demarcation would imbue. Though his words found little favor amongst the
people he met while writing The Cotton Kingdom, Olmsted’s views on nature and
non-linearity did find an audience amongst the designers and urbanists of his
day. His legacy lives on in emphasis placed on ecosystem services by
contemporary landscape architects and city planners.

1

F. Olmsted. 1861. The Cotton Kingdom: A Traveler’s Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the
American Slave States, 1853-1861. New York: Mason Brothers.

2

This dissertation represents one of the first explorations into how and why
nature-based strategies are being deployed and discussed along the American
coast. Premised on the idea that coastal infrastructure should provide the kinds
of ecosystem services that Olmsted envision, these strategies include the
conservation, restoration, and design of marine landscapes like dunes, wetlands,
marshlands, and near-shore reefs as a means to reducing surge and flood risk.
Their purported advantage over more conventional, grey coastal infrastructure is
two-fold. One is that they can provide a myriad of other services that grey
infrastructure cannot, including improvements in water quality, wildlife habitat,
and recreational programming. The other is that they can grow and evolve over
time in ways that walls and levees cannot – marshes and dunes can migrate as
sea levels encroach and habitats migrate.
As this dissertation will show, the greatest challenge to making coastal
communities in the US more resilient is less a product of local issues like a lack
of financial capacity or political in-fighting, though those are surely barriers to the
implementation of nature-based strategies. Rather, the ability of cities to build
resilience-driven projects is most-hindered by institutional forces – the inability of
the US Army Corps of Engineers to evaluate the ecological benefits of the
projects it considers, the state land and environmental policies that are not
attuned to the realities of climate change, and a design culture that reinforces
misconceptions of nature as ornamentation instead of a performative piece of the
coastal resilience-making project.

3

Were Olmsted to pen a similar missive today, it’s likely that his ire would
have been directed elsewhere and in response to one of the greatest challenges
embedded in our own cultural moment: planetary climate change.2 Its near-term
effects are already being expressed in places like the Pacific Northwest, where
ocean acidification, triggered by an unprecedented increase in atmospheric and
oceanic CO2, is dissolving the shells and habitat of most bivalves. In doing so, it
is disrupting – and, some would argue, destroying – a vital global oyster and
mollusk fishery that provides significant economic wealth to the region while
cleaning and filtering pollutants billions of gallons of water. But the effects of
ocean acidification are not isolated to the Pacific Northwest – fisherman and
ecologists across the globe are grappling with its effects across much of the
Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific basins.3
Erstwhile, global temperatures are rising. Based on data from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016 was the warmest year in human
history. The second and third hottest? 2015 and 2014.4 Urban heat deaths – or
the loss of life attributable to seasonal spikes in temperature – have increased

2 Holy Father, Pope Francis. 2015. “Laudato Si’ On the Care for Our Common Home.” Encyclical
Letter, Vatican. Available at:
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html.
3 Nina Bednarsek et al., “Extensive Dissolution of Live Pteropods in the Southern Ocean,” Nature
Geoscience 5(2012): 881–885; Richard Feely et al., “Scientific Summary of Ocean Acidification in
Washington State Marine Waters: Washington Shellfish Initiative Blue Ribbon Panel,” NOAA
Special Report, accessed August 10, 2014,
https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/1201016.pdf/.
4 J. Patel. 2017. “How 2016 Became Earth’s Hottest Year on Record.” New York Times, 18
January 2017. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/18/science/earth/2016hottest-year-on-record.html.
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every year in the US since 2010. The rate of heat-related mortality is expected to
double by 2100 as a result of climate change-driven temperature increases.5
But those effects can appear abstract and somewhat removed from the
daily life of most Americans. Most scientists agree that ocean acidification and
increasing temperatures are a product of human-induced climate change, but
they differ, at times, on the magnitude of our responsibility. Also, those processes
are underway in places that are quite remote. Few people spend time in a marine
fishery along the northern latitudes. Those that do would have difficulty spotting
the slow dissolution of a shellfish population with a pair of flippers, goggles, and a
few marine scientists. Climate change is a difficult problem to solve for just this
reason – its effects are muddled and diffuse, effecting everything and, seemingly,
nothing all at once. It is difficult to construct a political constituency around such
an ethereal phenomenon, especially when the immediacy and urgency of other,
more acute crises subsumes so much political capital.
That constituency is beginning to form along the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts
of the US. There, the ocean has slowly crept towards, and is now encroaching
upon the phalanx of communities clustered along the water’s edge. Some of
those cities already find themselves periodically under water. Norfolk, Galveston,
Miami, Charleston, and Savannah each experience recurrent flooding during
their monthly high tide events. It occurs because their sewer outfalls – many of

5

B. Stone, J. Vargo, P. Liu, D. Habeeb, A. DeLucia, M. Trail, Y. Hu, and A. Russell. 2014.
“Avoided Heat-Related Mortality through Climate Adaptation Strategies in Three US Cities.”
PLOS ONE, 9(6): 1-8.
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which were built during the late-19th and early 20th-century – now, as a result of
sea level rise, find themselves below the mean high tide. So as the monthly high
tide comes in, seawater is forced up, through those outfalls and drainage pipes,
into the streets and lawns above their drainage system. When those tidal floods
are accompanied by rainfall, the results can be jarring to an outsider.
During the course of my fieldwork for this book, I spent about six weeks in
Norfolk. At the monthly high tide that coincided with my trip, a brief shower –
0.05” of precipitation – fell. That small shower, coupled with the monthly high
tide, allowed as much as three feet of water to pool in parts of downtown Norfolk.
Children, accompanied by parents in their galoshes, sped past me on kayaks
and canoes as I watched the water bubble up through the city’s drains and into
the streets. When I asked one of the parents if they were shocked to see so
much water from such a small rain event, they replied “not at all…we’re out here
every couple of months…in our kayak. That’s why we bought it for [our child] –
he asked Santa for one to use in the streets last Christmas.”6
Along the coast and within many of its communities, rising sea levels have
begun to expose what Olmsted knew at the time of The Cotton Kingdom’s
writing: that the very idea of a coast line is disingenuous. The ecology of coastal
environments is as dynamic as any other on the planet. The tidal prism – a term
describing the volume of fresh and salt water exchanged between low and high-

6

Anonymous interview with resident. Digital Recording. Norfolk, April 8, 2016.
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tide – deposits nutrient from the tail-waters of rivers like the Mississippi, Hudson,
and Delaware into estuaries and bays, creating one of those most vibrant and
biodiverse ecosystem types on the planet.
The difference between those low and high-tide water levels is captured
by a statistic known as mean tidal range – or the average gap in elevation
between those events in a particular location. In Norfolk, that range is nearly
eight feet. In Galveston, it is just a shade over five. In the outer boroughs of New
York, it can be as much as twenty-five feet. Tidal range, along with a process of
sediment deposition known as littoral drift, helps build the marshlands, dunes,
and reefs that populate those coastal environments by scouring, depositing, and
shaping landforms along the shore.
This is all a long-way around to saying that if there are no lines in nature,
then surely there can be no lines between water and earth – or nature and
culture – along the coast. As tides rise and fall, they shift the location of that edge
each day. As sediment is deposited and scoured from our beaches and
estuaries, that edge shifts dramatically over millennia. Whatever lines we choose
to draw – be them in our maps or in our minds – are surely imagined. There are
no coastlines. There are only coasts.
This may seem like an alien concept in many of the communities along the
Gulf and Atlantic coasts. There, a century’s worth of coastal infrastructure – built
in the form of bulkheads, seawalls, groins, revetments, and breakwaters – form a

7

hard line between the terrestrial and marine environments. All told, roughly
13,670 miles of artificial structures and grey infrastructure rim the American
coast, creating a literal line where it was once only imagined.7 The coastline is an
artifact of culture. The coast is one of ecology.
Still, the process of creating literal, physical manifestations of cultural
natures is one that the Americans know well. Ideas about nature as a wild,
chaotic force in need of control, separation, and conquest by humanity became
the conceit upon which the greatest period of environmental denudation was
inflicted upon the American landscape: postwar suburbanization.8 Technological
innovations in earth-moving and transportation technology coalesced with shifts
in federal land development and housing policy – along with racial resentment
and white flight – to scatter Americans across the countryside, sprawling into
farms and forests. A similar set of processes played out along the coast, where
steam-power drove a growth in port capacities as new forms of concrete and
coastal engineering tactics unleashed a torrent of development. Harbors and
estuaries became rimmed with riprap and bulkheads – replacing the swamps and
seagrass beds that once softened their boundaries. Levees and dikes protruded
from the coastal and riverine edge – supplanting dunes and beach heads. All of
this was done in the service of economic expansion – often through trade via
ports, but also through recreational tourism and water-driven industrial

7

R. Gittman., K. Fodrie, and A. Popowich. 2015. “Engineering Away Our Natural Defenses: An
Analysis of Shoreline Hardening in the US.” Frontiers in Ecology & Environment, 13(4): 301-307.
8 B. McKibben. 1989. The End of Nature. New York: Random House.

8

development. By the end of the twentieth century, some 90% of the land in urban
coastal counties was lined with some form of grey infrastructure.9
To the benefit of some, this process of linearizing – and then
commercializing – the coast through grey infrastructure has transformed
American marine environments from sites of ecological abundance to ones of
substantial economic wealth. Eight of the top ten cities by gross regional product
in the US are located along the coast, and more than 40% of all Americans live in
a coastal county.10 The transformation of the coast has always been predicated
on economic growth – and the dividend created by exploiting it is the only thing
that makes sustaining the rest of the nation possible. Without such economically
productive, vibrant coasts, the rest of the nation would be unable to function.
Even today, many planners11 believe that an economic imperative like that
of protecting the coast will be what compels business and political leaders to join
those in the scientific and advocacy communities in developing real, effective
plans to mitigate climate change. It is a sentiment at the core of what has come
to be known as sustainable development: the practice of building communities
that balance the needs of today with those of future generations – sometimes
referred to as the seventh generation principle. The desire to create a stability in
the material flows, consumption, and health of urban systems has inspired

9

R. Gittman., K. Fodrie, and A. Popowich. 2015. “Engineering Away Our Natural Defenses: An
Analysis of Shoreline Hardening in the US.” Frontiers in Ecology & Environment, 13(4): 301-307.
10 Ibid.
11
T. Beatley. 2014. Blue Urbanism: Exploring Connections between Cities and Oceans. Washington, D.C.:
Island Press.
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hundreds of city plans, thousands of scientific papers, and untold numbers of
design projects across the globe. It would be difficult to find a major work of
design or planning, executed over the last two decades that does not explicitly
support such an aspiration.12
But by nearly every measure, our experiment with sustainability is proving
itself a colossal failure. Global CO2 emissions are still increasing, development
patterns are still sprawling into and consuming valuable and high-functioning
landscapes, and the ecological crisis identified by writers like Ian McHarg and
Rachel Carson continues largely unabated.13 In a chilling 2015 essay published
in Science, Paul Ehrlich and several colleagues note that “our estimates reveal
an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating
that a sixth mass extinction is already underway. Averting a dramatic decay of
biodiversity and the subsequent loss of ecosystem services is still possible
through intensified conservation efforts, but that window of opportunity is rapidly
closing.”14 However earnest our efforts have been thus far, humanity and the
Earth are no more sustainable today than they were a half-century ago.

12

F. Steiner. 2012. Design for a Vulnerable Planet. Austin: University of Texas Press.
IPCC. 2013. “Summary for Policymarkers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; R. Ewing and S. Hamidi.
2014. “Measuring Urban Sprawl and Validating Sprawl Measures.” Metropolitan Research
Council. Available at: http://gis.cancer.gov/tools/urban-sprawl/sprawl-report-short.pdf.
14 G. Cellabos et al. 2015. “Accelerated Modern Human-Induced Species Losses: Entering the
Sixth Mass Extinction.” Science Advances, 1(5): 1-5.
13
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There are other forces rendering the potential of sustainable development
moot as an instrument of climate change mitigation. One is that it is predicated
on an outdated worldview that fails to recognize and plan for the interconnected
systems of consumption, development, production, and neoliberalism that drive
urban growth and human behavior. Instead, sustainability is premised on the idea
that each can be measured and managed in discrete domains independent of
one another. Most troublingly, it presumes that a balance can in fact be struck –
that the inputs and outputs of consumption and growth can be managed in a way
that allows people to live as they like now and for the natural resources upon
which we all rely to fully regenerate. This, of course, is an absurd proposition –
which stands inapposite to everything we know about the formation of fossil
fuels, natural resources, and the development of cleaner, more efficient
alternatives. As a number of ecological and economic scholars have begun to
argue, there is simply no way to balance the desires of capitalism with those
ecological and human health.15 Put another way, sustainability belongs in the
same conversation as Howard’s Garden Cities and Le Corbusier’s Radiant City –
utopian pipe dreams that never managed to move past their abstract diagrams
and into the built environment.16

15

C. Eisenstein. 2014. “Let’s be Honest: Real Sustainability May Never Make Business Sense.”
The Guardian, 8 January 2014, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/blog/sustainability-business-sense-profit-purpose.
16
D. Palazzo. 2016. The Role of Utopia in Ecological Planning and Design, In F. Steiner, G. Thompson, and
A. Carbonell (Eds.), Nature and Cities: The Ecological Imperative in Urban Design and Planning (pp. 213238). Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute Press.
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But the inadequacy of sustainable development to meet this cultural and
ecological moment has not stopped cities along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts from
doubling-down on their investments in linear grey infrastructure projects. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans invested $14.5 billion in a
surge protection system comprised entirely of massive seawalls, flood gates, and
pumps to encircle and protect what Colten referred to as “an unnatural
metropolis”17 – a human-derived bathtub, full of people, pushing hopelessly
against the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. In New Orleans – and most
other coastal communities in the US – these kinds of projects have produced
what is known as a moral hazard – a policy intervention intended to solve a
problem (in this case flooding) that actually exacerbates it. Coastal grey
infrastructure’s moral hazard is produced in three steps.
The first is that most seawalls, levees, and dikes are built to open up new
areas to development – either by treating coastal swamps and marshland as a
tabula rasa upon which to build new communities or by adding a layer of
protection to existing low-density neighborhoods that triggers a cycle of
densification. The effect is to place new residents into a flood-prone landscape –
essentially creating a risk for property damage and death where it did not exist.18
The second is that these kinds of projects create a physical and visual barrier
between the communities they encircle and the flood risks they face. The effect
17 C. Colten. 2005. An Unnatural Metropolis: Wresting New Orleans from Nature. Louisiana State
University Press: Baton Rouge.
18 T. Steinberg. 2006. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

12

of this has been to reduce the perception of risk in those communities and thus to
reduce the political capital available and necessary to maintain a reasonable
level of disaster preparedness.19 The final step in its production of a moral hazard
rests in the extraordinary expense and technical expertise required to maintain
massive networks of coastal grey infrastructure. The effect of this it to create a
system that is impossible to properly maintain yet is responsible for inducing new
development in high-risk areas. This is the moral hazard of coastal grey
infrastructure – to design a system in which new people are induced to live in an
area with high flood-risk under a false promise of security. In every populous
region along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts – from Brownsville, Texas across to
Miami and up to Portland, Maine – similar surge protection systems are under
review by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE or Corps).20
The surge protection system in New Orleans – and, indeed, much of the
coastal grey infrastructure work underway in the US – has been deeply
influenced by Dutch engineers. Holland is the reference point upon which all
coastal infrastructure turns. Dutch hegemony along the American coast has roots
in The Netherlands’ Great Flood of 1953. That winter, a massive storm – akin to
what might be called a N’oreaster in the US – swept swiftly across the low-lying
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country, killing 1,835 people and inundating an area of more than 1,300 square
kilometers – roughly eight times the size of the District of Columbia.21 Unlike the
US, Holland’s entire population and economy is located along the coast. There
are no inland or upland cities to which its residents might retreat, as much of the
nation is below sea level. The 1953 floods – and the precarious position of the
nation’s cities – prompted a massive and sustained investment in flood control
infrastructure and management protocols. It transformed The Netherlands
coastal zone into a coast line – rimmed by dikes and levees, retractable flood
gates and enormous pumping stations. The culmination of the Dutch approach to
coastal engineering arrived in the Delta Works and Room for the River projects –
both of which used massive works of grey infrastructure to resist flood-waters
along with gargantuan pumping stations to displace any water that managed to
overtop them. The success of the Dutch approach inspired officials in dozens of
American cities to emulate their work – sometimes implicitly, by adopting a
resistance strategy to flood risk management, and other times explicitly, by
contracting Dutch engineers and designers to work in their cities.
Few of those city officials – or the designers with whom they work – spent
much time considering how well those Dutch ideas might translate across the
Atlantic, or even if they managed to perform as well as their mythology implies. If
they had, a few issues might have dissuaded them from investing so many
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resources in such an approach. This is because the very nature of flood risk in
Holland is so different from that of the US. In the Netherlands, coastal storms are
comparatively mild events. They bring heavy precipitation and wind-driven waves
to be sure. But coastal storms in Holland usually come with surge heights of ten
feet or less. The 1953 great flood brought surge heights of 14.5 feet to the
Netherlands, which qualifies as a one-in-ten-thousand-year storm event there.
Contrast that with the US, in which a 15 foot storm surge is used to model an
average hurricane event by disaster planners in the Federal Emergency
Management Administration. There is simply too much variance in the magnitude
of the risk facing each nation for the Dutch approach to find comparable success
in the US. Even in Holland, public officials have begun to recognize that there are
technological limits to their own ability to wall themselves off from the sea – the
nation has been shifting its coastal investments away from large defensive
structures and towards softer, green infrastructural systems. In addition, and in
contrast to the U.S., The Netherlands has a deep commitment to planning and
landscape design at all levels of government. A similar shift, however nascent, is
beginning to emerge in a few US cities.
It also represents one of the first critical examinations of the use of
resilience as a new organizing device for planning and designing cities. As a
framework for contemporary urbanism, it departs from the principles of
sustainability in two important ways. One is that resilience theory is premised on
a worldview of dynamic equilibrium – or that human and ecological systems are

15

constantly shifting and that whatever stability appears is ephemeral. Put another
way, resilience theory does away with the notion that a lasting balance can be
struck between the interests of business and people and of growth and the
environment. Instead, it flows from the idea that those systems can be resilient if
and when they have the capacity to absorb and evolve from the inevitable shocks
and shifts that ripple through the planet’s urban centers.
The other point of departure between the two frameworks rest in their faith
in regional and national collaborations to achieve their goals. Sustainable
development is predicated on such an ideal and, as a result, places great faith in
the ability of civic institutions to achieve its goals. Resilience, conversely, places
little or no faith in those institutions, relying instead on local actions and design
interventions to achieve its goals. If sustainability is the utopian idea of urbanism,
then resilience is its fatalistic foil. Nowhere is the disparity between those two
competing frameworks – and their use of grey and green infrastructure – more
apparent than along that Gulf and Atlantic Coasts of the US.
This dissertation asks a number of critical questions regarding the
resilience of coastal cities – and the role that nature-based strategies are and
should be playing in them. How do nature-based strategies stack-up,
performatively, against the more conventional methods of flood control? How do
political actors and institutions view, support, and obstruct their use? How are
philosophical tropes of nature reflected in design culture and, as a result, in the
urbanism of coastal cities? But at its core, this dissertation attempts to answer a
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singular, more complex question about the coast: what role can nature-based
strategies play in building resilience? These questions form the core of this
dissertation, and they are addressed through fieldwork in Galveston, Norfolk, and
New York.
Mapping the Nature of Risk along the American Coast
One of the most obvious a questions that reads of this book might ask is this:
why study Galveston and Norfolk alongside New York City? Case selection
methods vary wildly – from those chosen as a matter of convenience or proximity
to the researcher to those chosen through complex models and cluster analyses
that can provide researchers with a typology of cases to organize their work. For
this project, I opted for something in-between.
I began by creating a filter that allowed me to winnow the universe of
available cases to cities that fit three basic criteria: they must have participated in
one of the major federal or philanthropic disaster resilience initiatives that began
in 2013 (when the first wave of federal and philanthropic investments in disaster
resilience began), they must be along either the Gulf or Atlantic coast, and they
must have a population of 50,000 or more. Those initiatives include the Rebuild
by Design competition led by the US Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), the Structures of Coastal Resilience initiative led by the
Rockefeller Foundation, and the National Disaster Resilience Competition co-led
by HUD and Rockefeller. Their importance to this filtering exercise was that they
were the policy instruments pushing nature-based strategies out of the academy
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and into the built environment. Studying the culture surrounding nature-based
strategies required identifying the places where one might expect to find them
under consideration. Limiting this study to the Gulf and Atlantic coasts was a
product of reviewing the literature on climate change and disaster risk. Though
sea level rise will surely impact cities along the West Coast of the US, the flood
and disaster risks there are minimal – the oceanic and atmospheric processes
regulating the Pacific simply do not produce many tropical storms that make
landfall in the US.22 The final criteria – limiting my study to cities of 50,000 or
more – came from a review of the planning literature, which indicates that this is
the size at which we can expect communities to have the financial and technical
capacity necessary to plan for climate change.23
Applying these three screening criteria produced a sample of twenty-eight
cities – cities in which we might reasonable expect to find nature-based
strategies under serious consideration by local officials and designers. The task
then became how to make sense of this group of cities – I could not study all
twenty-eight, nor did I consider it wise to select two or three at random. Among
the many questions I hoped to answer in this study was: how do differences in
the magnitude and type of risk – surge versus tidal – effect the strategies
employed in coastal resilience projects in the US?
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That question compelled me to organize thee cities according to their
experience with disaster and by their exposure to future flood-related disasters. I
measured each in two ways. For disaster experience, I used county-level data
from the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) to calculate
the number of Presidentially Declared Disaster events due to hurricane-related
events from 1985-2014 for each city and I also summed the total value of
property destroyed as a result of those storms in each city’s county over the
same period. For disaster exposure, I calculated the total number of National
Flood Insurance Policies (NFIP) held within each city and I also measured the
total value of the properties insured through the NFIP in each. I then created a
simple index of experience and exposure for each of the twenty-eight cities that I
used to plot them within a two-by-two matrix containing four types of cities: highexperience and high-exposure cities, low-experience and high-exposure cities,
low-experience and low-exposure cities, and high-experience and low-exposure
cities. I then discarded the low-experience, low-exposure cities from
consideration, as they were unlikely sites in which to expect significant
investments in coastal resilience projects.24
From the remaining cities, I chose three to structure this book around:
Norfolk as a high-exposure, low-experience city, New York as a high-exposure,
moderate-experience city, and Galveston as a city of high-exposure and highexperience with disaster. I expected to find considerable variation in the degree
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to which nature-based strategies were being deployed in each and in the
motivations behind their implementation – or lack thereof. Norfolk, after all, is a
medium-sized city and home to the largest Naval Base – including the
headquarters for NATO Allied Command – in the US. It should approach coastal
resilience-making in ways that are distinct from a global financial center like New
York, or a petrochemical hub and barrier island community like Galveston. As
this dissertation will show, the challenge of resilience-making in cities is less a
product of diminished financial capacity or political in-fighting, though those
factors surely delimit the implementation of coastal infrastructure projects, and
more a product of institutional and cultural conflicts with building nature-based
strategies.
This speaks to an unexpected set of findings in this dissertation – I
expected the challenge to building nature-based strategies in coastal cities to be
more idiosyncratic. Though I certainly hoped to be able to speak to the general
problem of adaptation to climate change through the specifics of each city, the
degree to which the challenges facing them mirrored one another proved
shocking. The effect of the Corps’ recent project delivery overhaul – known as
the 3x3x3 reforms and detailed in chapter 3 of this dissertation – on the
prospects for coastal resilience planning appear to be ubiquitous and crippling
along the American coast. There will certainly be lessons from Galveston that are
of greater relevance to other barrier island communities than to other places –
just as Norfolk’s may find a firmer constituency in other medium-sized port cities,
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and New York’s in other global capitals. Together, they render an image of the
American coast that is both hopeless and hopeful; of a territory giving way to the
sea and as bold design experiments aim seek to extend humanity’s hold on its
edge; and of a system for adaptation that is both designed to fail and predicated
on failure to achieve progress. It is an image of the messy, decentralized process
of building resilience in the US.
Case Study Research and Climate Change Adaptation
This book is structured through a comparative case study analysis of coastal
resilience and nature-based strategies for climate adaptation in Galveston,
Norfolk, and New York. It deviates from the more conventional, single-case
research design often employed in planning and design projects for three
reasons. One is that, outside of planning, the trajectory of scholarly work has
been trending towards comparative case study work for some time – particularly
in projects drawing from and speaking to multiple disciplines.25 This project was
structured to place itself into conversation with comparative analyses like Crisis
Cities26, Acts of God27, and The Social Roots of Risk28 as much it aims to build
upon single-case projects like A River and Its City29 and more technical works
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like Reducing Coastal Risk.30 Put another way, this is a book about the culture of
nature, risk, and technology along the American coast.
A second reason is that I set out to answer a series of process-based
questions in this dissertation. How and why are nature-based strategies being
deployed in the coastal resilience plans of American cities? What are the
performative qualities of nature-based strategies as instruments of flood-risk
reduction? How are those qualities motivating – or not – their use in coastal US
cities? Why are nature-based strategies being pursued aggressively in some US
cities and not others? These are cultural questions that can only be answered
through the use of ethnographic methods and a comparative case-study
research design – key informant interviews, public document analysis, and
participant observations. I spent considerable time in each city – eight weeks in
Galveston, seven in New York, and six in Norfolk – meeting with marine
scientists, public officials, community leaders, and many others involved the
coastal planning process to try and answer those questions. I also pulled from
extensive collections of historical maps, meeting minutes from public
commissions and civic societies, and contemporary planning and scientific
reports describing and projecting the effects of climate change in each city. I also
attended or reviewed transcripts and videotape from a half-dozen planning
commission and neighborhood planning meetings. That work provided a robust
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set of data often omitted from discussions about risk and resilience along the
coast: local knowledge and intelligence.
The final reason that I chose to build this dissertation around Galveston,
Norfolk, and New York is that my goal in scholarly research has always been to
influence public policy and design culture. That usually requires an ability to
generalize from one’s research, and no other research design is as effective at
doing so as the comparative case study model.31 Unlike model-driven studies –
which are often too abstract or too complex for policy-makers to absorb – and
single-case studies – which are often difficult to place in a broader cultural
context – the multi-case model provided me with an instrument for creating a
broader relevance and narrative than a study of only Galveston, Norfolk, or New
York might have.
The import of these goals will only grow as the US enters a revivalist era
of climate change denial – and, indeed, a time of profound anti-intellectualism
unrivaled in my lifetime. Our coastal communities cannot face or respond to the
threats of climate change alone – they need strong civic institutions and
governments to do so. Denialism and censorship cannot push back against the
sea, nor can they keep communities safe that remain – or will become – exposed
to the effects of climate change Truth always finds us, whether we cower from it
or seek to discover it. My task in this dissertation – and our task as a community
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of scholars – is to expose it before others suffer because of the politics of
obfuscation.
Disaster, Resilience, and Design
This book is engaged in two broad fields of scholarship. The first pertains to
disaster planning, a body of literature that includes the application of public
policy, urban and landscape design, and social psychology to the challenge of
rebuilding and recovery. The conventional approach to post-disaster recovery
can be envisioned in four simple phases: normalcy, disruption, recovery, and
resilience. The normalcy phase contains the actions typically associated with
disaster preparedness – developing an emergency or evacuation plan, investing
in physical upgrades to a city’s infrastructure, and creating a communications
network to ensure the free flow of information during a crisis.32 During this initial
phase, disaster planners often endeavor to create hazard mitigation plans that
can be integrated into comprehensive city plans, which carry a legal and financial
force that standalone mitigation plans cannot.33
Then, the disruption phase is the period in which these systems of
infrastructure and communication are tested as the result of a hazard or other
debilitating event. During this period, the conventional position of disaster
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planners is to expedite and coordinate the relief process.34 It is generally
considered to be the phase of disaster planning at which the U.S. is best, though
scholars argue that this is a strength borne of out necessity – that by consistently
failing to invest in preventative and protective measures and infrastructure, the
nation’s disaster-relief industry is well-practiced in the evacuation and relief
provision processes.35
Next, the recovery phase is where many of the activities discussed in this
dissertation occur. It is when cities and governments begin to rebuild the facilities
and the housing lost to storms and other destructive events. But it is also the
period when the physical and social landscape of cities is most apt to change.
During this phase, decisions are made about where to invest in new protective
infrastructures, where and how to engage in land swaps and buyouts, and where
to remove or displace pre-disaster risks – all of which have second- and thirdorder effects on where and how well people live.36
The final period – the resilience phase – is characterized by a return to
normalcy for a city or region, often with a more robust set of protections and
expanded capacities in place. This is when investments in social capital and
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community development are often prioritized by disaster planners.37 Though
ecologists, engineers, sociologists, and planners differ on the proper scales –
both in time and space – for evaluating resilience, they tend to converge around
the idea that it is a property exhibited in cities and systems by an ability to learn
from the past when adapting to the future. In other words, resilience should be
evident in places where rebuilding – necessitated by disaster – is being explored
through new, innovative means.38 Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City
certainly fit that description.
The problem with this conceptual framework for disaster planning is that
events rarely unfold in this linear, idealized fashion. Limiting planning capacity,
insufficient financial resources, misaligned state and federal regulations, and a
myriad of other factors all undermine the path towards resilience laid out in that
body of literature. This model’s failure to produce more resilient cities is what led
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the
Rockefeller Foundation to invest in more experimental approaches like Rebuild
by Design, Structures of Coastal Resilience, and the National Disaster Resilience
competition – all of which inspired and are discussed in this dissertation.
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Plan for the Dissertation
This book is organized through four additional chapters. In chapter two, I develop
an urban and environmental history of Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City. Its
central aim is to identify the projects and processes through which each city’s
coastal landscape was shaped and its geomorphology irrevocably altered. Put
another way, chapter two places each city’s contemporary vulnerability in a
broader, historical context of American coastal urbanism and development. I use
historical documents – including maps, meeting minutes, and public documents –
to develop these narratives. In Galveston, the city’s relationship with the sea was
shaped by the Great Storm of 1900 – the deadliest storm event in US history39 –
and the region’s response to it: constructing a massive seawall and raising the
barrier island’s elevation by upwards of twelve feet through dredge and fill
operations. The performative success of that early-20th century defense system
shaped attitudes on the island about the role of technological landscapes and
flood risk reduction, and it inspired a suite of contemporary resilience plans that
extend and expand its logic across the coastal plain of Southeast Texas. Norfolk
and New York depart from Galveston’s experience and instead experienced a
more conventional process of growth along their coasts: a port-driven expansion
of coastal grey infrastructure along their waterfronts and a suburbanization-driven
expansion of impervious surface throughout their rivers’ watersheds. They
arrived at their contemporary struggle with coastal resilience through an
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experience that was less defined by major, storm driven events like Galveston’s
and more by the gradual spread of seasonal, tide-driven flooding throughout
each city. Yet, each city now faces the surge risk posed by catastrophic,
hurricane-driven storms as well as the more existential risk of sea level rise – and
the possibility more regular and widespread inundation.
Chapter three focuses on the politics of resilience by tracing the norms,
functions, and influence of the USACE and its partner organizations along the
coastal zone of each city. Its central aim is to build up framework for
understanding the ways and means through which local and national politics
influence, undermine, and otherwise affect the ability of coastal cities to bolster
their resilience. I use public documents and my key informant interviews – with
technical experts, public officials, and community organization leaders – to
develop this chapter. Though each city has its own idiosyncratic politics, the force
exerting overwhelming influence on each – and, in fact, the entire American
coast – is the USACE. This chapter illustrates how a series of seemingly benign
reforms – known as the 3x3x3 reforms – rendered the Corps’ ineffective and, as
a result, severely limited the future potential of each city.
In chapter four, I examine the major proposals for new coastal
infrastructure in each city. I assess their performative qualities by pulling from
interviews with technical experts and the scientific literature – all to help
determine the extent to which each proposal will reduce risk and build resilience,
in every sense of the word, in each city. But I also explore their cultural meaning,
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using the same body of evidence to assess how different views on nature and its
role in coastal protection has shaped these alternative futures in Galveston,
Norfolk, and New York City.
In the fifth and final chapter, I aim to accomplish two goals. One is to
generalize the findings from each city – both from, say, Galveston to other barrier
island communities and from the triumvirate of cities to the American coast as a
whole. The aim there is to identify the ways in which political coalitions, public
policy, and land development can be leveraged to build a more lasting and
durable resilience along the nation’s shore. The second goal is to instrumentalize
the findings from Galveston, Norfolk, and New York in the service of reshaping
design and planning culture around the social, ecological, and physical science
of resilience. As chapter four details, design-led resilience projects – however
interesting and innovative – often succumb to the same tropes of environmental
ornamentation and conquest that shaped the postwar suburbanization of the
American landscape. The societal challenge along our coast is that time is a
factor – adapting to sea level rise and the other effects of climate change must
progress, or our cities and the people and ecosystems that inhabit them will
suffer. The more discipline specific challenge to planners and landscape
architects is that we may only get one shot at leading that adaptive process. We
find ourselves in an exciting moment for the professions. Foundations,
governments, and society writ-large are turning, more and more, to designers for
answers on how to solve the wicked problem of sea level rise. But if we squander
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it by chasing strategies and ideas that we know will not work, we’ll only have
ourselves to blame. Without a firmer grounding in the science of resilience, we
risk reinforcing tropes of design as a frivolous, ornamental actor along the coast.
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Figure 1: The Experience-Exposure Matrix (author). These matrices show where the
cities outlined in chapter one fall along the experience-exposure spectrum. Galveston,
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Norfolk, and New York City hold similar levels of exposure to and differing degrees of
experience with disaster.

CHAPTER 2 — Unnatural Legacies: How the Coastal Engineering of
Galveston, Norfolk, and New York Produced New Vulnerabilities and
Undermined Each City’s Resilience
“When you make a decision about where to build a seawall or
where to build a jetty…or where to expand a port, those are 100year decisions. They aren’t the things that you can easily undo or
correct…once they’re built. You live with them – whatever that
means…for better or worse.”40
The legacy of 19th and 20th-century coastal engineering projects in the U.S. is
one unintended sociological and ecological consequences. Their primary aim
often centered on expanding the commercial and industrial capacity of cities
along the nation’s shore. In this, they have been successful. The American
Association of Port Authorities, using data captured by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, estimates that coastal ports
account for roughly 26% of the nation’s economy – or nearly $17.4 trillion in
2014.41 The National Ocean Economics Program attributes an additional $7.6
trillion to the coastal economy during 2014 fiscal year – a figure that includes
direct and indirect jobs created by the industries found along the American coast.
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Nearly 40% of the nation’s GDP is produced in coastal cities.42 Prior investments
in port expansion and freight waterways made that possible.
But its effect on commercial activity came at an unexpected cost: the
denudation of coastal environments along the nation’s shore. The aim of most
coastal engineering projects during the 19th and 20th-century centered on
stabilization. They sought to limit the volatility of coastal zones and to increase
the ability of ship and freight logistics to operate without frequent disruptions for
dredging and other maintenance procedures. Naseem Taleb and other
behavioral economists have described this kind of approach as a forced
smoothing – or the attempt to remove fluctuations from a system by removing or
micro-managing its sources of volatility.43
Engineers working along the American coast accomplished this primarily
through the construction of massive seawall barriers along the edge of cities,
jetties and breakwaters at the mouths of ship channels, and placing bulkheads
and other forms of coastal grey infrastructure along the bays and harbors of most
port facilities. The degree to which each of these approaches to coastal
engineering were imposed upon the landscape varied considerably between the
three cities explored in this dissertation. In each, the biophysical impacts to the
landscape were stark. A massive, phalanx-like seawall and a pair of jetties
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characterized along the mouth of the Houston Ship Channel reshaped
Galveston’s marine landscape. The seawall contributed to a pattern of scouring,
which stripped away the island’s beachfront and began to alter the width and
length of both Galveston and the Bolivar and San Luis Peninsulas to the east and
west, respectively. The jetties altered the region’s sediment flow, creating new
sand spits and land mass in some areas and stripping land – especially
marshland – away in others. Galveston’s reconfiguration came swiftly and totally
in the aftermath of their construction.
Bulkheads, revetments, and other less monolithic projects altered the
coastal edge of Norfolk and New York. Developed more slowly and over time
than those in Galveston, these projects produced similar consequences. Norfolk
– already an extraordinarily low-lying city – saw its rate of land loss and
subsidence increase, increasing the tidal range of the region and making it more
vulnerable to tidal and precipitation-driven flooding. A similar process unfolded in
New York City, though it enjoys a higher mean elevation than either Norfolk or
Galveston.
Though each city blazed a slightly different engineering pathway, all three
found themselves in similarly precarious positions at the start of the 21st-century.
Some of that precarity is a product of planetary climate change. Sea levels are
projected to rise between three and seven feet in the U.S. by 2100, inundating at
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least thirteen million coastal residents and imperiling many more.44 At least $880
billion in home values and more than $1 trillion in commercial property is
projected to be lost as result.45 The other immediate effects of climate change –
ocean acidification and increasing volatility in weather patterns – are expected to
reshape marine ecosystems as shellfish and bivalve populations wane46 and
seasonal and tropical storm-driven flooding events become more frequent and
intense.47 All of these effects would pose threats to Galveston, Norfolk and New
York City regardless of their past investments in coastal grey infrastructure.
But the degree to which those global phenomena threaten each city is, in
fact, a product of transforming their coastal zones into coastlines. The question
that coastal cities must answer is not if they will be impacted by climate change,
but the extent which that impact will be felt. Galveston, Norfolk, and New York
City are more vulnerable to sea level rise because of their prior investments in
grey infrastructure, not in spite of them. That is because the seawalls, jetties,
bulkheads, and revetments that now characterize the physical landscape of each
city induced new investments in water-dependent industry and new residential
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development in the newly drained wetlands and marshlands filled in by these
projects. Though this led to a period of incredible economic expansion, it also left
each with a heavy burden: nearly all of their major economic assets and many of
their residents would find themselves in the FEMA-defined surge or flood zone by
the end of the 20th-century.
In Galveston, the surge zone is now populated by a sprawling patchwork
of cheap suburban homes, large ports, and petrochemical processing and
storage facilities. Nearly all of Norfolk is exposed to sea level rise and recurrent
flooding, including the NATO Allied Forces Naval Base and the Port of Virginia.
New York City and its global financial center, twenty-two million residents, and
massive port network are similarly exposed. When one factors in the projection
that the Mid-Atlantic and Northwestern Gulf – where Galveston, Norfolk, and New
York City are located – will experience an above average rise in sea level by
2100, the risks facing each city can seem overwhelming.
But understanding how those risks were produced – and the mechanisms
through which design and planning might ameliorate them – requires
understanding how and why each city arrived at this point, and asking three
critical questions: what were the unintended geomorphological and sociological
impacts of these 19th and 20th-century coastal engineering projects in each city?
What motivated local leaders and federal policy-makers to invest in them? How
have local attitudes towards and federal policy for building coastal infrastructure
projects been shaped by the legacy of these works?
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As this chapter will argue, the legacy of these investments has been the
prioritization of commercial power along the American coast at all costs – a
project that ultimately induced more people and businesses to settle in areas that
became more vulnerable to sea level rise over time. By attempting to stabilize the
ecological forces that characterize most marine environments, these projects
produced a robust-yet-fragile urban system – a term Zolli and systems ecologists
define as being highly productive yet highly vulnerable to collapse.48 In
Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City, this resulted when the negative feedback
from investing in linear, grey infrastructure projects – and the slow accrual of risk
they induced – became excised from the decision-making process. Over time, all
of the development incentives in such systems become oriented towards
increasing economic output. The social and ecological consequences are given
secondary status, if they are considered at all.
A key contribution from this chapter is that this logic can be extended
beyond the decision-making process of elites and into the attitudes and values of
local residents. Not only are the political institutions tasked with developing and
regulating the coast affected by the misplaced incentives of robust-yet-fragile
systems, but so too are the people living in each city. Many of the most revealing
exchanges over the course of my fieldwork for this dissertation came in
conversations with the people leading the networks of community and non-profit
organizations. The clearest came in Galveston. There, a hard line is drawn
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between what are known as BOIs – or people Born on the Island – and IBCs – or
those who are Islanders By Choice. Amongst BOIs, there is tremendous pride
and faith in the performative value of coastal grey infrastructure as a result of the
perceived success of Galveston’s seawall. Most even include the moniker “BOI”
on their business cards and awnings. “Why would we want to build anything
else?” a BOI who runs a local non-profit asked rhetorically. “My great-grandfather
helped build the seawall and it hasn’t failed us yet...we ought to extend it as long
and high as we can.”49
In this chapter, I develop a history of the major works of coastal
engineering in Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City. I rely on a blend of
archival documents – including maps, engineering studies, newspaper coverage,
and other public materials – and key informant interviews to identify how and why
each city’s coast was transformed into a coastline. The impact and the legacy of
these projects – both on the social and ecological systems of each city, and in
the attitudes towards green infrastructure and nature-based strategies of their
residents – remain powerful, durable forces along the American coast. Their
obdurateness must not be overlooked.
The Legacy of Coastal Engineering in Galveston
Fifty miles southeast of Houston, Galveston Island serves as a barricade
between the nation’s fourth-largest city and the sea. It spans twenty-seven miles
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in length and nearly three in width, stretching westward towards the edge of West
Bay and eastward towards Bolivar Peninsula – both of which are low-lying
protrusions of sand from mainland Texas. To the island’s north is Galveston Bay,
the nation’s seventh-largest estuary and home to both a robust marine fishery
and a bustling port and petrochemical economy.50 Oyster reefs line the rim of the
Bay and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway – the nation’s second-busiest shipping
route – bisects it. Along the shore, at least a dozen refineries process, store, and
distribute up to four million-billion barrels of oil each day – a legacy of the deepwater channels and protected harbors carved out over millennia throughout the
region.51 It is the petrochemical capital of America, if not the planet.
With more than fifty-thousand permanent residents, Galveston is the most
densely populated barrier island along the Gulf Coast. Many of the island’s
residents work in the refineries, ports, and fisheries rimming the Bay.52 Others
work in the tourism industry that anchors the island’s economy – a legacy of
Galveston’s place in southern culture as a paradisiacal retreat along the Gulf.53
This industry clusters along the seaside of the island, pressing up against the
golden beaches of Galveston and along the top of Seawall Boulevard. Behind
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that phalanx of hotels, restaurants, and tourist traps are the homes of Galveston
Island’s permanent residents. The dense cluster of petrochemical processing
facilities, port and shipping logistics, and low-lying housing render Galveston
highly exposed to the surge risk posed by tropical storms.54 Given the necessity
of proximity to water by those industries, these vulnerabilities are likely to persist
and increase over the next century.
Though a variety of forces drove Galveston down this path towards
vulnerability, none contributed more to its precarious contemporary position than
the three major works of coastal engineering imposed on the region during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first project involved the construction of
the North and South Jetties at the mouth of the Houston Ship Channel. At the
time of their construction, they were the largest jetties on the planet. Their
principal purpose was to reduce the need for the ship channel to be dredged – a
goal they accomplished by diverting large volumes of sediment away from it and
towards other parts of the Galveston Bay region. The second project came in two
parts, both in response to the Great Storm of 1900 – the deadliest hurricane in
U.S. history. Those parts were an island-wide, 17’ high seawall and, incredibly,
the nation’s single largest grade-raising project ever that increased Galveston
Island’s elevation by as much as 12’. Their goal was defensive – to wall
Galveston off from the risk of future storm surge damage. They proved largely
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successful, though as this chapter will discuss, that success came at a steep
ecological cost. The third project centered on the construction of a jetty field – an
island-wide array of relatively short jetties built to stabilize its rapidly eroding
beachfront. It too reshaped Galveston in unexpected ways – and helped create
the conditions of vulnerability that now pervade the region.
But before one can understand how these projects altered the ecology
and geomorphology of the Galveston Bay region, there must be some
understanding of how those forces evolved prior to the three works of coastal
engineering outlined above. This section begins by describing those forces and
then moves on to the projects, their impact on the evolution of Galveston, and,
ultimately, their influence on the landscape of risk and vulnerability across the
region.
The Ecological and Cultural Context of Galveston
Along a geologic time scale, barrier islands like Galveston often begin as small
spits of sand. They are formed when the littoral drift – the sediment transport
pattern – and the prevailing or dominant drift of near-shore currents are not
aligned. This is due to the disruption that occurs when those two drifts intersect,
which causes sediment to settle out of the water column and begin accreting on
the seafloor. In Galveston, the prevailing drift created by the Trinity and San
Jacinto Rivers, which empty into Galveston Bay and create a sediment-rich
outflow that is perpendicular to the coast. This outflow is then disrupted by the
east-to-west littoral drift that is endemic to the region. When this process
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happens at a large enough scale and over a long period of time, a sand spit – or
glorified sandbar – begins to form. The effect is then compounded, as the spit of
land created by sediment being stripped from the water column and deposited
onto the seafloor attracts more sand, detritus, and other land-building materials
into its territory. As the spit grows in height and area, pioneer vegetative species
begin to colonize it, stabilizing portions of the landform and allowing dunes,
marshes, and other coastal habitat types to form. On Galveston Island, the eastto-west direction of littoral drift would have created a shearing effect, stripping
sand and sediment from the east end of the island and transporting it westward
down the coast – some of which would settle along the opposite the island’s west
end. The long, narrow profile of Galveston is a product of this process.
The gradual process of accumulation, dissolution, and migration that built
Galveston Island would have been accelerated at times by tropical storm activity
in the Gulf of Mexico. As storms traversed the Texas Coast, their surge and wind
energy would literally push, pull, and drag the barrier island. Storms moving over
the island would reshape dunes and depress its overall topographic profile.
Occasionally, these events would break the island apart, dividing it into a
complex of several smaller landforms and introducing another layer of complexity
to the regional geomorphology. Nineteenth century maps indicate that as many
as five distinct landforms – separated by channels scoured during one such
storm over-wash cycle – were considered part of Galveston Island.55 Storms

55

See image appendix.

42

creating a backwash effect would deposit organic material along the bayside of
the island, seeding the marshes and wetlands that later colonized it. Much of the
Texas coast formed in this manner. From Brownsville to Port Arthur, a barrier
island complex parallels the state’s coast, with sediment generally flowing
towards Corpus Christi from all directions.
Prior to European colonization, this megaregional landscape was of
dynamic, evolving, and low-lying barrier islands. They performed important
ecological services – buffering the mainland from wave energy and contributing
to robust estuarial fisheries like Galveston Bay. They also existed in a state of
flux. There was a coast to be sure, but the idea of a coastline had not yet
permeated the environment. On a daily time scale, the ebb and flow of the tides
ensured that the boundary between Galveston Island the Gulf of Mexico
remained fluid. Geologically, the physical space occupied by Galveston was
constantly shifting. The transformation of the region’s coast into a coastline would
come later, at the hands of European colonists and, eventually, engineers with
the U.S. Army.
Though encountered for the first time by sailors in 1528, Galveston’s
colonization began in 1817 under the direction of Jean Lafitte.56 A French pirate
who led smuggling and privateering operations along the Gulf Coast for much of
the early nineteenth century, Lafitte transformed Galveston from a non-descript
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sand spit into an icon connoted with tropes of paradise and wealth. With
permission from the Spanish colonists in New Orleans, he quickly established a
trading outpost on the island. As many as two-hundred craven, swashbuckling
privateers and pirates joined Lafitte there and their operation was wildly
successful. By 1818, Galveston had become one of the Gulf Coast’s principal
hubs for trade. This included agricultural and textile products, treasure captured
from wayward ships, and slaves being sold to colonists throughout the region.57
But Lafitte and his privateering comrades quickly ran afoul of the island’s
Karankawa tribe. They skirmished repeatedly – often at Lafitte’s instigation –
over the next year.58 One battle during the summer of 2018 ended with Lafitte
turning his ships corsairs on the tribe, an act that killed dozens of their members
and sent the rest fleeing from the island. The pirates’ savage peace would prove
fleeting. That fall, a hurricane ravaged Galveston. It leveled the island, destroying
all but six of the men’s homes and their entire shipping fleet.59 Though they
attempted to rebuild and reestablish their privateering operation in Galveston,
Lafitte and his men never fully recovered. Three years later, a U.S. Naval fleet
arrived at the island to expel the pirates. Lafitte and his men went quietly, though
he managed to abscond with much of their entire stockpile of treasure. The
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material wealth they accumulated on the island helped to form one of
Galveston’s first national advertising campaigns: the “Treasure Island” branding
strategy carried out during the postwar period by the island’s visitor bureau.60
Lafitte’s expulsion marked the beginning of Galveston’s ascension in the
economic hierarchy of Texas and the nation. The crude port developed by the
pirates soon became the state’s largest.61 The deep-water channels scoured into
the marine landscape by the outflow from the Trinity and San Jacinto Rivers –
and the well-protected estuary enclosed by the island – gave the region a natural
advantage over others along the Gulf Coast. By the start of the Civil War, the
Port of Galveston became the planet’s largest cotton-shipping depot and the
nation’s second-busiest immigration portal.62 In the antebellum period, what
would later become the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) initiated a
period of massive infrastructural investment in and around Galveston. Their work
ranged from small, bulkhead and groin development along the shore to massive
feats of engineering aimed at beating back and controlling the sea. Three of their
projects conspired to entirely and irrevocably reorganize the geomorphology of
Galveston: the North and South Jetties along the mouth of the Houston Ship
Channel, the great grade-raising and seawall construction, and the jetty field
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development along the seaside of the island. Their construction marked the
physical and metaphorical onset of the Anthropocene in Galveston. The changes
they wrought – and the landscapes they destroyed – would spark a century of
redevelopment aimed at conserving what remained and recovering what was
lost.
The North and South Jetties
In 1874, the USACE proposed building the North and South Jetties at the mouth
of the Houston Ship Channel. Their purpose was instrumental: to preserve and
enhance the navigability of the channel in order to bring reliability and
opportunities for growth to the burgeoning freight industry in Galveston.63
Protruding thirty-four thousand feet into the Gulf of Mexico, the North and South
Jetties were the largest such structures on the planet when completed in 1892.64
The jetties functioned by disrupting the coast’s littoral drift and diverting
sediment away from the channel and towards other areas of the Galveston
region. Sediment being pushed through the channel by the prevailing drift of the
Trinity and San Jacinto Rivers would be accelerated through the pass and
deposited farther out to sea. The same material that once moved and spread
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evenly along the island’s coast was also altered – creating areas of accretion and
erosion that were novel and unexpected.
They were envisioned by the Army as instruments of economic
development – a mechanism for limiting the frequency and intensity of dredging
operations in the Houston Ship Channel. Without them, the USACE feared that
frequent disruptions to the flow of freight ships in and out of the port would limit
the growth potential of the region and, potentially, drive some of that traffic to
other locations along the Gulf.65
By that measure, the North and South Jetties were a success. Dredging
operations moved from a quarterly endeavor to an annual exercise. This allowed
the Galveston region to industrialize and urbanize at a rapid pace as its ports and
industrial facilities expanded with the Houston Ship Channel. But the sediment
that those jetties displaced had to settle somewhere. It turned out that the East
End neighborhood of Galveston would be that somewhere.
Behind the South Jetty, sediment that was once distributed evenly along
the island began to accumulate in large volumes on what became East Beach.66
This began to alter the shape and stability of the region. The eastern third of
Galveston Island grew – rapidly in places – as the western third became sand-
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starved and began to shrink. This is because this part of the Texas coast is
continuously scoured by near shore effects like littoral drift and by the global
currents that help transport sediment across the planet. Once the jetties were
built and the steady supply of sand and gravel to western Galveston became
disrupted, there was nothing left to counteract that scouring. “Any project that
gets built in the catchment zone like that…which is probably two or three miles in
Galveston…there are winners and losers in terms of where the sediment goes.
The East End [neighborhood] won as a result of the jetties and the West End
[neighborhood] lost. Big time.”67
This effect might have proved minor if not for a subsequent series of
municipal development decisions that induced new housing developing in the
island’s West End. But for much of the twentieth century, Galveston’s city council
invested in infrastructure extensions that helped guide development into its
eroding extents and away from the stable and growing portions of the island.
Eager to establish a lucrative, vacation home presence on the island, the city’s
political class helped create a luxury enclave in Galveston – and they did so in an
area rendered highly vulnerable to flooding and storm surge by the North and
South Jetties.
The impact of the jetties may have also been less pronounced had
Galveston’s experimentation with coastal engineering ended with their
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construction. The problems it created were serious but manageable for the
region. But when they were compounded with a massive barrier system
developed during the early twentieth century, the jetties – and other works of
coastal engineering – ensured Galveston’s vulnerability.
The Seawall, Grade-Raising, and the Great Storm of 1900
On August 20, 1900, a massive hurricane swept across the region. The storm
ravaged the island and bay communities around Galveston, killing at least eightthousand residents en route to becoming the deadliest tropical storm in American
history.68 It razed the ramshackle houses and bungalows scattered across the
Galveston coast, and it severely damaged the port and industrial facilities
rimming the bay. Galveston’s economy was premised upon a proximity to the
water. Ports and industrial facilities could not operate without physical access to
the water, beaches could not attract vacation-goers without an oceanfront, and
residents working in the region’s industrial and tourism sectors could not live
outside of the surge zone. The 1900 Storm laid bare these vulnerabilities.69
Though other storms in other places occupy much of the literature and
nearly all of the public’s imagination on the topic, the sheer scale and scope of
Galveston’s destruction remains unmatched in the American experience.70 Much
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of the storm’s destructive capacity is derived from the era in which it struck.
Homes built before the storm were not designed to withstand hurricane force
winds nor twenty feet of surge. There were no early warning systems and no
official evacuation plans.71 Most importantly, there were no flood-gates or
barriers. All that lay between the homes of Galveston Island the surge were a
low-lying dune and a row of salt cedar trees. A century into the island’s
development, little had been done to adapt the coast to its growing population of
residents and businesses. Galveston remained a fluid component of the Texas
Barrier Island Complex – designed to be reshaped by the tides and to be overwashed and relocated by tropical storms. The natural defenses of the island were
not built to protect a community of fifty-thousand residents. In the aftermath of the
1900 storm, Galvestonians dedicated themselves to redesigning their coastal
defenses for that singular purpose.
Their work was hastened by the need to project stability and calm to the
industrial and touristic economic pillars driving the city’s growth. Prior to the
storm, port operators had begun to slowly drift northward, establishing new
facilities near what would become Texas City, League City, Kemah, and
Houston. Their purpose at the time was to support the freight operators’ primary
terminal in Galveston, but they also served as a hedge against over-crowding
and disruption at the hub.
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After the storm, those operators began to shift more of their volume
northward, abandoning the Galveston Port en masse to seek shelter in the more
protected ports of Galveston’s West Bay.72 City officials also had to contend with
public concern over the vulnerability of the region to future storms. In order to
quell a growing public fear about the viability of the island, Galveston’s civic
leaders framed the 1900 storm as an act of god – a brutal and rare event, rather
than the natural outcome of life on a barrier island in the Gulf of Mexico.73
To project a calmness and to frame the disaster as a one-off episode, city
officials did two things. First, the island’s public officials embarked on a
propaganda campaign aimed at projecting an image of rapid recovery and
resilience in Galveston. The local Chamber of Commerce and the island’s
Visitors Bureau produced pamphlets, newspaper advertisements, and other
marketing materials to this end. 74 This proved to be a relatively simple task.
Then, they lobbied the federal government for investments in new
protective infrastructure along the coast. The key components of their plan
involved building a seawall along the southern edge of Galveston Island and then

72

Anonymous. “Galveston one of pioneer manufacturing centers of state before 1900.” Galveston Daily
News, April 11, 1942.; Anonymous. “Natural advantages, man-made improvements make great port.”
Galveston Daily News, April 11, 1942.
73
T. Steinberg. 2006. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disasters in America. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
74
See image appendix.

51

raising all of the homes, infrastructure, and other structures behind it to a safer
elevation.75 This proved to be a more complex endeavor.
The process for raising the island required engineers to construct a
patchwork of dikes and canals. Engineers began by enclosing a quarter-mile
square section of land with temporary dikes. Next, they would dredge a canal
from that section to the primary depot for fill material along the east end of the
island – which was often up to two-and-a-half miles away. Then, the physical
infrastructure and buildings would be hydraulically lifted and remain suspended in
the air for months at a time. Finally, the fill material would flood into the diked-off
section of land. When it settled and dried out, new building foundations were
constructed on top of it.
The work was excruciatingly slow – this process would repeat until mid1911, when the last homes were lowered back to the newly-raised ground. In all,
more than sixteen million cubic yards of sand were piled atop Galveston.76 In
places, the dredge-and-fill operation doubled the island’s existing elevation,
leading some to exclaim that “a new Galveston had been constructed upon the
old one.”77

75

Grade-raising Commission. 1904. “Meeting Minutes.” The Galveston & Texas History Center at the
Rosenberg Library: Galveston.
76
Anonymous. “Rising the grade.” Galveston Daily News, May 27, 1903.; Anonymous. “The grade-raising
commission.” Galveston Daily News, May 16, 1903.
77
Editorial Board. “Mighty protective works built here as bulwark against threat of sea.” Galveston Daily
News, April 11, 1942.

52

As laborers raised the inland elevation of Galveston, those working along
the beach were constructing its primary defensive mechanism: a 17’ foot
concrete seawall. Where salt cedars and undulating dunes once stood, a stark,
imposing wall began to take shape. The initial section of the wall – completed
1911 – stretched from Stewart Beach to 14th Street, armoring the East End
neighborhood where most of the islanders resided.
The seawall’s first test came in 1915 when a category three hurricane
roared through the region. Though much of Galveston Bay experienced
significant damage from the storm, the island’s residents emerged relatively
unscathed. The seawall had worked as advertised and, in doing so, it began to
establish a cultish following. The Galveston Daily News, Texas Monthly
magazine, and a number of other local and state publications became filled with
stories, op-eds, and letters to the editor extolling the virtues of the wall – and
calling on Galveston’s civic leaders to extend it across the rest of the island.
Many of those who helped build the wall had also lived through the 1900 and
1915 storms – and they became quick converts to the religion of coastal grey
infrastructure.
As a result of the seawall’s performance, city officials called for a
westward extension of the wall to 45th Street. Construction began in 1916.78 By
1922, city officials managed to extend the wall even further, stretching the barrier
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all the way to 61st Street – which protected nearly all of the island’s permanent
residents at the time.
Plans were made to extend the seawall all the way to 103rd Street, where
it terminates today.79 Between 1925 and 165, five major hurricanes made landfall
in Galveston. A dozen minor storms struck too. None breached the seawall.
None flooded the neighborhoods directly behind it. Over time, the seawall
became a symbol on the island – a symbol of strength and progress, a symbol of
stability, and a symbol of conquest. Nature could not override the ingenuity of the
islanders. Nor could it thwart Galveston’s booming tourism and industrial
economies.
Soon, the island’s promotional materials began to feature the seawall –
framing it as both a protective mechanism and a spectacle to be experienced by
beach-goers along the Gulf.80 The seawall adorned brochures and postcards,
and it inspired new public works that were carried out in other locations across
the country by the USACE.81 By the start of the postwar period’s suburbanization,
Galveston had begun branding as “The Atlantic City of the South, “Treasure
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Island”, and “Nature’s Resort” – a tranquil, paradisiacal environment in harmony
with the sea.82
But quietly and without much public attention, the seawall began to
reshape the ecology and geomorphology of Galveston. The wide, low-lying
beaches that once characterized its coast were replaced by much narrower ones
along the east end of the seawall. They disappeared entirely from the western
end of the seawall. The wall created a scouring effect which, when combined
with the shift in sediment deposition introduced by the North and South Jetties,
slowly dissolved most of Galveston’s idyllic beachfront.
The only area to benefit – in terms of accruing new land area as a result of
the projects’ ecological disruption – was the East Beach public park near the
mouth of the ship channel. Remote and uninhabited, it grew wide and
established dunes as the rest of the island’s beaches disappeared.
This did not stop the city’s civic leaders from investing heavily in new
infrastructure and commercial development along the seawall. New hotels,
souvenir shops, restaurants, and tourist traps colonized the area – a welcome
sight at the time as Galveston sought to revitalize its tourism industry and shed
its reputation as a storm-ravaged, island outpost. The island simply could not
survive without such patronage – not at a time when its port facilities were
migrating northward and its role in the global shipping industry diminishing.
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Like many other tourism-driven cities, Galveston’s permanent residents
grew poorer as its industrial facilities relocated and were replaced by low-paying
retail and service-oriented businesses. In addition to this physical exposure to
flood risk that the seawall, grade-raising, and jetty projects produced, they also
contributed to the social vulnerability of islanders – a product of rising poverty
rates during Galveston’s deindustrialization period, but also of a spatial
reorganization that shuffled many of the its poorest residents into areas
unprotected by the seawall. In fact, many of those newly low-income
neighborhoods were actually harmed by the seawall – coastal engineers now
know that many of the flooding issues on the bayside of Galveston Island are a
result of the seawall deflecting wave energy away from the beachfront and
towards those homes.
The island’s wealthy vacation homeowners in the West End had a
different experience. Though their flood risk did increase, the homeowners there
were able to successfully lobby the city for a subsidy to help raise their homes
using pilings by as much as 18’.83 By the end of the 20th century, the West End
had become the center of political power in Galveston. As its property owners
association, West Galveston Island POA, is fond of saying, the neighborhood’s
property taxes makeup 40% of the municipal budget.84 The West End gets what
the West End wants.
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With the performative value of the seawall firmly entrenched in the minds
of Galveston’s residents, the city’s civic leaders began to look for ways to
counteract the slow dissolution of their beachfront. Rather than recognizing the
role that the jetties and seawall played in creating that problem, they decided to
double-down on their investment in coastal grey infrastructure. They decided to
build a jetty field across the length of Galveston Island.
The Jetty Field and Reverse Engineering the Coast
The Galveston jetty field – an array of sixteen groins and jetties, each around
1,500’ in length – was conceived during the 1960s by the USACE as an
instrument of shoreline stabilization. Though the Corp’s documents did not frame
it this way, the jetty field was developed to counteract the effects of the other
major coastal engineering projects in Galveston. They were built to restore the
beachfront the North and South Jetties and the seawall dissolved.85
There are parallels in the biological world to this approach – and the
unexpected consequences that often ensue. The mongoose – a carnivorous
mammal endemic to the Indian subcontinent – was often brought into Western
nations during the 19th century as a way to control local snake and rat
populations. Though it occasionally did this, the mongoose ate many other
species too. In Hawaii, the mongoose feasted on rare birds and lizards – pushing
dozens to the brink of extinction. The voracious mammal is often seen as a
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marker of globalization – an invasive species distributed throughout the world by
colonists which has, in the decades since, completely changed local
ecosystems.86
Though the effects of the jetty field were not this dramatic, they too
wrought unintended consequences on Galveston. The island’s shoreline erosion
slowed, but did not stop as a result of their construction.87 Because the Corps
could not build a jetty field across the entirety of the Texas coast, the project also
created downstream sediment depositions like the North and South Jetty. By
halting their construction at 61st street, the Corps ensured that the West End’s
erosion issues would not be addressed by this project – in fact, they were
exacerbated.88
But the ecological debt of these projects would go unnoticed – and unpaid
– for the rest of the 20th century. In building the North and South Jetties, the
seawall and grade-raising, and the jetty field, the USACE and Galveston’s civic
leaders reshaped and fortified the island’s coast in ways that projected a
performative value for grey infrastructure and a frivolity to its nature-based and
green infrastructural analogs. The seawall become a symbol of the island itself –
diminishing its importance or breaking from its precedence would be to diminish
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or break from what it meant to be a Galvestonian. The obdurateness of its legacy
on the island cannot be overlooked.
Fortifying the Norfolk Coast
Nearly two hundred miles southeast of the nation’s capital, Norfolk sprawls
across the alluvial plain endemic to coastal Virginia. Unlike the relatively linear
coast of Texas, Virginia’s coast is crenulated and complex, carved up by the
myriad rivers slicing through the landscape. Norfolk sits at the center of the
state’s Hampton Roads region – a constellation of small-to-medium coastal
communities strewn along the waterfront of its many inlets, bays, and sounds.
This includes the communities of Hampton and Newport News to the North,
Virginia Beach to the East, Chesapeake to the South, and Suffolk to the West.
Norfolk is also rimmed by water. Chesapeake Bay, the nation’s largest estuary
and home to a global marine fishery, lines the northern shore of Norfolk.89 The
James and Elizabeth Rivers help to define its western edge. Though it is lowlying and prone to flooding, Norfolk is relatively unexposed to the surge risk
facing Galveston and New York.90 This is due to the protected position of the city
– the Atlantic Ocean is buffered by Virginia Beach before reaching Norfolk. As a
result of that favorable position, Norfolk is home to the largest ship-building port
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in the world and the fourteenth-largest overall port by volume in the US.91 It is one
of the planet’s most important hubs for shipping – freight, military, or otherwise.
With nearly a quarter-million residents, Norfolk city is one of coastal
Virginia’s largest cities. Most of those residents work in one of the city’s two
major employment centers: the Port of Virginia and the Norfolk Naval Station.
Unlike Galveston – which saw its industrial and tourism sectors rise in equal
measure – or New York – whose FIRE industries quickly surpassed its
manufacturing base – Norfolk never grew another pillar in its local economy. Both
port facilities are clustered along the western edge of the city, where deep-water
channels scoured by the James and Elizabeth Rivers link to Chesapeake Bay.92
This is also the least-exposed area of Norfolk – it is both protected from open
water by the mainland and atop a small topographical protrusion. Beyond the
dense, militarized cluster of the ports, the rest of the city sprawls rather evenly
across a low-lying coastal plain. There, the average elevation is about seven feet
above sea level. Most of Norfolk’s residents work in the shipping and logistics
industry, or in the retail sector that services them.93 The combination of low-lying
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housing and high-levels of employment in low-wage jobs leaves Norfolk highly
vulnerable to sea level rise and climate change. Ameliorating that condition
would require not only a physical transformation of Norfolk’s landscape, it would
require a socio-economic transformation as well. But as in Galveston, the
shipping industry and naval operations require proximity to the sea. The social
and biophysical vulnerability of Norfolk is likely to persist as the conditions of the
Anthropocene worsen.
Norfolk’s evolution from a flood-prone, non-descript settlement along the
coastal plain of Virginia to a global center for ship-building, military operations,
and freight movement differs from the experience of Galveston. There were no
shock events like the Great Storm of 1900 to catalyze Norfolk’s planners and
engineers. Rather, the city – like many others along the Mid-Atlantic – grew up
around its port. As it expanded, so did Norfolk. Along with that growth in port
capacity came a halting, inexorable growth in coastal grey infrastructure.
Bulkheads and breakwaters pervaded the city’s landscape in lieu of seawalls and
levees, but the end result was the same: a city left highly exposed to sea level
rise and with few, if any, good options for adapting to a wetter future.
The Ecological and Cultural Context of Norfolk
Across a geologic time scale, coastal plains like the Hampton Roads region are
the product of three geomorphological events. The first requires receding sea
levels. Over the last two million years, oscillations in glacial mass have triggered
eustatic or global shifts in sea level. As glacial mass shrinks, sea levels rise. As
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glacial mass grows, sea levels shrink.94 During periods of glacial mass growth
and sea level recession, the Virginia coast extended into the Atlantic Ocean. This
helped to trigger the second geomorphological event that shaped Norfolk: shifts
in the channels of the James and Elizabeth Rivers. As the tail-waters of these
rivers were forced to migrate eastward towards Virginia’s new shoreline, their
flow rates would slow and their channels would fill with sediment. When that
deposition reached a critical threshold, the rivers would shift towards a path of
least resistance, carve new channels in the landscape, and begin depositing
sediment elsewhere. This process repeated for millennia, increasing the
complexity of the region’s coast while smoothing over its topographical profile.95
This set the stage for the third geomorphological event to take place: a gradual
rise in sea levels as global glacial mass began to shrink. As the Virginia coast
slowly submerged, the channels cut over prior eras of land-building became the
tail-waters for the James and Elizabeth Rivers and, as a result, the edge between
Norfolk and the sea. This resulted in a low-lying coastal plain with little
topographical variation. Put another way, this process of shifting sea levels and
oscillation rivers created a rather start, featureless plain rising ever so slightly out
of the sea. Though it shares characteristics with Galveston in terms of exposure,
it differs from the barrier island in an important way. The complexity of Virginia’s
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coast means that a large, linear system of protection is not possible there – at
least not without creating a massive dead zone akin to Holland’s.96 Such a plan is
a non-starter in the nation’s largest estuary and most robust fishery. But the
region’s landmass would be – and still is – slowly consumed by rising seas over
the last twenty-thousand years. Norfolk was created to be submerged.
The scouring effect of the James and Elizabeth Rivers also created a
network of deep channels in and around Norfolk. This created a tremendous
natural advantage for the city. Already buffered by the more exposed regions of
the Virginia coast, the deepwater channels connecting Norfolk to the Atlantic
Ocean made it an early and critical hub in the global trade network. British
colonial settlers discovered this ecological asset during an expedition in the early
seventeenth century. Led by Christopher Newport and Sir George Yeardly, the
colonists began establishing the port network in Hampton Roads as early as
1607.97 Like Laffite and his privateers in Galveston, Newport and Yeardly’s men
quickly clashed with members of the indigenous Chesapeake tribe. Unlike their
swashbuckling counterparts, the British colonists forced the tribe to sell their land
rather than aiming corsairs at them.98 Though this freed the colonists of conflict, it
did not initiate the sort of rapid growth in Norfolk that one might expect. The
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colony of Virginia’s bankruptcy in 1624 and the Revolutionary War suppressed
the port city’s potential for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. But
the region’s natural advantage would not be squandered under American control.
By the late-nineteenth century, the economic potential deep-water
channels and protected harbors of Norfolk and Hampton Roads were finally
being exploited. Innovations in shipping technology – including the advent of
steam-power – enabled merchants to use larger ships carrying heavier freight
loads across the globe. This required deeper channels and ports, rendering
many of the smaller, shallower, and more exposed locations along the east coast
obsolete as the shipping industry modernized. What had been a relatively small
and un-profitable hub during colonial rule was now growing into a major logistical
node. As the shipping industry revolutionized, the city’s port network
consolidated, with the larger, heavier ships shifting towards deep-water ports like
Norfolk.99 This, in turn, created a population expansion in Hampton Roads as
people poured into the region to work in the booming freight industry.100 This led
to a massive investment in grey infrastructure – to harden the port, to facilitate
inter-modal freight transfers through new rail lines and roadways, and to develop
the city’s landscape in order to house its new workforce. Slower than the
processes that reconfigured Galveston, the gradual spread of coastal grey
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infrastructure proved similarly transformative in Norfolk. The region’s soft,
featureless coast became a hardened, urbanized landscape. Norfolk was always
going to succumb to rising seas. Only now, that submersion would place
hundreds of thousands of people and trillions of dollars at risk.
The Port of Virginia and the US Navy
The economic potential of Norfolk’s port induced local, state, and federal
lawmakers to direct massive investments in grey coastal infrastructure to the
region. Later named the Port of Virginia, Norfolk’s deep-water harbor became the
foundation on which the Hampton Roads region would be built. Its depth and
well-protected position provided Norfolk with a natural advantage over most other
east coast cities.
But the ports of New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, and others along the
East Coast were similarly endowed. What set Norfolk apart – and allows it to
remain globally competitive to this day – was the migration of the nation’s capital
from Philadelphia to Washington, DC in 1790. The Hampton Roads Region – and
Norfolk’s port in particular – represented the lone waterborne passage to DC and
thus became a critical national security outpost during the 19th and 20th centuries.
Unlike Galveston, where commercial interests were the sole driver of urban
development, the growth of Norfolk centered on both its port’s economic values
and the region’s military significance.
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As the nation’s center of political gravity shifted to DC, civic leaders in
Norfolk capitalized on their strategic position investing in its first wave of major
port upgrades and expansion They built bulkheads, logistics and storage
facilities, and began developing one of the first multi-modal freight hubs in the
U.S. Though Norfolk’s coastal position came with a set of major economic
advantages, engineers working on the city’s port plans came to view its complex,
crenulated shore as a liability. Nearly all of their infrastructural proposals for the
port involved hardening and stabilizing the shore – removing the dynamism and
volatility that once characterized it so that, like Galveston, the region’s
commercial interests could grow uninterrupted.
Beyond the shoreline, Norfolk’s deep-water channels traversing the
Chesapeake were also dredged wider and deeper. Much of this was driven by
the revolution in steam ship-engine technology during the Industrial Revolution.101
It led to larger, heavier ships carrying higher volumes of goods – all of which
required upgrades in port facilities to accommodate. Most American ports grew in
response to the steam engine – few grew as quickly as Norfolk’s.
By the end of the 19th century, the city’s port was a key hub in the nation’s
global trade network. The growth of its port brought tens of thousands of blue
collar jobs to Norfolk which, in turn, instigated the slow, outward sprawl of low-
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density housing across the regional landscape. Until the start of World War II, the
growth of the port and the sprawl of the city happened slowly and through
relatively minor projects. Until then there were no major works of engineering to
spur Norfolk on. That all changed in 1914 as World War I erupted in Europe.
The city’s industrialized waterfront, high-volume and modern port facilities,
and proximity to both the nation’s capital and the European theater made it an
ideal location for Naval shipbuilding. Federal officials directed billions of dollars to
the city in the run-up to – and throughout – the Great War.102 Though Norfolk is
now synonymous with shipbuilding, the industry – like many other mass
manufacturing processes developed during World Wars I and II – essentially
grew from scratch and for the sole purpose of defeating the Central, and then
Axis, Powers.
Norfolk’s Naval operations grew slowly during the 1920s and 30s. But it
received another massive federal investment during the ramp up to World War II.
By the time the U.S. emerged victorious from the conflict, the city’s port had
become the global hub for shipbuilding. That strength – coupled with its close
proximity to D.C. – played a key role in the establishment of Norfolk’s Naval
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Station and its 1952 designation as the center for NATO’s Allied Command
Atlantic – a provision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s charter.103
The designation of Norfolk as a military outpost of international
significance marked the start of what would become a decades-long conflict
between the federal and naval planners, port operators, and the city’s public
officials. As the port and the city’s military significance grew, tens of thousands of
new residents moved to Norfolk during the postwar suburban boom. This placed
incredible pressure on the city, which had to keep land development regulations
relatively lax to compete for growth in the Hampton Roads region.
The resulting sprawl created a myriad of issues for Norfolk, but the most
vexing proved to be the strain it placed on the city’s stormwater management
system. With its shoreline hardened and its rivers channelized, those pipes
became the only vehicle for moving water through the city’s low-density
landscape and out to sea. Because Norfolk’s mean elevation is less than ten feet
and its average gradient or slope is around two percent, it became very difficult to
capture and convey all of the new runoff created by sprawl.
During the 1970s, the city commissioned Wallace, McHarg, Robers, and
Todd (WMRT) to develop a new comprehensive plan – and part of their charge
involved addressing the increasingly frequent flooding that came when the
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drainage system backed-up.104 Though little came of that plan, some of WMRT’s
maps proved particularly prescient. They identified areas that could expect to
experience a higher frequency of flooding in the future. Nearly all of those
neighborhoods flood regularly today. Some, including Ghent and The Hague, are
historic districts considered vital to the city’s architectural character.
But like the slow creep of sea level rise, the fortification of Norfolk’s coast
took place so slowly and subtly that, by the time the public noticed, it was too late
to reverse its effects. The legacy of Norfolk’s port and militarization is akin to that
of Galveston’s: the commercially driven tenets of stability and predictability
supplanted the ecological values of dynamism and evolution along the coast.
Though they followed different paths, the coasts of Norfolk and Galveston both
become coastlines during the 20th century. Each has been trying to figure out
how to live with that burden ever since.
Holland in New York
New York is a territory of confluence. It is where the Hudson and East Rivers
meet the brackish waters of Long Island Sound, Newark Bay, Jamaica Bay, and
the Atlantic Ocean. There, a massive, tidally driven estuarial system cuts through
the coastal landscape, encircling Manhattan, the outer boroughs, and the myriad
small islands characterizing the region. Unlike Norfolk – which has a mean city
elevation of seven feet – or Galveston – which is directly exposed to the Gulf of
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Mexico – New York is in a relatively protected position. Prior to colonization,
Manhattan and its surroundings were a vibrant, verdant landscape of oyster
beds, marshlands, and soft coastal edges. Though that ecology vanished more
than a century ago, city officials and designers continue to long for its restoration.
Buffered by Long Island, Staten Island, and the deep-water harbor behind
them, the city experiences neither the tidally driven flooding of Norfolk nor the
frequent tropical storm events of Galveston. Yet, New York remains at the center
of the climate change conversation in popular and design culture.105 Part of its
centrality to the discourse around climate change is a function of New York’s
primacy in other sectors: namely the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE)
industries that made it into a global financial capital.106 The wealth generated by
these sectors contributes to an exceptionally sophisticated planning culture in
New York, where the resource constraints that often undermine the profession in
other cities are far less restrictive.
It is also due, in part, to New York’s role as the cultural capital of the
nation. It has been – and remains – a hub for immigrants and young
professionals alike, each of whom continually refresh the city in ways not found in
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other post-industrial regions.107 More recently, the city’s experience with
Superstorm Sandy triggered a renewed focus on the coastal vulnerability of New
York.108
Since 2009, New York has been the focus of at least three sea level riserelated design competitions or exhibitions: On the Water, Rising Currents, and
Rebuild by Design.109 Though their products varied in mission and method, they
each sought to restore a nostalgic vision of New York to the present day. But
ecologically, the city no longer resembles the robust, verdant territory described
in Manhatta.110
It shares traits with Norfolk, Savannah, and other port cities that hardened
and grew as freight interests drove urbanization. The city’s wealth – spurred on
by an agglomeration economy drive by the FIRE industries – induced a cluster of
highly valuable development in southern Manhattan. There, Wall Street’s firms
form the economic center of New York.
But outside of Manhattan, the boroughs of Queens, Staten Island,
Brooklyn, and The Bronx remain have been largely overlooked. The Financial
District received the majority of the city’s 9/11 and Superstorm Sandy disaster
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appropriations. This is, at least in part, a result of Manhattan’s perception as
quintessential New York City and the outer boroughs’ perception as other, less
important places. As walls went up around lower Manhattan, dunes and wetlands
were conserved and restored in Queens and Brooklyn – a literal manifestation of
the nature-culture dialectic at the core of Western environmental thought. Like
Norfolk, New York City arrived at that point through a gradual – though far
greater – expansion of its port and development pattern.
The Ecological and Cultural Context of New York
New York is composed of Manhattan Island, Staten Island, Long Island, and
more than thirty other small islands – some occupied, some not – along the
shore. Its metropolitan footprint extends into New Jersey and Connecticut. Those
islands provide a buffering service to Manhattan, attenuating wave action and, in
the event of a coastal storm, suppressing surge risk for the region’s financial
center.
As in Galveston and Norfolk, New York is part of a dynamic marine
ecosystem. The Hudson and East Rivers carry sediment and runoffs from the
Adirondack Mountains into the estuarial harbor that surrounds the city. There, a
network of deep-water channels, inlets, and sounds are refreshed by one of the
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largest tidal prisms in the nation – the volume of fresh and saltwater exchanged
during high and low tide events.111
Unlike Galveston and Norfolk, New York sits upon a hardened bedrock of
Schist, Marble, and Gneiss formations. Without the magnitude of erosion found in
those cities, New York’s shore remains relatively stable, even across a geological
timescale. But they do share some geologic commonalities.
During periods of high glacial mass and sea level retreat, the Hudson and
East Rivers extended hundreds of miles east. Sediment accumulating in their tailwaters forced the rivers to shift course, carving a complex network of deep
channels in the process. As sea levels rebounded during the latest period of
glacial mass shrinkage, the New York coast – and Manhattan in particular –
became the beneficiary of that riverine scouring. In this, Norfolk and New York
City share similar geomorphologies.
But it was the combination of those marine assets with New York’s firm
bedrock that distinguished it from other locations along the Atlantic Coast. The
region’s relatively stable coast provided Dutch colonists with a tremendous
natural advantage – the ability to construct and intensify their port in ways that
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would never be possible on a sand spit like Galveston or loamy coastal plain like
Norfolk.
When Henry Hudson and his crew of Dutch and English sailors stumbled
upon Manhattan during voyage to China in 1609, they recognized the
tremendous advantage New York’s stability and assets could provide.112 The
robust marine ecology, deep and well-protected harbor, and, of all things, the
robust beaver population convinced Hudson to settle in and fortify the region.113
For much of the 17th century, the colonists organized Manhattan around
the fur trade. The mammals’ pelts were incredibly popular in Europe and
provided Hollands’ colonists with all the incentive they would need to settle
Manhattan.114 But the also trafficked in slavery, bringing African captives to the
island to build the homes and infrastructure necessary to house the settlers. The
colony also became an important node in Holland’s slave trade network and
physical conflicts between the slaves and their owners became a frequent
occurrence.115 Crude fortifications along the coast enabled Hudson’s men to trade
pelts with the French and English. Their small settlement – known as New
Amsterdam – remains preserved through sporadic quirks in the gridded
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streetscape of the Financial District, especially Beaver and Pearl Street.116
Hudson’s accidental discovery of Manhattan in 1609 marked the beginning of
New York’s rise to the pole position of global trade and commerce.
By the middle of the 17th century, New Amsterdam had become a critical
part of the Dutch West India Company – though it proved to be one of Holland’s
worst investments. The fur trade simply was not enough to sustain the high cost
of developing and fortifying Manhattan. This left it exposed to capture by the
British military, who were also in search of a trading outpost along the Northern
Atlantic to enrich their empire – a feat their army accomplished rather easily in
1664.117
Renamed for the Duke of York, the British colony of New York received
significant upgrades throughout the 18th century. Walls, bulkheads, and other
port and militaristic infrastructure fortified the city, leading New York to become
the continental headquarters for Britain’s military. In 1763, the military invoked
the Navigation Acts in New York regional tensions mounted between the British,
French, and colonists – a colonial decree forcing Manhattan to funnel all of its
trade through England and to invest all of its revenue from the port in a massive
new coastal defense system.. By the time the French-Indian War and the
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Revolutionary war conspired to wrest New York City from their empire and give it
to the Americans, the island was a literal fortress.118
New York’s hardened coastline made it an ideal location for the new
nation to invest in a port. Like Norfolk, the benefits of that investment would be
immediate and immense – New York became a global capital for trade and
wealth during the 19th and 20th centuries. But it came at a high, delayed cost in
the form of ecosystem denudation and the slow but total erasure of the region’s
natural floodplain functions.
The Port of New York and the Wild Outer Boroughs
As the nation’s military conflicts with Europe subsided over the course of the
nineteenth century, Manhattan’s port benefitted from the massive British and
American investments in coastal upgrades and fortification that military action
induced. The steam revolution in shipping created faster, heavier ships that
required deeper, better-protected ports. Few were as well positioned as New
York to capitalize on that revolution.
As in Norfolk, this triggered a slow, inexorable spread of grey
infrastructure along the coast and new urban development behind it. Both World
Wars also contributed to the growth of its port, though its exports included tanks
and arms rather than naval fleets. The incredible manufacturing and shipping
capacity that wartime created in New York’s ports helped to ensure its
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importance throughout the rest of 20th century. Indeed, the port of New York and
New Jersey remains the third-largest such facility by tonnage in the nation.119
The regional scope of the port grew as New York’s population spread into
the hinterland. But the walls, bulkheads, and revetments deployed around
Manhattan’s major economic assets were mostly absent in the outer boroughs.
There – in Queens and Brooklyn, on Staten Island and in The Bronx – the city’s
bedroom communities received little attention or investment from civic leaders.
But their marine ecology – including the fisheries and beachfronts upon which
many of those outer borough communities relied – suffered all the same. The
benefits of port expansion and urban development tended to accumulate in
Manhattan. The costs were borne elsewhere, in the outer boroughs.
This all left the majority of New York City highly exposed to storm events
like Sandy. Hurricanes Carole (1954), Agnes (1972), Bob (1991) and Irene
(2011) all dealt significant damage to the outer boroughs of New York – and left
Manhattan relatively unscathed. Unlike Galveston, no great seawalls or islandwide grade-raising projects followed on from those storms. A few portions of
Staten Island, Brooklyn, and Queens received small floodwalls, levees, and
bulkheads, but no major surge barrier plans were ever seriously considered in
New York City. As long as the damage and the risk was relegated to the outer
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boroughs, the city’s leaders felt no imperative to invest in coastal resilience
projects. Their only concern along the coast involved finding ways to preserve
and enhance the port’s capacity and to turn its waterfront into a site for luxury
condos and boutiques.
For much of the 20th century, New York’s greatest flood events came from
two different sources: winter N’oreasters and spring thunderstorms. The former
certainly involved the coast, with much of its damage coming as a result of wind
and tide-driven flooding issues. But the city never developed a design response
to the flood risk those storms posed. It would take a direct hit from Superstorm
Sandy to turn their focus towards the city’s coast.
Living with an Engineered Coast
This chapter lays bare the legacies – and burdens – borne by coastal
cities transformed over the last two centuries by investments in grey
infrastructure. From the experiences of Galveston, Norfolk, and New York,
three particular legacies stand out. The first is that, despite that multitude
of pathways or options available for developing the coast, in the U.S.
nearly all of them lead to approximately the same place: cities that are
poorly prepared for the challenges posed by sea level rise and climate
change. Galveston’s 20th century civic leaders built a massive seawall and
raised the grade of the entire island by nearly a dozen feet. Though better
positioned to deal with flood risk than some communities along the Gulf
Coast, it is still not well positioned to do so. Norfolk’s and New York’s
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founders made more modest and sustained investments in bulkheads,
levees, and other forms of coastal grey infrastructure, often to help fortify
and militarize their cities. Yet they too are ill-prepared for a future of rising
seas and more powerful storms.
As one of the marine scientists I interviewed over the course of my
fieldwork said at the opening of this chapter, these decisions – the walls,
bulkheads, and levees – are 100-year decisions. In Galveston, Norfolk,
and New York City – and indeed across much of the American coast –
those decisions radically transformed those territories, creating coastlines
where once there were only coasts. The next generation of infrastructural
investment in the coast will be similarly transformative. The only question
now is whether it will reinforce or dismantle the 20th century’s attempts at
stabilizing the coast.
The second legacy is that experience disaster and exposure to
flood risk are crucial elements in understanding how and why the leaders
of coastal cities plan and develop the ways that they do. As I posited in
chapter one of this dissertation, we should expect to see significant yet
varied investments in coastal resilience in cities according to their place in
the exposure-experience matrix.
A high-exposure, high-experience city like Galveston is precisely
the sort of place where we should expect to find massive investments in
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large, structural protections. New York City, which measured out as highexposure, moderate-experience, and Norfolk, which came in as highexposure, low-experience, are precisely the kinds of places where we
should expect to see less extensive investments in protective
infrastructure. This chapter discussed that phenomenon from an historical
perspective. Chapters three and four engage in it through political and
contemporary design lenses.
The final legacy of considerable durability discussed in this chapter
is a product of longing – or, more precisely, the long-held desire of local
leaders and coastal designers to restore and recover landscapes lost to
the urbanization and fortification of the 19th and 20th centuries. Memory
and nostalgia are powerful forces in American landscape planning. They
contribute to a system of planning and design in which a desire for the
verdant outweighs the need for the functional – one in which adorning the
coast with golden beaches, thriving oyster beds, and dynamic marshland
becomes the focus of designed resilience projects in lieu of a more
evidence-based approach to the designing the coast.
In the next chapter, I explore the ways in which those preferences
have become institutionalized in the USACE and why that creates such a
massive barrier to resilience for coastal cities.
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Image Library: Chapter 2

Figure 2: The Galveston Entrance to the Houston Ship Channel (1867). This map, drawn
by surveyors from the U.S. Army, shows the bathymetry and geography of Galveston
Island and its environs before the North and South Jetties were constructed. Note the
cigar-like shape of Galveston Island, the small land mass of Pelican Spit, and the
shortened western extent of Bolivar Peninsula – all of these would be considerably
altered by the jetties.
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Figure 3: A Study for the Improvement of Galveston Harbor by Douglas (1870). This
map, drawn by a local surveyor (last name Douglas) shows one of the first plans for
constructing jetties at the Galveston Entrance to the Houston Ship Channel. Because the
drawing conventions are unclear, it’s difficult to discern how closely this resembles the
final, constructed project.
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Figure 4: A Plan for the Improvement of Galveston Channel (1900). This map, drawn by
Captain Riche, U.S. Army Engineers, shows the completed South Jetty and indicates
where in the bay that significant dredge operations and wetland fill-and-draining work will
take place.

83

Figure 5: The Port of Galveston (1884). This map, published in the Galveston Daily
News on December 1, 1884, portrays Galveston’s port as the economic center of the
nation. Though this was never actually true, the city’s port was a major international hub
during the 19th century. Most of its facilities and operators migrated northward, towards
Houston, after the 1900 storm.
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Figure 6: The City of Galveston (1871). This rendering, produced by the Galveston
Visitor’s Bureau, shows the city’s landscape before civic leaders invested in the seawall
and grade-raising projects that reshaped the island. The foreground is the bayside and
the background the seaside – not the low topographic profile of the island indication of
wet or tidally influenced zones (blue/gray) throughout the area.
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Figure 7: The Galveston Storm (1900). This map, produced by Joseph Love on
commission from the Galveston Daily News, shows the extent of the damage caused by
the 1900 storm.
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Figure 8: Post Announcing the Preliminary Construction Plans for the Seawall (1902).
This document was posted throughout the island to solicit public input – and buy-in – for
investing in the seawall. It was produced by the Grade-raising Commission in partnership
with the U.S. Army Engineers.
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Figure 9: Storm Damage Photos via the Galveston & Texas History Center (1900).
These images are part of a special collection held at the Rosenberg Library in Galveston.
They show the totality of the damage and death wrought by the storm.
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Figure 10: Grade-raising Photos via the Galveston & Texas History Center (1904-1909).
These images are part of a special collection held at the Rosenberg Library in Galveston.
They show the totality of the process of re-engineering and raising Galveston Island.
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Figure 11: Seawall Construction Photos via the Galveston & Texas History Center
(1902-1910). These images are part of a special collection held at the Rosenberg Library
in Galveston. They show the totality of the process of re-engineering the coastline of
Galveston Island.
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Figure 12: Postcards of the Galveston Seawall via the Galveston & Texas History Center
(1915-1932). These images are part of a special collection held at the Rosenberg Library
in Galveston. They show the rise of the seawall as a cultural icon on the island. It
appeared on a myriad of promotional materials – including these postcards.
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Figure 13: Promotional Brochures and Stamps from the Galveston Visitor’s Bureau,
Chamber of Commerce, and Other Agencies via the Galveston & Texas History Center
(1936-1960). These images are part of a special collection held at the Rosenberg Library
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in Galveston. They show the projective framing of Galveston as a utopian resort town
along the Gulf.
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Figure 14: Promotional Brochures and Stamps from of Norfolk from the Norfolk Chamber
of Commerce (1951). These images are part of a special collection held at the Old
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Dominion University Library. They show the projective framing of Galveston as a utopian
resort town along the Gulf.

Figure 15: Coastal Survey of Norfolk (1958). This document was commissioned by the
City of Norfolk to identify areas in need of fortification along its historic neighborhoods
and civic core.
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Figure 16: The Port of Norfolk Expansion Study (1961). This is part of a report produced
by the Hampton Roads Economic Development Commission – a regional planning
organization that helped fund the planning of Norfolk’s Port Expansion.
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Figure 17: The Cover of the Norfolk Regional Development Plan Produced by WMRT
(1973). This is part of a set of reports and plans produced for Norfolk during the 1970s for
the City of Norfolk by McHarg’s former firm, WMRT.
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Figure 18: The Cover of the USACE’s Regional Infrastructure Promotional Manual for
the Hampton Roads Region (1977). The manual was used to promote the region and to
disseminate best practices amongst other districts of the Corps.
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Figure 19: A Promotional Mailer Produced by the Hampton Roads Chamber of
Commerce (1977).
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Figure 20: A Redraft of the Castello Plan for New Amsterdam (1660). This image shows
the ambition of the Dutch Colonists in Manhattan and indicates where and how the port
upgrading and fortifications along the island began.
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Figure 21: An Engraved Map of New York Harbor by Emanuel Bowen (1750). This
image provides a rough overview of the landmarks and verdant character of New York
and its environs during the period of British Colonial Rule. It is an image that persists in
the minds of New Yorkers today.
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Figure 22: A Military Survey of New York (1776). This image, commissioned by the
British military, aimed to callout strategic points of high ground and critical assets to fortify
and protect.
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Figure 23: A Survey of Manhattan (1854). This image shows the scale of Manhattan’s
urbanization and port expansion by the middle of the 19th century.
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Figure 24: A Pocket Map for Manhattan (1879). The red shading indicates new
infrastructural investments – some of which are transportation related and some of which
are along the waterfront.

Figure 25: An Aerial of New York (1911). This image, published by the New York Times,
shows the relatively compact footprint of the City during the early 20th Century. It also
shows the extent to which the port and waterfront development expansion had stretched.
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Figure 19: The Manufacturing Economy of New York (1922). This image shows the
footprint of the city’s then-booming manufacturing sector.
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CHAPTER 3 — Resilience Politics: How the Institutional Norms,
Inter-Governmental Tensions, and Provincialism of Coastal
Infrastructure Planning Undermines the Viability of Nature-Based
Strategies
This chapter traces and analyzes the forces delimiting the ability of the USACE to
promote resilience and nature-based strategies in coastal cities. It builds on
chapter two by examining how – and why – the legacy of 19th and 20th century
coastal engineering continues to impact the design of coastal cities. In it, I use
primary sources, key informant interviews, and public documents to interrogate a
question at the heart of this dissertation: how do political actors and civic
institutions view, support, and obstruct the construction of nature-based
strategies along the American coast? Drawing from the experiences of residents,
planners, scientists, policy-makers, and others in Galveston, Norfolk, and New
York, I posit that the resilience politics of coastal design are what shape the
physical features and social processes of those communities.
Like Vale’s design politics, the resilience politics of the American coast
can describe both the products of landscape design and the process of designing
the landscape. They are an expression of cultural and social values, an aesthetic
judgement about how to value coastal landscapes and the people who occupy
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them. These are inherently political acts – ones with which planners, designers,
and engineers routinely engage.120
If the design politics of public housing involves “the dual act of clearing
sites and displacing communities”121, then the resilience politics of coastal cities
requires the dual act of removing sites of apparent disorder and ornamentation
and replacing them with more serious, technological works of engineering. But it
moves beyond the aesthetics or poetics of risk reduction along the coast.
Resilience politics also imbues a set of value judgments about who gets to stay
and who must retreat, who is worthy of protection and who is not, and which risks
are acceptable parts of coastal life and which are not. Landscape planning and
design decisions are, inexorably, expressions of policy and politics along the
coast.
This means that the resilience of a community is as much a product of its
social and political landscape as its physical one. Along the coast, physical risk is
an endemic condition. Wetness and the specter of flooding are always present
there. But it is not risk borne through ignorance or hubris. Rather, the risks posed
by living along the American coast are borne of necessity – the necessity of
ports, of manufacturing and heavy industry, and of military operations to be
proximate to the sea. They are the primary drivers of local economic
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development along much of the East and Gulf Coast, and their existence is
inseparable from risk. In a sense, the natural condition of coastal cities like
Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City involves living in a perpetual state of high
risk. The resilience politics of each city are what govern whose risk is mitigated,
whose is increased, and how the instruments of design are deployed in the
service of each.
But it would be a mistake to view that process as a purely, or even mostly,
technical one. There are a limited number of methods for reducing coastal risk,
most of which fall into two categories. The first are often referred to as resistance
strategies. Whether in the form of grey infrastructural walls and barriers or green
infrastructural dunes and breakwaters, the design intent of resistance-based
resilience strategies is to draw a literal line around the areas to protect and those
that can be sacrificed. The criteria used for drawing those lines – property values
and commercial activity – are purely economic. They determine where
resistance-based forms of resilience infrastructure will be built and the level of
protection that they will provide.
The second set of methods are known as avoidance strategies. Whether
in the guise of managed retreats, rolling setbacks, or building code upgrades, the
design intent is generally to completely remove structures and people from floodrisk.122 The criteria used for this approach are also economic in nature – land
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values and other property-driven cost estimates are used to determine which
areas should be depopulated and which should not. It is often prohibitively
expensive – and politically toxic – to embark on an avoidance strategy. Buying
out homeowners can add up quickly for small communities. So too can the
political cost of displacing entire neighborhoods. But that does not always deter
public officials from pursuing it. In fact, buyouts became a key component of
resilience politics in Galveston during the post-Ike disaster recovery process,
which I discuss at great length later in this chapter.
Most communities pursue a resistance-only approach to coastal
resilience. The example of New Orleans is instructive in this regard. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a variety of approaches were put forth for the city
to consider. Some, like the infamous Green Dot Plan, proposed a managed
retreat from the city’s lowest-lying and most-impoverished neighborhoods.
Others, like the Louisiana Recovery Authority’s coastal wetland restoration plan,
proposed massive investments in green infrastructure around the city. Ultimately,
the city’s civic leaders opted to invest in the nation’s largest and most expensive
surge barrier system – a sprawling, towering system of walls, pumping stations,
flood gates, and other fortifications.123 Less than a year after the system’s
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construction, local officials began sounding a public alarm about their inability to
fund its maintenance.124
Given all of the options available to New Orleans after Katrina, why did its
leaders elect to build such an expensive and difficult to maintain system of flood
protection? The answer is, at least in part, because the resilience politics of
coastal design tend to reinforce and reproduce pre-existing vulnerabilities.
Resilience thinking requires an approach to design that eschews the
conventional problem-solving approach that most American institutions are
designed to pursue. Instead, it requires planners and designers to think
incrementally – over time and space – about how to manage and reduce risk
through projects that are phased in over time, hybridized with grey and green
infrastructure, and adaptable to unforeseen shifts in coastal ecology.125 The
challenge in the U.S. is that the principal agency tasked with designing, planning,
and managing the coastal zone – the USACE – is incongruous with resiliencethinking.
That is because, as an institution, the USACE is primarily equipped to
build one type of project in and around cities: vertical works of grey infrastructure.
Though it has a stated interest in building alternative, nature-based strategies
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along the coast, the Corps’ norms and internal policy framework largely preclude
it from pursuing their construction.
The resilience politics of coastal planning are channeled through the
USACE in three important ways. One is that the Corps evaluates and selects
projects using a narrowly tailored cost-benefit method. Property values,
commercial activity, and public infrastructure are the primary considerations
within their system. This creates a framework in which areas of property and
commercial value become sites of intervention and areas of lower value are
ignored. The result is that the Corps’ projects tend to protect those with the most
resources and leave poorer, more vulnerable communities to fend for
themselves.126
A second delimiting factor is that the USACE treats ecosystem services as
an ancillary consideration in its evaluative process. More precisely, the Corps
does not consider the various services and benefits that nature-based strategies
can provide. Rather, its primary measure of environmental impact comes by
estimating the number of habitat units created or destroyed by a project – a
metric used by wildlife ecologists to determine the suitability of certain
landscapes in specific areas (e.g. wetlands and seagrass beds). But even then,
the Corps does not make a one-to-one comparison between the impacts on
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property values and commercial activity with those on the environment. The
USACE’s environmental impacts are generally delivered qualitatively and are
treated as secondary to the impacts on local economies.127 The result of being
unable to properly assess the ecological impacts of their work means that the
USACE’s project evaluation method is skewed towards grey infrastructure.
A third sources of constraint for the Corps is that they, as an institution,
possess very little agency or self-determination. The USACE is, by definition, a
political body. It is governed by the U.S. Congress and its funding is subject to
the same appropriation process that stifles many other federal agencies. Through
the course of my interviews with civilian staff and engineers in the Corps, it
became clear to me that they recognized the importance of reforming the way
they evaluate projects. But it also became clear that they were unable to do so,
either because it might require Congressional action to do so, or because there
may be political retribution for the agency if it instituted internal reforms that
proved unpopular in either legislative chamber.
It is important to note that there are few technological limits to the height,
scale, or scope of the projects that the Corps builds along the coast. Most
seawalls, surge barriers, and levees could be built to a height and at such length
so as to suppress the probability of flood damage to nearly zero in most coastal
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cities. In The Netherlands, these goals are often achieved because it uses a riskstandard approach to project evaluation, rather than a cost-benefit method.
Within their system, risk reduction is the primary concern while capital costs are
considered ancillary.128 This creates a uniformity of protection along the Dutch
coast that does not exist in the U.S. Gotham and Greenberg were correct in
asserting that there is an “uneven landscape of risk and resilience” within
American cities. Yet, there is also a high degree of variability from one city
another – not just within the individual neighborhoods of a particular city. Just as
some neighborhoods are considered worthy of protection over others, the
resilience politics of the coast also dictate that the perception of worthiness and
unworthiness extends to entire cities.
The USACE’s institutional limits are exacerbated by the decentralized
system of governance that characterizes American Federalism. Though the
USACE plans and builds coastal infrastructure, local communities are often
tasked with managing it. The Corps only funds capital construction – not
maintenance and operations. This creates serious challenges, as few, if any,
municipalities have the financial resources necessary to do so. Worse, most of
these systems traverse multiple jurisdictions, leaving the broader system
vulnerable to failure if and when only one municipality fails to maintain their
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portion.129 This is precisely what happened in New Orleans during Katrina – the
city proved unable, or unwilling, to maintain the Corps-built levee system. When
a stretch of the network breached, it led to a cascade of failures throughout the
region’s entire flood-control system.130
The resulting system of American flood-protection is thus, predictably, one
of extreme fragility. The USACE builds protective infrastructure that provides total
protection up to the point at which its marginal economic benefits decline. For
instance, the height of a community’s floodwall might be twelve feet instead of
thirteen simply because that’s the height at which the benefits of protection
began to decline – and not because it provides some standard or ideal level of
protection.
Once that threshold of protection is breached, the Corps’ system no longer
provides any protection – and it can even exacerbate the underlying flood risks
facing the area. It does this by inducing new development behind the Corps’
structures by flooding the real estate market with cheap marshland that was once
undevelopable. Because the Corp uses a fail-safe approach to coastal risk
reduction, some form of catastrophic, system failure is inevitable. By placing new
people and structures behind these failure-prone systems, the probability of a
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breach does not change – but its consequences do.131 Understanding how and
why resilience politics shape this system is key to devising an approach that can
reimagine the USACE’s role operations in coastal cities.
The rest of this chapter examines the ways in which resilience politics
shape the Corps, the way the Corps shapes the American coast, and the way
those forces affect the viability of nature-based strategies in coastal cities. In
Galveston, those forces are manifest in the anti-science, anti-government
sentiment of public officials throughout the region. Their antagonism towards
climate science and the Obama Administration left Galveston bereft of the
resources and attention it needed to rebuild after Hurricane Ike. In Norfolk and
New York, those forces are more coded, but they – and their underlying
problems – remain.
Institutionalizing Risk, Undermining Resilience
This section traces and analyzes the forces delimiting the ability of the USACE to
promote resilience and nature-based strategies in coastal cities. As the
introduction to this chapter noted, the USACE lacks the internal agency
necessary to respond to the growing body of knowledge regarding ecosystem
services, the ability of nature-based strategies to provide them, and their role in
the broader notion of resilience. This section explores those limits through the
experiences of residents and planners in Galveston, Norfolk, and New York.
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The USACE is a singular, near-omnipotent force along the American
coast. No project that deals with flood risk, navigation, or storm defense can
proceed without input from – and approval by – the Corps. Historically, their
operations centered delivering “vital public and military engineering services” by
way of designing and constructing military fortifications. That changed throughout
the early 19th century, as Congressional legislation – including the General
Survey Act of 1824 – shifted the USACE’s mission away from militaristic
operations and towards the planning and design of public works projects. By the
start of the 20th century, the Corps began to focus on two types of projects along
the coast: the channelization of rivers and hardening of coasts, and the dredging
of shipping lanes, ports, and harbors.132 Their purpose became centered on
providing stability and predictability to the large commercial waterways and ports
of the American coast. Put another way, the 20th century saw the Corps focus its
efforts on controlling nature.
As a result of the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), the commercial mission of the Corps eventually grew to include
ecological stewardship. Its influence on the environment expanded again through
the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA), which gave the Corps broad new authorities
over the regulation of wetlands, coastal zones, and water supplies.133 But that
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expansion in power did not always lead to better stewardship practices by the
Corps. The USACE’s commercial origins often proved difficult to shed.
Indeed, many of the Corps signature environmental projects along the
coast – ones enabled by the NEPA and CWA – remain economic in nature. The
most obvious example of that commercial durability within the Corps can be
found in its dredge and beach nourishment operations. The USACE dredges an
incredible volume of sediment from the nation’s waterways and ports each year –
more than 200 million cubic yards per annum.134 The spoils of all that dredging
are often repurposed and used as fill or foundational material in many of the
Corps’ restoration projects.
When deciding if and where to use that dredged sediment along the coast,
however, the USACE uses an economic calculation known as incremental cost:
they will use the material along the coast, to replenish beaches or to build dunes
and wetlands, only if the cost of doing so is less than the cost of dumping it out at
sea.135 If the cost of restoration work is higher, the Corps requires a local partner
to pay the incremental cost difference. What this means, ultimately, is that, until
very recently, the Corps has been dredging massive volumes of sediment from
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the nation’s waterways and dumping it in the middle of the ocean – all while the
beachfronts and edge conditions of coastal cities erode and deteriorate.
The Corps’ 404 wetland permitting program follows a similar logic. In it,
the USACE relies on a form of internal credits to decide if and when wetlands
and marshlands can be filled or should be conserved. As a planner in Galveston
remarked, “the 404 permits allow the Corps to tell everyone else what counts as
a wetland and what doesn’t – they decide which ones stay and which ones go.”136
Though the Corps often tries to ensure that the wetlands it allows to be filled are
replaced by new, constructed ones nearby, which is not always possible. In a
sense, the 404 permitting program treats environmental restoration as a zerosum proposition. Only what is lost can be replaced – a sentiment that is both
antithetical to the idea of stewardship and entangled in a misplaced sense of
saving or conserving nature.
Though the Corps possesses an incredible transformative potential, its
vast power is rarely used to bolster ecosystems. Indeed, their power is often
wielded in the service of ecological denudation. This is, in part, a result of the
USACE’s focus on technological solutions to the issues of navigability and flood
risk reduction. Walls, levees, and other defensive structures provide real,
tangible, and easily calculable economic benefits. But they also disrupt and
damage ecological processes in ways that are difficult to see and measure.
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Isolating the effect of a flood-wall on a Bay’s ecological health is far more
complex than simply adding up the value of the property and economic activity
that sits behind the structure.
The Limits of a Cost-Benefit approach to Coastal Resilience in Galveston,
Norfolk, and New York
The Corps wastes a lot of money. They have to look at every
alternative. All the crap they have to do is nonsense…It costs a lot
more money that in should.137
One of the greatest barriers to building resilience in coastal cities is the use of a
contrived, cost-benefit method by the USACE. Cost-benefit analyses are not a
problem in and of themselves. In fact, one might expect a public agency like the
Corps to use it or other methods to ensure that public funds are used judiciously.
But the resilience politics of coastal design ensure that only a select set of costs
and benefits are included in their analysis. The issue in this case is that the
inputs to the USACE’s cost-benefit analyses – the things they have chosen to
measure – are driven entirely by its commercial mission. Property value,
commercial activity, and industrial and infrastructural assets are the only benefits
quantified by the Corps. Environmental features – measured through the creation
or destruction of habitat units, an opaque environmental metric – are considered
qualitatively and are often framed as ancillary to the decision-making process
within the USACE.138 Ecosystem services, or the ability of natural features and
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systems to provide tangible benefits to human health and economic growth, are
not a core element of their analyses.139
This places nature-based strategies at a significant disadvantage in
coastal cities. Their ability to provide ecosystem services – whether by improving
water quality, providing new recreational benefits, or developing new wildlife
habitat in addition to reducing flood risk – is simply not considered in the Corps’
method. The result is that the USACE is perpetually biased towards the
construction of conventional, grey infrastructure projects. They are easier to
model and measure than their green, nature-based counterparts. Most
importantly, grey infrastructure often requires less land area to develop. A wall
providing flood-protection for a 100-year storm event has a relatively narrow
foundational footprint. A dune or breakwater system providing commensurate
protection generally requires much more land area. This is because naturebased strategies tend to rely friction, rather than resistance, to suppress surge
and flood risks – and the physics behind that approach simply requires more land
area to absorb all of that wave energy.
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In cities, where the performative stakes of flood protection are highest, the
Corps’ bias towards these vertical interventions reinforces the nature-culture
dialectic. It does so by treating nature as frivolity – an intervention best left to the
hinterlands, where fewer people live and work. Technological projects like the
newly built surge defense network around New Orleans are the only approach
that can pass muster with the Corps. This means that the USACE will tend
towards the construction of monolithic grey infrastructure in and around cities
while relegating nature-based strategies to their exurbs. This is because outside
of cities, there is more room to build nature-based strategies and the economic
stakes are often much lower.
As a result, the USACE’s cost-benefit method of project evaluation tends
to undermine resilience more than it enhances it. It does this by privileging and
thus creating a near-ubiquity of vertical centralized systems of grey infrastructure
along the American coast. One of the marine scientists that I interviewed over the
course of my fieldwork has extensive experience with coastal planning through
the Corps. When asked about the prospects for building nature-based strategies
along the Galveston coast, they remarked that “[The USACE] is never going to
spend federal money for surge protection unless it’s for a wall. They also aren’t
going to just protect rooftops – if the barrier doesn’t help the refineries in the Bay
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or if they build their own, that will kill the project here. They’ve told the folks in
Galveston as much.”140
The Corps’ bias towards these systems is instrumental. To calculate the
benefits of a given project, the USACE relies on three models: the Advanced
Circulation (ADCIRC), Sea, Lake, Overland, and Surges from Hurricane
(SLOSH), and Coastal Storm (CSTORM) simulation models. Each provides the
Corps with a way to estimate property damage and economic loss as a result of
storm events. Each also allows the Corps to run millions of scenarios in which
the size and intensity of the storm, its surge, its wind, and its movement vary.
This creates a probabilistic distribution of impacts – a series of odds that tell the
Corps what the expected economic impact of a storm will be and how the various
projects it is considering reduces them. The projects are then ranked according
to which generates the highest marginal benefit, not which provides the most
overall protection.
This means that the key performative feature of projects favored by the
Corps is an ability to deflect storm surge as cheaply as possible. In cities, simply
reducing wave energy is not enough. There, some nature-based strategies can
be competitive. Dunes, where there is ample land to construct or restore them,
can absorb and mitigate surge energy. But most others – marshes, beaches, and
near-shore reefs – simply provide a frictional surface against which wave energy
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is attenuated. Inundation often still occurs, but without the force of an unfettered
storm surge. These kinds of strategies do not fare well in the USACE’s analysis. I
spent nearly twenty hours in conversation with employees on the civilian side of
the USACE. When discussing the Corps’ cost-benefit analysis methods with a
group of its own district managers, one remarked that “[The Corps does] the
incremental analysis on how the protection should be and whichever has the best
cost-benefit ratio is the one we’ll build. Then we can say how much protection it
provides – we can’t start with a level of protection and go from there. It’s hard to
justify most of those [nature-based] strategies that way – they just don’t perform
the way structures do in our models.”141
The USACE’s cost-benefit method of project delivery also undermines
resilience by attempting to balance economic and security concerns. A planner
who worked on post-disaster recovery planning in Galveston noted that “Even
though [FEMA] is in Homeland Security – and has to deal with the consequences
of inadequate storm protection – and, at least in Galveston, we’re talking about
protecting billions of dollars in military fuel processing capacity, flood risk
management is treated as an ancillary concern…You could never get away with
that in the other areas overseen by Homeland Security and FEMA…like counter-
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terrorism.”142 Put another way, the security of coastal cities is not always a priority
of the Corps.
In some countries, their USACE-equivalent agencies use a risk standard
approach in lieu of a cost-benefit approach to floodplain management. Under that
system, the governing agency sets a minimum standard of protection – in
Holland this standard is a ten-thousand year storm event – and all of the projects
under its purview are required to meet or exceed. Of course, the vulnerability of
The Netherlands differs greatly from that of the U.S. – there are no major inland
cities in Holland. A Katrina-like event in Amsterdam or Rotterdam would cripple
its national economy in ways that are impossible in the U.S. This partly explains
why the degree of protection required in The Netherlands is so high, and why the
Corps has no such standard for coastal cities in the U.S. While discussing this
disparity with a team of engineers from the Corps, one remarked that “Ultimately,
the engineers can tell you the parameters [of the wall], but it’s a political decision
as to how much protection you want. We could tell you the sweet spot where it’s
most cost-effective, but that’s all…That’s what determines the height of a wall for
the Corps.”143
For the regions of Galveston, Norfolk, and New York, the lack of a riskstandard approach to flood risk reduction leads to a number of issues. The most
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serious one is that broader system of protective infrastructure is uneven,
affording certain places more protection than others. Almost invariably, the bestprotected neighborhoods are also the most affluent.144 This creates an uneven
landscape or risk and resilience in cities that can be found in the divides between
the Bay side and West End in Galveston, the Ghent and Chesterfield Heights in
Norfolk, and the Financial District and Far Rockaway in New York.
Another issue presented by the Corps’ cost-benefit-driven operation is
that, in addition to building infrastructural systems that may already be
incongruous with the risk, the cost of management are precluded from its
calculations. One of the central challenges to grey infrastructure-driven risk
reduction is that it is extraordinarily expensive to maintain – especially in the
loamy soils that often characterize the low-lying landscapes they traverse. Yet,
the Corps does not include those costs in its calculations because it is not
responsible for them. The cost of management falls on local government and,
unsurprisingly, most lack the resources to carry it out effectively. The result is
that levees and walls sink – sometimes rapidly, always inexorably – as their
footings settle. Thus, the uneven landscape of risk and resilience created by the
Corps provides less protection over time. In most cities, the lack of any real
monitoring or management strategy means that no one is sure what level of
protection is actually being provided. A group of engineers from the USACE
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noted that “All we have are the design specifications – which are often amended
as the projects are built – to tell us what standard of protection [the levees] are
providing. Most of those projects are a decade old or more and we just don’t
know…how much the walls of slumped or settled…but we do know that, if the
drawings say you have one-hundred year storm-level protection, it’s probably
significantly less than that.”145
This is not to say that grey infrastructure has no place in coastal cities.
Indeed, it has vital role to play in promoting urban resilience. But the notions of
resilience drawn from ecological science argue that no single system – grey,
green, or otherwise – should have near-ubiquity in the landscape. Rather, coastal
resilience emerges when there are blended approaches to protection,
restoration, and design. At their best, these interventions provide redundancy,
modularity, and multi-functionality within a region’s flood-control system.146 These
characteristics are endemic to nature-based resilience strategies and they feed
into the broader idea that infrastructure should help create cities that are safe-tofail.
The Preclusion of Nature-Based Strategies from Cities
Well I’ll tell you what is really frustrating: the emphasis on structural
flood hazard mitigation that some people would like to see is
distracting from the non-structural options which, at least [in
Galveston], are most cost-effective and easier to
implement…People holding out for this grand scheme of the Ike
145
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Dike or whatever you want to call it just diverts people’s attention
and effort away from doing what we can right now to mitigate our
risk.147
The resilience politics of coastal design often preclude the USACE from given full
consideration to nature-based strategies. Even hybridized, grey-green
infrastructures struggle to find approval within the Corps. New York’s largest
post-Sandy project – the BIG U or Dryline around lower Manhattan – proposes
braiding public space, flood walls, and ecosystem services into a massive barrier
system. But the USACE is designed to strip away the recreational and ecological
components of projects like it. “It seems unlikely that anything resembling [the
BIG U] will be built. Sure, there will be a wall and probably some kind of earthen
levee or berm, but not much else. The Corps wants to build big, dumb walls –
and that’s what New York is going to get.”148
A similar stripping process is being contemplated in Galveston. There, the
primary design response to Hurricane Ike came in the form of the Ike Dike – a
massive, island-wide coastal spine blending sea walls, fortified dunes, and
parkland aimed at absorbing surge energy. “If you want to protect this region, a
coastal spine is the only solution. Every analysis will converge on that. But I just
can’t imagine the Corps approving any of this…nature-based stuff. It will get costengineered off the Ike Dike by the time it’s built.”149
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Norfolk has already moved past this phase. Though its district office for
the Corps is actively pursuing nature-based projects along the coast, most are
being treated as ornamentation, not protection. “Unless you can afford to build a
monster dune, nature-based strategies are not going to work here. We’re doing
some reefs, but those don’t address storm surge. Tidal erosion, maybe, but if you
get a surge of two feet or more they won’t attenuate any wave energy. We’ll have
to build walls in areas where there are serious assets to protect.”150 There, as in
New York and Galveston, nature-based strategies are viewed as ancillary
components of the coastal landscape – interventions to be introduced when the
stakes are low and where the desire for ornamentation outweighs the need for
protection. As long as the ecosystem services they provide are precluded from
the USACE’s cost-benefit calculations, grey infrastructure will predominate.
The resilience politics of coastal design – and their impact on the viability
of nature-based strategies – are also reflected in the ways that the USACE’s
storm surge models measure success. In each of the SLOSH and ADCIRC
simulation tools used to estimate property damage by the USACE, success is
measured by the presence or absence of water – whether a property or element
of infrastructure was inundated, or not, and to what depth. Borne of the
resistance-oriented approach to resilience so prevalent in engineering, this
approach elides past a crucial variable: wave energy. Though inundation causes
property damage which often requires substantial work to remediate, it is the
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energy from a storm surge that knocks buildings off their foundations, breaks
them apart, and demolishes infrastructure. Building a fortification aimed at
resisting that energy is one way to ensure that wave energy is attenuated – but
not the only one.151 Some nature-based strategies can provide similar services.
But because they work by slowing water down and allowing a very small volume
of low-energy water into the areas they protect, they do not perform as well in the
models used by the Corps – models which typically use wetness and dryness as
proxies for damage and non-damage.
This all contributes to a system of project development within the USACE
that privileges grey infrastructure over green, structural protections over
landscape-based ones. Not only does this fail to remove the risk of catastrophic
failure and flooding in those cities, but it also contributes to the widespread
denudation of ecosystems and their services in coastal zones. Resilience politics
dictate what areas receive protection – and whether it comes in the form of grey
infrastructural walls or green infrastructural landscapes. Either way, the result is
often the same: large, one-off works of grey infrastructure are typically built
around areas with high property and commercial value while others languish with
little or no investment from the USACE. The Corps largely recognizes this failure.
I spoke to a former engineer at the Corps and local public official in Norfolk, who
noted that “We have to frame [all of our coastal work] as part of a national
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economic benefit…and a lot of that is driven by our navigation mission. In the
end, what we build will come down to that. I don’t know if natural or nature-based
strategies can be a part of that in cities. I would love to…but we just aren’t
equipped to build them.”152
The Lack of Agency in the USACE
My assessment is that we might have a lot of things that are
authorized and not built until an event happens – then coffers open
up and we can build projects. That’s what happened with Sandy…I
hope and pray that we don’t have a Sandy event here in my lifetime
– if we’re able to formulate some things and get them authorized
then I would hope and pray that we can actually implement them
before one of those happens, but the reality is that it will take an
event like that to get us the money we need to build it. Then
localities have little or no cost-share – that’s the big hang-up. You
have a $500 million program and a local sponsor is on the hook for
35% of it – that’s not chump change for a small or medium city –
that’s not even chump change for some states.153
Though it would be easy to fault the USACE for these shortcomings, laying the
burden at their feet would be a mistake. Indeed, most of the program officers and
civilian staff with whom I met over the course of this research openly
acknowledged that their mode of operations appeared to be at odds with the
reality of rising seas along the coast. The issue at the center of the Corps’
inability to promote resilience is that it is an institution with little real agency – its
operations are subject to the whims of Congress. Despite widespread recognition
within the career staff of the Corps that its method of cost-benefit analysis was
broken, that its bias towards grey infrastructure creates serious problems, and
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that its approach to risk reduction often exacerbates the very issues it is
attempting to solve, the USACE is incapable of feeding that knowledge into a
process of internal, institutional reform. That is because the conventional process
institutions follow for developing cultural and behavioral norms is largely
irrelevant to the Corps – its culture does not evolve in the same way that the
culture of more autonomous institutions can.154 An engineering consultant with
significant experience working with the USACE described this by saying that “It’s
not the Corps’ fault. It’s the legislature’s fault – they’ve tied the Corps’ hands
because they don’t understand anything about coastal engineering.”155
This is best exemplified in the recent “three-by-three-by-three” reforms
carried out by the Corps since 2009. Under this new regime, the Corps is
required to complete all of its individual projects and studies within three years, at
a cost of three million dollars or less, and, depending on their format, come in file
sizes of three megabytes of less or bindings of three inches or less.156 Prior to
2006, Congressional appropriations were subject to the process of earmarking –
or the designation of specific, and often non-germane, capital and programmatic
projects in all spending authorizations. They were often used to incent members
of Congress in moderate districts or states to break with their political party and
convey an imprimatur of bipartisanship. Under this system, the USACE became
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one of the primary vehicles for channeling earmarks to the elected officials willing
to cross party lines in exchange for earmarks. Their dissolution after the 109th
Congress is often blamed, at least in part, for the rise of hyper-partisanship in
both chambers.157
The effect of this new mandate upon the Corps has been to both slow the
pace with which it operates and to diminish its ability to take on large, complex
projects. This runs counter to the intent of the three-by-three-by-three mandate,
which sought to expedite their work and free up the resources necessary to scale
up the ambition of their work. Each of the “threes” helps to explain why. By
limiting the expenditure on individual projects overseen by the Corps to three
million dollars, Congress essentially severed their ability to plan at a scale large
enough to meet the challenges of sea level rise. “The baseline expenditure for
any project that comes [to the Corps] is about $1.5 million – that’s the minimum
we can spend for staff time. Most are well over that, so to limit costs on
projects…we now have to break them up into smaller parts that can fit this
mandate. That eats up more time…and slows us down considerably.”158 By
limiting the timeline of their work to three years, Congress also forced the Corps
to take on far less ambitious projects. “After Ike, we all got together…and
decided that the best way to think about strategic, structural protection [in our
region] would be to study the whole coast – Brownsville to the Louisiana
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border…But we had to apply for a waiver to do it…because there’s no way to
handle a project like that in only three years.”159 The constraints of the three-bythree-by-three mandate are such that the vital, complex work of resiliencebuilding is nearly impossible to carry out for the Corps.
The Corps is now forced to rely on two project delivery pathways, neither
of which lends itself to the construction of progressive, ecological infrastructure.
The first requires them to compartmentalize their work into small, discrete
projects that can easily circumnavigate the three-by-three-by-three process. In
coastal territories where complex, geomorphological processes are involved, this
often means that the only projects considered by the Corps are simple walls,
levees, and berms. It also means that the USACE must process and consider a
greater volume of projects than ever before. In Galveston, this meant abandoning
the idea of a hybridized approach to the coastal spine in favor of large,
resistance-driven structures. A local engineer described it by saying that “there’s
no way to do this [project] for $3 million. We’re talking about huge
megastructures and crazy geo-technologies for the foundation. If it gets built –
and who knows if it will – we’ll have to do it in sections or hope for a waiver from
the three-by-three-by-three.”160 In Norfolk, the pace of work has been nearly
ground to halt as a result. “The most obvious shift [of the mandate] is that it’s cut
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down on our already dwindling resources – so it’s slowed down projects we
already had in the queue and kept us from getting others lined up.”161 Breaking
the projects – including studies and actual physical projects – into discrete
elements that can negotiate the three-by-three-by-three system has produced a
steady stream of work, but dramatically limited the scale of intervention available
to the Corps. An engineer in Norfolk described it as “when we begin a study,
that’s a new start decision that’s made. When we go to build it, that’s another
new start. So we might complete a study, but then we have to go back in the
queue to try and compete for the money we need to build whatever came out of
the study. That’s a challenge, because it creates a big backlog of projects – even
bigger now that everyone has to break them up into such tiny pieces.”162
Scientists and policy-makers in Galveston and Norfolk both cited New York as an
example they wished they could follow – the unleashing of a project backlog,
funded in large part through Disaster Recovery appropriations.
The second pathway for USACE projects to be realized is through a
Sandy-like event – one that triggers a large, congressional appropriation of
disaster recovery funds. A form of crisis-driven urbanization, this approach to
coastal resilience borrows from notion of “bounce-back” found in sociological and
ecological research. “Since the USACE budget was frozen and they banned
earmarks, the way you get more money is through disaster bills. That’s how the

161
162

Anonymous interview with two technical experts by author. Digital Recording. Norfolk, April 21, 2016.
Anonymous interview with technical expert by author. Digital Recording. Norfolk, April 20, 2016.

140

Corps builds its big projects now – it’s all storm related…I don’t think the Corps
will ever have any significant money again unless there’s an event. They’ll try to
get these couple million dollars per year, but that just won’t build anything…It’s
frustrating, that they’re as broken as they are. You want it to work. But I think it
will take us pushing and pushing on them until a storm hits and then BAM – we’d
have our surge barrier under construction immediately.”163 For projects like the
BIG U in Manhattan, the Ike Dike in Galveston, and the Chesterfield Heights
redevelopment in Norfolk, this pathways seems to be the only one capable of
producing large, complex, and experimental strategies for coastal resilience.
This shift, then, marks a foreboding time for coastal communities in the
US. Cities that follow the first pathway that resilience politics offers will see their
protective systems built in excruciatingly slow increments. As a result, the costs
of construction will surge, the political coalitions supporting them will lose energy,
and their resilience will be undermined. The poorest neighborhoods will be forced
to bear the greatest burden of this incremental approach – the surge barriers built
by the Corps in places like Galveston, Norfolk, and New York will protect the
most valuable assets first. That means the second homes on the West End of
Galveston, the Ghent and other historic neighborhoods in Norfolk, and the
Financial District in Manhattan. These are the types of neighborhoods often
considered worth protecting by Corps-led planning processes. Not only will this
leave the poorest communities exposed to the effects of sea level rise, but it may
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also exacerbate their issues by displacing flood-water away from wealthy
enclaves and into poorer ones. Those projects following the path of crisis-driven
urbanization – while likely to be realized more quickly and completely – will come
at a tremendous cost: the displacement of the region’s poorest, most vulnerable
residents from its newly protected neighborhoods. Whichever path a Corps-led
project takes, there is little hope for near-term investments in nature-based
strategies as long as their method of evaluation privileges grey infrastructure
over green and they remain hamstrung by Congress.
The Tension between Federalism and Resilience
Though the conversation amongst planning and design scholars as to which
elements of a city or landscape contribute the most to its resilience remains
lively, the discussion around how that resilience can be made is mostly settled.
Resilience is, at its core, the ability of someone or something to learn from the
past, and to incorporate that learning into a process of adaptation in preparation
for a less certain future.164 There are no prescribed forms, only evidence of
adaptive learning. This section explores the ways in which the resilience politics
of each city form, how they shape their potential futures, and why they are
important for designers operating along the broader American coast.
For coastal cities, this means being to translate information about flood
risk, geomorphological change, and socio-political power into physical and policy-
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based interventions. It means building cities that fail safely, intelligently, and
justly. If “the illusion that we understand the past fosters an overconfidence in our
ability to predict the future”165, then the evidence of urban resilience should be
found in the humility of the interventions. In lieu of the massive, one-off structural
engineering projects that often traverse robust-yet-fragile coastal territories, one
would expect to find a tapestry of interventions in more resilient ones. Healthy
dunes systems, thriving wetland ecologies, and all manner of coastal green
infrastructure would be layered within smaller, more strategic works of grey
infrastructure. But this, as is now clear, is inapposite to the baseline operations of
the USACE.
As an institution, the Corps is best-equipped – and some would argue,
only equipped – to build large, monolithic, single-purpose works of grey
infrastructure in coastal cities. The redundancy, modularity, and multifunctionality that characterizes both nature-based strategies and notions of
resilience is mostly absent from that work. Instead, coastal cities are often forced
to rely on a single, flawed system of protection. It is rarely a question of if those
systems will fail, only of when.
Yet, for the fatalism this near-certain failure ought to engender, optimistic
and progressive proposals for alternative forms of coastal protection abound in
Galveston, Norfolk, and New York. There is no paucity of ideas for how to make
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these cities more resilient through nature-based strategies. The limiting factor in
each is a product of the politics of resilience. Indeed, I spend considerable time in
the two final chapters of this dissertation parsing the differences between – and
the viability of – those different ideas. It is manifest in the inherent tensions
between the overlapping layers of government that intersect in coastal zones,
and it is evident in the harsh, antagonistic posture of anti-government and antiscience coalitions in Galveston, anti-climate change advocates in Norfolk, and
anti-reform officials in New York.
The anti-science, anti-government sentiment in Galveston undermine
resilience in two important ways. One is that it strips local officials of the ability to
act on the threats posed by sea level rise. The Texas coast is managed by the
General Land Office (GLO) and its commissioner, Jeb P. Bush. Under his
leadership, the GLO has literally banned the phrase “climate change” from its
vocabulary and, in doing so, effectively blocked the state’s ability to act on the
phenomenon. A public official in Galveston remarked that “Jeb and the GLO are
just grandstanding – they’ve never done anything decent in their lives…The
problem is that he sees this as a stepping stone to becoming Governor, so he
started all this anti-climate change stuff to strengthen his credentials…in
Texas.”166 This feeds into the other way in which resilience is undermined in
Galveston: the state’s elected officials are openly hostile towards federal officials
as well as climate science. A federal employee who worked on the post-Ike
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recovery process noted that “It’s hard for [the Federal Government] to justify
investing in a place that won’t do the work or acknowledge the problem. We have
plenty of communities who are willing partners in this…we can’t be the ones to
make them face their own reality.”167
Though the tone is less hostile in Norfolk, the sentiments are largely the
same. Rather than referring to sea level rise or climate change, city and state
officials describe Norfolk’s issues with inundation as a product of “recurrent
flooding” – a phenomenon that, for reasons unknown, is increasing in scale,
scope, and frequency throughout the region.168 But the lack of hostility has served
the city well. It is the recipient of significant, non-disaster-related investments in
long-range resilience planning from HUD, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the
USACE. With one exception, however, these funds have all been directed
towards research and planning – not implementation and construction.
New Yorkers have no such issue acknowledging and planning for climate
change. In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg
mobilized the vast technical resources he and others cultivated during the
PlaNYC process to focus the city’s attention on its coast. Their work resulted in
the SIRR (Special Initiative for Recovery and Resilience) Report, which called for
several hundred resilience-oriented projects along the waterfront. But as that
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report’s proposals were fed into the ensuing Rebuild by Design (RBD)
competition, a rift emerged between the city’s design politics and the federal
officials tasked with administering it. That inter-governmental tension began to
undo the work of the SIRR Report and RBD.
That tension – between communities and states, states and federal
agencies – underpins all of the work underway in Galveston, Norfolk, and New
York. Several interviewees remarked that “Texas isn’t a coastal state – it’s a
state with a coast” 169 and that dismissive shorthand rings true in Virginia and New
York too. The resilience politics of coastal design intercede here too – within
states and between them. Coastal cities are convenient scapegoats in state and
federal politics – enclaves of progressivism and territories of risk perceived by
some undeserving recipients of federal and state insurance subsidies and
infrastructure investment.
Anti-Science and Anti-Government Sentiment in Galveston
Galveston – like most other major cities in Texas – is something like a pariah in
state politics. Its position along the coast only furthers its negative connotations
amongst legislators. But there is one aspect of Galveston which endows it with a
unique ire amongst public officials in Texas: the city benefits greatly from the
Texas Wind Insurance Association (TWIA), a public insurance market for coastal
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cities. The TWIA exists because, like the market for flood insurance, the pool of
property owners in need of wind insurance is relatively small and homogenous.
Well-functioning insurance markets are structured and governed by
Mossin’s Theorem – an economic principle describing the relationship between
full and partial insurance and real and perceived risk. TWIA, and most public
insurance markets, exist because few people are able to accurately assess their
own risk – and because private insurance carries a significant premium that
actuarially fair insurance would not.170 Because no one outside of the Texas
Coast purchases wind insurance and because there is no real risk of wind
damage inland, there is no real market for the product in the state. The state runs
the insurance program because no one else can.
Galveston benefits disproportionately from the TWIA market and, on at
least three occasions since 2000, state legislators have sought to reform or
abolish it in retaliation to the city’s perceived progressivism.171 Wrapped in the
rhetoric of rugged, resilient individualism, the TWIA fight is at the center of the
coastal-inland divide in Texas. This is, increasingly, a common fight in urbanizing
American states.
But what differentiates the relationship between Galveston and the state
from most other places are the stakes of that antagonism and the methods
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through which it is employed. The stakes should be abundantly clear. Galveston
is highly exposed and vulnerable to sea level rise and storm-driven flooding
events. Without a strategy for adapting the region to climate change, large
swaths of economically and ecologically valuable land will be lost and thousands
of lives will be disrupted. Yet, the state is, at best, agnostic towards the threat of
sea level rise along its coast. At its worst, the state is often antagonistic towards
the idea of climate change broadly and the Galveston region specifically.
That antagonism is manifest in three important ways. One is in the state’s
consistent denial of climate science. The Governor, the GLO, and an
overwhelming majority of state assemblymen are on record disputing the validity
of the phenomenon. The effect on Galveston is that it lacks the institutional and
financial support necessary to engage with the issues presented by sea level rise
in a serious and pragmatic way. A second is a product of the state’s antipathy
towards the Obama Administration, evidenced in public statements and actions
taken to undermine the credibility and authority of the federal government in
Texas. The most glaring example of this relationship can be found in the book
authored by former Governor Rick Perry during his first campaign for the
presidency, Fed Up! Our Fight to Save America from Washington.172 The effect
on Galveston is to deprive it of the federal resources necessary to construct any
meaningful form of flood protection.
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The third is a result of the strong, private property rights sentiment in
Texas. It is a rite of passage in Texas politics for candidates to proudly proclaim
that ninety-five percent of the state’s land is owned privately. One of the only
bastions of public land is along the Texas coast, where nearly the entire shore is
protected by the Open Beaches Act of 1959 – a remarkable piece of legislation
guaranteeing public access to the entire coast of the state. It came under attack
in 2010, when a Texas Supreme Court decision – which originated in Galveston
– stripped away the Act’s authority.173 The effect on Galveston has been one of
paralysis, as questions about which property is public and which is private
complicate their ability to use state and federal funds for coastal management
and resilience projects. It created considerable uncertainty as to how and where
CDBG-DR money could be used for property buyouts, new infrastructure
investments, and other post-disaster recovery efforts.
The anti-climate science posture of Texas legislators is unique in both its
hostility and obdurateness. It is also one of the principal barriers to resilience in
Galveston. A public official in Galveston described this by saying that “One of the
problems…in [Galveston] is that our political machinery is not focused on our
coast at all…they will all tell you, Texas isn’t a coastal state – it’s a state with a
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coast. They can afford to ignore sea level rise because none of them care what
happens out here anyway.”174
Not only are legislators disinterested in the coast, but – at the direction of
Governor Greg Abbott and Land Commissioner Jeb P. Bush – the GLO and
other state agencies have institutionalized climate change denial by banning
language that acknowledges it from public documents. A former planner with the
GLO described it by saying “all the draft reports – at one time or another – from
TCEQ and GLO had references to sea level rise or climate change. But that
language was always redacted by the Governor’s office or [Land Commissioner]
Bush in the final, public documents. So they are flat out denying the expert
advice of state employees and using their offices to politicize science.”175
Of course, Texas is a state built upon the wealth of oil and natural gas
and, as a result, many of its legislators’ campaigns are funded through the oil and
gas industry – including the engineering firms that help build and maintain their
operations. “This is typical Texas – Danaenbaum [Engineering] just wants to
make money and to give their friends money. They took around six million dollars
in Ike recovery money – it just burns me as a researcher. They’re doing the work
we’ve already done over again and they’re doing it worse – and I’m sure that
whatever gets built here, the contract will go to Danenbaum.”176 The combination
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of anti-Galveston and anti-climate science sentiment in Texas politics makes it
unlikely that any meaningful attempt will be made to address the surge risk along
the coast.
The state’s antipathy towards the federal government presents another
significant barrier to resilience in Galveston. “Texas is a very anti-Obama
Administration state. Our rapport with the federal government - it’s just awful. I’m
not surprised we don’t get much financial support for surge protection [in
Galveston].”177 Though Galveston received nearly one billion dollars to support
the Hurricane Ike recovery, much of that money went into rebuilding homes and
businesses – little, if any, was available for new investments in a coastal defense
system. Part of that is a product of the state’s lack of institutional capacity to plan
for and manage climate change along the coast. An elected official in Galveston
remarked that “Texas doesn’t see itself as a coastal state, so all of our
institutions – the GLO especially – treat this region as ancillary. After Ike, we
didn’t even have a state organization that could manage the federal recovery
dollars…it’s why that process took so long. The Feds see that and that lack of
state commitment to the coast and to climate adaptation is going to hinder the
federal investment in Galveston. We can’t build an Ike Dike or surge barrier on
our own – and the Feds won’t help us if our legislature can’t even bring
themselves to utter the phrase climate change.”178
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Many of the public officials that I interviewed for this dissertation looked at
New Orleans and New York with envy. Both cities received massive federal
investments in surge protection. Both also have highly sophisticated coastal
planning institutions. Without commensurate institutions, Galveston will never be
able to compete for commensurate resources. But for most of the political class
in Texas, scoring points – and winning an election – by denigrating the federal
government is always preferable, even if it costs the state much-needed
investments in protective infrastructure. A marine scientist in Galveston
bemoaned this reality by saying that “we have some real dumbass politicians in
Texas. Don’t misunderstand that. They’re in it for the short term. They don’t want
us to build anything – but you can bet your ass they’d be here for the ribboncutting if we did.”179
There is some validity to the frustrations of local officials trying to work
with federal partners in coastal zones. FEMA rules and regulations mandate that
critical facilities – like the wastewater treatment plant destroyed by Hurricane Ike
in Galveston – be rebuilt in place.180 The same is often true for homes insured
through the National Flood Insurance Program and those eligible for Community
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funding and financing
programs. One local official said “FEMA says, like manner, like design, like
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location. It’s cheaper to rebuild things where they were…It’s crazy. Nobody
wanted to take them on because FEMA isn’t there to learn new ways of enforcing
or interpreting regulations after an event. We literally had to rebuild that plant and
most of our homes – to a higher standard, sure – right where they were before
Ike. If we didn’t, FEMA – and then HUD – threatened to pull all of our recovery
money.”181
Finally, the durability and prevalence of attitudes towards private property
continue to complicate resilience-making in Texas. The Open Beaches Act of
1959 – authored by then State Senator Babe Schwartz – passed sweeping
reforms to the state’s coastal zone. In essence, it created a buffer zone that
provided Texans with unfettered access to every inch of the state’s coastline.
Unlike Malibu – where the beachfront is completely privatized – or even Norfolk
and New York – where industrial facilities and commercial activity have colonized
the waterfront – Galveston and its environs were wholly and unequivocally part of
the public realm. This meant that as coastlines eroded, whether due to the slow
onset of sea level rise or the more episodic impact of hurricanes – private
property owners were often forced to sell their land as the water encroached
upon them. That all changed in 2010 when, in response to a suit filed by a
wealthy woman named Carol Severance – who owned a vacation home in the
tony West End of Galveston Island – the Texas Supreme Court ruled “evulsions”
or the sudden erosion of a beach due to storm activity was not covered by the
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Open Beaches Act.182 This meant that portions of the Texas Coast – including
and especially the West End of Galveston – were no longer public lands. That
ruling triggered a cascade of issues for the region.
The two most damaging aspects of the ruling were that it prevented the
city from spending public resources on surge protection in and around the West
End. Because this once-public land was now private – and because the strings
attached to it prevented it from being used to upgrade private land – discussions
about how to best-protect the island quickly broke down. “When the GLO lost to
Severance, it put into question any ability of the state to lay money down on the
West End. What that means now is that if you say you own the property, that’s
fine – then you have to care for it. We’re not going to do that for you. Not a lot of
people can care for a beach – beach nourishment and surge protection aren’t
things you can do at the parcel-level.”183 The ruling effectively quashed any postIke momentum towards a comprehensive surge barrier for the island. But it also
led city officials – many of whom were swept into office during the 2010
Republican electoral wave – in Galveston to funnel tens of millions of dollars
towards the wealthy second-homers on the West End.
The CDBG-DR funding in Galveston came with few restrictions on its use.
CDBG money is typically reserved for place-based, anti-poverty projects like

182

N. Satija. 2014. “Debating What’s More Sacred: Private Land or Public Beaches.” The Texas Tribune, 28
September 2014, available at: https://www.texastribune.org/2014/09/28/open-beaches-law-uncertain/.
183
Anonymous interview with technical expert by author. Digital Recording. Galveston, February 17, 2016.

154

mixed-income housing and improvements to the social service infrastructure of a
city. Though that was its intent after Ike, Galveston’s city council managed to
appropriate more than ten million dollars from that fund into purchasing vacation
homes from residents of the West End who did not want to return to the island.
“That council bought out a lot of beach houses with that [CDBG-DR] money. It
was just a naked admission that, as a city, we’re going to spend federal money
that’s meant for the poor on political purposes. There was no public benefit to it.
It was just deplorable – to spend money like that…people here always knew that
if you bought a house out on the West End, you should only do so if you’re
wealthy and can afford to lose it. Now all that’s been undone.”184
Recurrent Flooding in Norfolk
Norfolk receives little attention from legislators in Virginia. Larger communities in
the Washington, DC metropolitan area – Arlington, Alexandria, and Fairfax – are
viewed as the engines of economic growth and demographic change in the state
– and they are where the resources are often sent. This is true, though to a
lesser extent, for the capital city of Richmond. Like Texas, Virginia is also home
to a vast rural and agricultural landscape which, due to its sprawling geography,
dominates the state’s politics. Like Galveston, Norfolk is often viewed derisively
by the state’s legislators as a result of its coastal, urban status.
That derision is manifest in Norfolk’s approach to and engagement with
sea level rise – or, as it’s referred to in Virginia, “recurrent” or “nuisance
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flooding”185 – in at least two important ways. One is the manner in which climate
science is denied through legislative language and action. The Virginia General
Assembly pressured Norfolk and its neighboring communities to redact language
about sea level rise and climate change from its public documents and to use the
phrase recurrent flooding in its place.186 “It was such a joke – there’s this thing
called recurrent flooding. Like, we don’t know what it is or why it’s happening.”187
The term is used to describe the increasing frequency of precipitation-driven
flood events in and around Norfolk.
But their proliferation over the last decade is not the result of some
unknown phenomenon. It is the result of the city’s sewer outfalls sitting below
Norfolk’s mean high tide – a relatively recent development and the result of sea
level rise. A city official described it by saying that “we don’t really have the surge
issues [other cities have]. We have nuisance flooding, because we’re getting
heavier rains, we’re extremely flat, and our stormwater system’s outfalls are now
underwater at least once a month. So often times, if it isn’t raining at high tide,
you can walk downtown and see water bubbling up, through the stormwater
system and into the street.”188 Norfolk found ways to work around this barrier, but
without a willingness to name and address the issue of sea level rise, the state
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legislature effectively blocked any large-scale attempt at adaptation in the city.
“We had to get real about it, even though most of our state elected officials have
been saying there’s no such thing as climate change or there’s no such thing as
sea level rise. We had to, because we have so many more days now each year
in which parts of Norfolk are underwater.”189 Indeed, much of Norfolk’s ongoing
resilience planning is focused on ameliorating social vulnerability. There are no
major public works projects or defensive structures under discussion there.
The denial of climate change – through the coded language of recurrent
and nuisance flooding – prevents Norfolk from thinking more strategically about
how to defend and manage its coast going forward. “It’s hard to justify building
any big defensive structures here anyway – the coast isn’t linear in Norfolk. It’s
very complex, so a wall or other structure would be a hard sell. But it’s impossible
to really broach the topic of defensive measures – whatever they might be –
when we can’t even acknowledge that sea level rise is occurring.”190 This is
driving the city to consider resilience at the individual rather than community
level. While important, this approach to coastal planning is, essentially, an
acknowledgement that nothing can or will be done to forestall or limit rising seas.
Norfolk is simply trying to provide its residents with the safety net and services it
needs to navigate a wetter future – it lacks the will and ability to envision a drier
one.
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A second manifestation of Norfolk’s disjointed relationship with sea level
rise lies in its fatalistic approach to resilience. By that I mean that Norfolk – unlike
Galveston, New York, and nearly every other coastal city in the US – has largely
abandoned any ambitions for armoring the coastline, whether through grey or
green infrastructure. Instead, the city is focused on two things: bolstering the
social resilience and safety net of its residents, and providing incentives to
property-owners to initiate a parcel-level approach to stormwater management.
Some of that focus is evidence-based, a result of the city’s tidallyinfluenced flooding issues. A marine scientist whose work is focused on the
Hampton Roads Region remarked that “Our landform just is not designed for
massive defense structures. The shoreline is too complex and everything else is
too low – it would take a truly massive network to defend it all. Plus, building
something like that here – which would have a measurable impact on surge
reduction – would inflict major and irreversible ecological damage. It also just
doesn’t work for N’oreasters, which are a much more serious issue in Norfolk
than tropical storms.”191 But much of it is a result of the political constraints placed
on the city by state officials unwilling to acknowledge and to grapple with the
reality of rising seas. The same marine scientists went on to say that “There just
aren’t any simple solutions here. If you’re willing to invest in things that might
provide a century’s worth of protection, but are ultimately doomed then there are
a couple of areas you could defend with a dyke or barrier. But between the wind
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and rain here, it’s really hard to move water out of the city and it’s only going to
get worse – especially because the state isn’t interested in sounding any alarm
bells about the future. They don’t want to spook businesses or other industrial
actors in the region.”192 Though there is an argument to be made that such an
approach is, perhaps, more intellectually honest than strategies aimed at
fortifying and preserving coastal cities, it is unique amongst the more aspirational
visions for the future under development in Galveston and New York.
The lone force pushing back against Norfolk’s fatalistic vision is, ironically,
the US Navy. Already heavily invested in the region for national security
purposes, Naval planners and officials with the USACE and city of Norfolk have
begun looking for ways to braid their planning efforts together. “The Navy is
saying that there are some things that make mission-readiness easier for us that
happen outside of our gates – and sea level rise might impede that going
forward…As a result, Norfolk is the first pilot for the Navy and the Feds to try and
coordinate their planning with a municipality’s.”193 Whether that collaboration
bears fruit remains an open question.
The bottom line is that for Norfolk, the high point is about ten feet
above sea level. The SLR curves take you to about seven feet by
the end of the century, so the city is effectively doomed. But it will
be interesting because the naval base and the port will have to stay
– DoD won’t give up the strategic positon of their NATO Allied
Command Center sitting at the only waterway entrance to DC. And
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more water may not be such a problem for them – ship captains will
never complain about more water beneath their keel.194
The Navy will always be in Norfolk. The fate of the city’s residents is far less
certain.
Provincialism in New York
Before Superstorm Sandy struck New York in 2012, planners and designers in
the city had already begun thinking about the impact of sea level rise. Design
competitions – like On the Water195 – and art exhibitions – like Rising Currents196
– instigated thoughtful, albeit outlandish, approaches to resilience in New York as
early as 2008. The former, a design competition led by the Van Allen Institute, fell
victim to the forces that typically undermine such exercises: the lack of a political
constituency for the work. Disconnected from the people and the institutions
governing New York’s neighborhoods, On the Water failed to produce any real
movement in the city’s approach to its waterfront. The latter, an art exhibition
commissioned by the Museum of Modern Art, fell victim to its own insularity. The
designers and artists involved produced a series of provocative visions for the
future of New York’s coast, but they did so without any real basis in the science
of climate change or its effects on the city. One participant went so far as to say
that “it should have just been called Artists against Climate Change. We didn’t
really understand what we were doing – and we probably weren’t supposed to.
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The work may not have been as beautiful if we did.”197 However, the divide
between the city’s design culture and its vast reservoir of political and scientific
expertise began to narrow after Sandy.
But RBD was not destined to fail as an instrument of disaster recovery.
Instead, two forces undermined the competition. One was a concerted effort
within the state and federal bureaucracy to delegitimize the Dutch-led effort as
naïve and ill-suited to the New York region. As the competition drew to a close
and the winning teams began planning to pursue their proposals, one designer
involved in RBD said that “there are a lot of people who do not like [Henk] in the
agencies and the governor’s office because he’s saying they all need to change.
They were all bad-mouthing him. When we’d bring something to them that had
been discussed with Henk, they’d say ‘who in HUD are you talking to? Real
people who can do something or other people?’ That was pretty alarming to
us.”198 One of the most consistent topics raised by participants in the competition
was the divide between career staff in the state and federal agencies and their
political leaders. By all accounts, RBD did little to bridge that divide. This is why
many of the proposals that were selected for implementation are moving forward
in forms that might appear alien to competition participants. Those entrenched in
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state and federal agencies simply waited for RBD’s political constituency to fade
and are now working to scale down the ambition and creativity of its projects.
Part of that also came from the structure of the competition, which
emphasized community engagement in its marketing materials but forced design
teams to operate independent of it for significant periods of time. “The weird part
about their process is that they didn’t want to piss anyone off – so they asked us
to do all this design work without talking to any communities because they didn’t
want us to work with them on proposals that weren’t selected to go forward. So
we were put in this terrible position of trying to figure out what the right design
opportunities were without talking to anyone who lived in these
neighborhoods.”199 The efforts by the institutional partners to delegitimize the
Dutch-led competition and to drive a wedge between the designers and their
communities ensured that a durable political coalition could not be sustained for
RBD.
The second force that undermined the competition came in the ways in
which funding and resources were apportioned across New York’s
neighborhoods. More specifically, the competition’s viability suffered from its
clear bias towards investments in the already-wealthy and fairly well-protected
Financial District – a decision that, in a zero-sum effort like RBD, drained
resources from places of higher need like the Hunts Point, Far Rockaway, and
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Staten Island. “The frustrating thing for us – and especially for our partners in [the
neighborhood] – was that we really needed the time and the money Rebuild and
later the National competition provided. We couldn’t do much of this work without
it. We all knew that [the Financial District] would get something but when it was
announced that so much of the competition’s money was going there and almost
nothing would come to us – we were all pretty distraught. Our partners felt
played.”200
This is not to say that RBD was inconsequential. But the degree to which it
altered where and how the city chose to invest in coastal infrastructure is unclear.
Lower Manhattan was always going to get a large surge suppression system and
Staten Island was always going to invest in some shoreline stabilization projects.
The argument in favor of using competitions like RBD as a post-disaster recovery
vehicle is that they allow for CDBG-DR appropriations to be spent differently than
conventional methods might allow. As the next chapter discusses in greater
detail, the ability of RBD to do so in New York City remains an open question.
Political Resilience and Ecological Fragility
The challenges to building resilience in coastal US cities are a result of both topdown, structural impediments and more localized, inter-governmental tensions.
As an institution, the USACE is the primary structural force shaping the physical
environment of the American coast. It is largely incompatible with the
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characteristics of resilient systems described by Ahern and others: redundancy,
modularity, and multi-functionality. As this chapter has made clear, the Corps is
organized around the goal of building large, one-off works of grey infrastructure
that serve a single purpose. Its methods of project evaluation and its lack of
agency render it an insufficient force in creating more resilient cities. Put another
way, the USACE is not equipped for the task of building resilience along the
coast on its own. Yet it remains the most powerful broker in that territory and thus
possesses an untapped reservoir of power in the broader project of climate
change adaptation. Locally, the politics of resilience are a comprised of antiscience, anti-government, and anti-reform sentiments that threaten to halt
whatever progress might be made through the Corps. Only recently has there
been hope that a new model for climate change adaptation might be found. But
even there, the results of RBD are being whittled away by the shearing force of
those sentiments.
This chapter has focused on underscoring those forces and their influence
on coastal resilience across three fronts. One is to make clear that the
characteristics of our coast are a reflection of the institutions that govern them.
No amount of design intelligence can alter a system that is designed to exclude
it. In Galveston, Norfolk, and New York, the coast is a reflection of the Corps:
rigid and robust-yet-fragile. A second is that politics of resilience are ordered in
such a way as to counteract any bottom-up effort to counteract the institutional
inertia of the Corps is inevitably stripped away. The solidarity one might expect to
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find in regions universally imperiled by the threat of sea level rise is mostly
absent along the American coast. There simply is not enough money or
protection to go around and all of those at risk know it. If the market-oriented
process of crisis-driven urbanization is left to govern who gets protection and
when, the results will be devastating: the wealthiest enclaves of New York,
Norfolk, and Galveston will receive considerable public investments in new
infrastructure while the rest are left to face the threat of rising seas on their own.
But the third argument made in this chapter is that there are real limits to
all of these impediments and some cities are pushing up against them. By that I
mean more than just the technological limits of a grey infrastructure-only
approach to coastal engineering – I mean a limit to the politics of obstruction that
have defined prior eras of coastal urbanism. A point will come when the inertia of
the USACE and the obdurateness of local politics break down and an opening for
new ideas about building resilience in coastal cities through nature-based design
strategies will appear. In Galveston, Norfolk, and New York, that breakdown is
coming – and will continue to come – through the disruption of tropical storm
events. Hurricane Ike (2008) and Superstorm Sandy (2012) unleashed a torrent
of ambitious, progressive planning efforts in each city. They are the focus of the
next chapter.
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Image Library: Chapter 3

Figure 26: The Galveston Greenprint Plan (2007). This map, drawn by planners with the
Texas chapter of the Trust for Public Land, shows where shoreline erosion is an issue
along the east and west end neighborhoods of the island.
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Figure 27: The WMRT Plan for Norfolk (1974). This illustration, produced as part of the
firm’s comprehensive plan for the city, shows the downtown waterfront of Norfolk and
several of its neighborhoods.
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Figure 28: The WMRT Plan for Norfolk (1974). This series of maps shows the growth –
both in development and in land mass via fill – of Norfolk’s downtown core.
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Figure 29: The Division of Surveys Map of High Tide in Norfolk (1933). This map, used in
the WMRT analysis section of the city’s plan, shows the historic flooding issues in
Norfolk.
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Figure 30: The Hurricane Evacuation Zones of New York (2006). This image was used
wihtin the On the Water competition to illustrate the flood risk posed to the city preSandy.
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Figure 31: The New Urban Ground Proposal for New York’s Waterfront (2011). These
images, produced for the Rising Currents Exhibition by dlandstudio, show the growth of
Manhattan’s waterfront via fill (pp 53) and a proposal for softening the area’s edge via
nature-based strategies (pp 54).
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Figure 32: The Oytser-tecture Proposal for New York’s Waterfront (2011). This image,
produced by SCAPE/Landscape Architecture, shows a plan for oyster bed restoration in
the New York Harbor. It grew into the Living Breakwaters plan for Staten Island,
discussed in chapter four.
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CHAPTER 4 — Unnatural Futures: How the Relationship between
Resilience Politics and Nature-Based Strategies is Reshaping the
Coast in Galveston, Norfolk, and New York
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which attitudes about nature, resilience
politics, and engineering legacies are influencing the post-disaster recovery
projects under consideration in Galveston, Norfolk, and New York. It builds on
chapters two and three by contextualizing and critiquing nine proposed projects –
three in Galveston, three in Norfolk, and three in New York City – that are
intended to protect each city from future surge risk and climate change. I rely on
primary sources, key informant interviews, and public documents to address a
question at the core of this dissertation: how are philosophical tropes of nature
reflected in design culture and, as a result, in the urbanism of coastal cities?
Drawing from the experiences of residents, planners, designers, and
policy-makers in Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City, I posit that, for all its
progress, design culture remains enamored with aesthetics over performance or,
at the very least, that it privileges the art of resilience over the science of it. As
this chapter will show, that creates issues for coastal cities where, for reasons
entangled in Romantic ideas of nature and the need for its restoration, many of
these post-disaster recovery proposals call for a recreation of landscapes lost
during the 19th and 20th centuries – and which are no longer viable in this era of
climate change and habitat migration.
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But first it is important to note that the coalitions driving each city’s
resilience planning are unique: engineers and marine scientists in Galveston,
elected officials and city planners in Norfolk, and designers in New York. As this
chapter will show, the proposals under consideration in each city clearly differ in
ways that one might expect, given their differences in leadership. For example,
conventional engineering methods of coastal resilience are at the core of
Galveston’s projects while more programmatic and policy-driven ideas form the
basis of Norfolk’s.
I begin in Galveston, where three major coastal protection projects are
now under review by the Corps as a part of their statewide “Coastal Texas”
study: the Ike Dike, the Centennial Gate System, and the Ring Levee System.201
Using the logic of the island’s seawall, the Ike Dike proposes a system of walls,
levees, dunes, and other structural protections that extend across the entire
length of the region’s coastline. It is an archetypal resistance-based approach to
coastal resilience. The Ring Levee and Centennial Gate Systems proposed more
modest interventions. Each calls for a series of nature-based restoration projects,
including coastal wetlands and marshlands, to help stabilize the shoreline of
Galveston Bay along with a few strategic structural protections – levees for the
Ring Levee System and a surge gate for the Centennial Gate System – to fortify
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the most densely populated areas in the region. Slated to conclude in late 2021,
the goal of the Coastal Texas study is to conduct an in-depth analysis of each
project’s viability, to compare their tradeoffs, and to select one for further study
and, eventually, implementation.
Next, I examine three proposals under consideration in Norfolk: the Vision
2100 Comprehensive Plan, the Chesterfield Heights Redevelopment Plan
(CHRP), and the Fingers of High Ground proposal for the broader Hampton
Roads region. Both plans eschew investments in major, structural protections.
Instead, they call for a policy-driven approach to resilience that provides
incentives for homeowners to build rain gardens and green infrastructure on their
property and expansion of the city’s welfare system to better equip its workingclass population for challenges and stress that sea level rise will bring to the lowlying, mid-Atlantic city. If Galveston’s proposals represent the structural pole of
resilience-focused options for cities, Norfolk’s two plans occupy the opposite end
of that spectrum. The Fingers of High Ground proposal – which calls for a
strategic, managed retreat to sparsely populated areas of high elevation along
the Virginia coast – rests somewhere in-between.
Finally, I assess three projects under development in New York City: the
BIG U or Dryline proposal for Lower Manhattan, the Living Breakwaters proposal
for Staten Island, and the Lifelines Proposal for the Bronx. The proposals vary as
much as the conditions and culture of the three boroughs they traverse. The
Dryline builds upon the Dutch legacy of coastal fortification by calling for a
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massive, U-shaped surge barrier along the southern tip of Manhattan. Driven in
part by that legacy – and in part by the economic imperative to protect the
financial industry assets in the area – that project is closer to implementation
than any other that is discussed in this dissertation. It also represents a rather
advanced interpretation of naturalness, eschewing the tendency of designers to
draw a line between what constitutes ecology and what represents culture. In this
regard, it stands inapposite to many of the ideas about nature that are entangled
in the Living Breakwaters proposal – which calls for a restoration of the oncevibrant bivalve population in New York Harbor as an instrument of resilience on
Staten Island. But rather than building on – and extending the meaning of – the
legacy of cultural natures in the region, this proposal tends to sentimentalize
ecology and to reinforce dangerous tropes about where – and if – such a line
should be drawn. The Lifelines proposal, like Norfolk’s Fingers of High Ground,
rests somewhere between those poles in New York City.
But before I present the more detailed findings and insights that my
fieldwork in each city provides for each of these projects, it is important to step
back and reiterate how and why these proposals – and these three cities – are
grouped together in this dissertation. One rationale for placing all of these
projects together in this chapter stems from a question I posed in chapter one:
how might the difference between the risks posed by storm surge and those
posed by tidal and wind-driven flooding provoke different responses to coastal
design in U.S. cities? It would be difficult to find a better grouping of cities to
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answer that question than these three. Galveston, a barrier island completely
exposed to the Gulf of Mexico, faces extraordinary surge-driven flood risks.
Norfolk, conversely, faces little in the way of surge risk. It, as a well-protected
and low-lying port city, is exposed to the risks posed by sea level rise – and the
resulting increases in tidal and wind-driven flooding that will ensue. New York
City faces moderate degrees of both risk types. Together, the three cities
represent the full spectrum of flood risks facing coastal cities in the U.S.
Of course, the question of how experience with coastal storms and
disaster influences urban adaptation strategies also serves as a link between
Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City. As I discussed in chapter one, these
three cities were selected purposefully and, in part, because their individual
levels of experience with tropical storms ranged from very low (Norfolk) to very
high (Galveston), with New York in-between. The matrix illustrated in chapter one
is useful here, too.202
Finally, it is also important to underscore a critical point of differentiation
between these three cities: their biogeographies vary widely. A stated goal of this
dissertation is to develop a portable strategy for coastal resilience – one that can
be deployed in cities like Boston, Savannah, and Tampa as well as Galveston,
Norfolk, and New York City. Their internal geographic variations are not a mark
against their usefulness as a group. Rather, it is a point of leverage in extending
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the findings of Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City beyond their municipal or
regional boundaries and out across the whole of the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. As
chapter five discusses in far greater detail, there is much that other barrier island
communities, port cities, and global cities can learn from the projects discussed
in this dissertation.
Recovering Nature in Galveston
Few cities are as experienced with disaster as Galveston. Since the federal
government began recording tropical storm events in 1848, the barrier island
community has been struck by at least fifty-seven tropical storms – one every 2.9
years. Outside of Miami and New Orleans, Galveston is the most storm-plagued
city in the United States – a heavy burden for an island community with just north
of fifty-thousand residents. It lacks both the internal financial resources of those
cities as well as the state and national political clout that they demand in the
aftermath of disaster. It is both a literal and a figurative island, unto itself, pushing
against the ocean.
The Great Storm of 1900 marked the start of Galveston’s modern coastal
planning era. In its aftermath, planners and engineers throughout southeast
Texas turned to extreme earth-moving and massive structural protection projects
to lessen the impact of storm events on the island. The coastal fortress they
erected in and around Galveston withstood most of the twentieth century’s
natural challenges – a series of powerful, unnamed storms in the 1910s failed to
breach the island’s new seawall, inspiring a tourism-focused postcard series for
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the region; a series of named storms in the 1950s and 1960s wrought havoc in
the unprotected regions beyond the seawall, inspiring Galveston to extend its
flood control system for more than one-hundred blocks; and Hurricane Alicia’s
1983 landfall stripped what remained of the island’s seawall beaches without
overtopping any of its flood-control infrastructure. By the end of the twentieth
century, Galveston’s surge protection system was considered complete – a
massive triumph of technology that preserved the barrier island’s future. But its
completion also signaled the limits of this grey-only approach to resilience. The
wall could not be built any higher nor extended any further.
Tropical Storm Allison, a relatively weak system that made landfall in
2001, dumped nearly four feet of rain over the region and exposed one of the
biggest flaws in Galveston’s approach – its seawall did little more than keep
floodwaters in place. The extraordinary rainfall wrought by Allison – much of
which fell on the mainland – filtered into Galveston Bay and then over the island,
where it pooled, inundating the homes behind the seawall for weeks. But Allison
lacked the surge height and wind velocity that could have transformed this local
disaster into a catastrophe of national proportions – buildings were simply
flooded, not blown off their foundations and swept to sea. Galveston would not
be so lucky during its next storm event – Hurricane Ike.
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On September 14, 2008, the Galveston Bay region lay in ruins unlike any
time since 1900.203 Three-fourths of the island’s homes, businesses, and other
structures lay scattered across the briny, post-Ike landscape.204 The low,
undulating dune system that once rimmed the seaward edge of the Texas coast
was now imperceptible. The once impenetrable seawall and surge protection
system lay solemn in its first defeat. A clear path of erasure stretched from the
beaches of Galveston Island to the Houston suburbs of Kemah, Baytown, and
League City. Fish flopped and snakes slithered across FM3005, the westward
evacuation route off the island that became washed out long before Ike made
landfall.205 By the time the insurance agents and actuaries finished surveying the
aftermath, Ike’s damage total rose to almost 150 billion dollars – the second-most
in US history.206 Nature – however fleetingly – had wrest Galveston back from its
inhabitants in one dramatic moment. Yet Ike and Galveston remain mostly
absent from the discourse on landscape planning and resilience.
That’s because on September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and represented the opening salvo in what
would become known as the Great Recession. As a result, the national press
and the federal government quickly pivoted away from disaster recovery in
Galveston and towards a desperate gambit to stave off national economic
203
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collapse. This deprived the region’s residents of the attention and resources that
typically follow in the aftermath of a storm like Ike. Nearly a decade later, the
region has largely recovered from the worst of Ike – homes have been rebuilt,
roads cleared, and beaches re-nourished. But little has been done to deal with
the vulnerabilities that enabled Ike – namely the region’s reliance on a single,
aging piece of grey infrastructure to mitigate flood risk. Galveston remains one of
the nation’s most vulnerable territories to storm events and sea level rise. More
than half of the region holds an insurance policy through the NFIP – meaning that
more than half of the region faces exceptionally high flood risks.
This section aims to accomplish two goals. The first is to provide a clear
context for the issues facing the Galveston region. The sprawling, cheaply built
residential development endemic to Texas, the dense cluster of petrochemical
facilities rimming the Bay, and the resilience politics of Galveston are all critical to
framing that context. The second is to describe, assess, and critique the three
proposals for new resilience infrastructure that emerged in the aftermath of
Hurricane Ike: the Ike Dike, the Centennial Gate, and the Ring Levee systems. I
use semi-structured interviews, public documents, and public meeting minutes to
do so.
The Contemporary Context for Coastal Resilience in Galveston
The Corps wastes a lot of money. They have to look at every
alternative. All the crap they have to do is nonsense. I describe it
like buying a house. There’s one-hundred to buy and I can get
down to three or four pretty fast. I’ll look at those pretty hard, but
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not all one-hundred. But the Corps has to – that’s part of their
charge. It costs a lot more money that in should.207
Galveston Bay and its distributaries – the San Jacinto, Buffalo Bayou, and Trinity
Rivers – represent the largest ecological system within the nation’s fourth-largest
and fastest-growing urban region: the Houston Metropolitan area.208 More than
six million people reside in and around the Houston-Galveston region. Half of
those residents live in a marshy surge zone encircling the Bay. There, a
sprawling patchwork of tract homes and wide, winding roadways blanket the lowlying, flood-prone landscape of Houston. This tapestry of low-density
development has so overwhelmed the hydrological system of southeast Texas
that seasonal flood events now trigger devastating floods throughout much of
Houston’s suburban landscape.
While the presence of these homes in the surge zone is a problem unto
itself, their vulnerability is complicated by the lax land development regulations
that guide growth in and around Houston. Most of these homes were developed
in flood-prone environments according to building codes that fail to account for
that risk. Put another way, much of the new construction in Southeast Texas is
built for a different landscape than the one it occupies. Simple inundation
routinely devastates communities in the surge zone around the Bay. Tropical
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storm-driven flood events threaten to remove those communities from the Texas
landscape altogether.209
Though this might force one to ask why a city like Galveston would
knowingly facilitate such a vulnerable development pattern, the rationale for
building cheap homes in a flood-prone landscape is quite clear. The suburban
communities surrounding Houston are simply vying for their share of the region’s
population boom. Spurred on by the growth in the oil and petrochemical
industries based there over the last two decades, Texas City, Kemah, League
City, and many other communities hoped to capture the property tax receipts that
these new residents could provide. In Texas, where property taxes are
extraordinarily high in order to offset the absence of a state income tax, this led
these suburban communities to compete in a race to the bottom for new
residents – a lucrative and vital component of their municipal operating
budgets.210 Nowhere is the process more evident than in the surge zone
surrounding Houston. There, cheap land and cheap housing coalesced to pack
hundreds of thousands of new residents into a high-risk coastal landscape.
Houston’s suburbs came to embody much of what Joel Kotkin refers to as
“opportunity urbanism”, or the notion that a deregulated land development market
is the key to creating an affordable, virtuous metropolis.211 If focused solely on
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housing affordability, Houston might be considered wildly successful – despite
being the nation’s fourth-largest and fastest-growing region, its median home
price sits at $162,000 – placing it in the bottom quintile for home prices amongst
the 100 largest metropolitan regions in the US. But the problem with using such a
simplistic measure for success is that it completely ignores what the quality of life
for Houston’s residents is – and how the hidden costs of sprawl undermine
whatever notion of affordability such an approach might use. Homes are cheap
when land is plentiful, construction is deregulated, or amenities are scarce. All of
these are true in Houston. There, it is also true that cheap housing comes at a
tremendous cost – residents are forced to drive great distances for work and
entertainment, resulting in the second-most congestion of any city in the US. The
low-cost of the region’s housing market comes at a steep social and ecological
price. Kotkin’s affinity for opportunity urbanism belies the precariousness of
shuffling low- and middle-income families into poorly-built homes in a flood-prone
landscape. If there is no such thing as a free lunch, neither is there such a thing
as a cheap home – the costs are just borne in other, less obvious ways.
The magnet that has drawn to many people to the Houston region is the
booming petrochemical industry headquartered in and around Galveston Bay.
Multi-billion dollar private investments in oil refining capacity, petrochemical
processing and storage, and port infrastructure has constantly pushed the
region’s center of economic gravity towards the water’s edge. Workers followed
that drift seaward, flooding the coast with hundreds of thousands of new
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residents over the last two decades. As a result, Galveston Bay is emblematic of
the risks posed by climate change to most port cities: the social and economic
fortunes of Southeast Texas are dependent upon proximity and access to open
water. Prosperity and vulnerability are inextricable in Galveston.
The region already boasts the largest cluster of petrochemical activity in
the nation, with nearly 30% of all domestic refining capacity operating in and
around the Bay.212 It is the petrochemical capital of the United States, if not the
world. It is also home to the nation’s second (Houston), fourth (Beaumont),
thirteenth (Texas City), eighteenth (Port Arthur), and forty-ninth (Galveston)
largest ports by tonnage in the US.213 All of these port facilities are expected to
grow as a result of the Panama Canal expansion – a massive dredging operation
aimed at allowing larger container ships to traverse the waterway.214 Many of
them also abut, intersect, or otherwise conflict with the sprawling patchwork of
suburban homes that makeup the region.
Put another way, the fastest growing metropolis in the US is rapidly
pervading the nation’s densest cluster of petrochemical operations. Placing
residential homes alongside such heavy industry poses a unique set of problems
in Galveston, all of which are complicated by rising seas. As a result, the
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residents of Galveston Bay face more than the simple risk of inundation. They
fact the risk of exposure to the petrochemical slurry stored within and around
their communities. They face the risk of being left with a toxic, untenable
neighborhood in the aftermath of the next storm. They face a risk that the seawall
can no longer mitigate.
The Ike Dike and the Death of Nature
I’ve worked with the Dutch on other projects and when Ike hit…I
remember mentioning to my wife that the Dutch would not have put
up with this mess. Ike hit in September. In November, I wrote an
op-ed saying we ought to build it – I called it the Ike Dike then…it
was the first time anyone on the island put an idea on the table for
a defense similar to what the Dutch have.215
In this section, I aim to accomplish three goals. One is to provide a basic
description of the Ike Dike surge protection system – where it will be located, how
it will work, who is supporting it, and how much it might cost. Another is to
connect the relationship between the Ike Dike and its environs with different
ideas about nature and resilience – the provenance of its intellectual foundations,
the environmental philosophies guiding its development, and the body of
resilience theory from which it arose. The final goal is to then discuss its
perception amongst the technical experts, public officials, and community leaders
with whom I spoke for this dissertation – who is supporting, who is not, and why.
The Ike Dike is a proposed coastal spine spanning the seaward side of
Galveston Island, Bolivar Peninsula, and San Luis Pass. It is a 50-mile-long
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network of structurally reinforced dunes, extensions to the existing seawall, and
flood gates at the mouth of the Houston Ship Channel all aimed as resisting and
deflecting the surge energy produced by storms like Ike. Promulgated by Bill
Merrell, the project represents a wholesale adoption of the resistance philosophy
common to engineering-based theories of resilience.216 The Ike Dike is,
essentially, a massive fortification project – one that stretches across the most
densely-settled portions of the Galveston Bay region. Its cost estimates range
from three to eight billion dollars, though none has yet determined how extensive
its foundation will need to be.217
The conceptual parallels between the resistance approach of the Ike Dike
and the Dutch methods of flood control are obvious – and openly acknowledged
by Merrell and other proponents of the project. In Holland’s coastal defense
system, structural protections are deployed to keep water out of its major cities.
Walls, levees, and hybridized dunes – though aesthetically varied – provide
similar functions in the Dutch system. Though the Dutch methods have kept
Amsterdam and Rotterdam dry for a half-century, their approach has also led to
the creation of one of the world’s largest hypoxic zones – otherwise known as
dead zones, where, as a result of pollution-driven algae blooms, oxygen levels
are too low to sustain marine life. Merrell and his colleagues have yet to offer up
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an explanation for how the Ike Dike might deviate from the destructive legacy of
the Dutch.
The Ike Dike is mostly supported by the technical experts and consulting
groups either working on it or that stand to profit from its construction – though
they would likely disagree with that assessment. This is because, during the
course of the project’s development, Merrell and others have been pitching the
idea in communities along the seaside of Galveston Bay in public meetings and
events. During those meetings, they often ask mayors and other community
leaders to sign a letter of support for the Ike Dike – something they are quick to
note that twenty-six communities have already done. But, as a state official in the
GLO noted, that claim is dubious. “They have gone to these communities and
said sign this form if you want hurricane protection, instead of saying is it OK if
we block your sightlines or direct access to the beach with a beach structure that
provides you some protection. That’s a bit different. They’ve been inflating their
support for it…and I have concerns about why they’re doing that.”218 One city
councilor put it more bluntly, noting that “The Ike Dike is being driven by a small
core of Galvestonians who have, I think, a personal financial interest in it. You
have people who work in non-profits, sure, but they also sit on boards at all the
banks in our region. When the Ike Dike gets built, who is going to be lending the
capital for it? You have one person pushing it who has two firms named “Coastal
Solutions” and “Beach Reconstruction, Inc.” You can’t tell me they’re not trying to
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get their finger in the pie.”219 Put another way, the Ike Dike is far from the
foregone conclusion in Galveston that its progenitors often claim it is.
As a piece of physical infrastructure, the Ike Dike is emblematic of three
philosophical positions – two pertaining to environmental thought and one to
resilience theory. The first treats nature as a wild other – a dark, destructive force
in need of human control. This is common to most surge protection infrastructure,
as their necessity is premised on the idea that tropical storms and hazards are
dangerous yet controllable phenomena. For most other barrier islands, a
massive, multi-billion dollar defense system would be laughable. In Galveston,
however, the Ike Dike has garnered significant attention because of the highvalue petrochemical, shipping, and logistics operations on and around the island.
“It would cost about 1/3 of what was spent in New Orleans. When you look at the
shutdown of the petrochemical complex in Houston, that’s really nothing. We lose
that network and you’re talking about percentage points of GDP lost – just billions
and billions. The Ike Dike would cost far less than a single shutdown – and a
coastal spine is the only way to control surge risk on a barrier island like ours.”220
In a sense, the Ike Dike is viewed by its proponents as both a mechanism for
controlling nature and flood risk and as a messianic force – one capable of
sustaining the petrochemical-driven vitality of Galveston over the next century.
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The second philosophical foundation of the Ike Dike is the belief that
nature no longer exists – that ecological and sociological forces are
indistinguishable from one another. In Galveston, this flows from the
extraordinary impact of industrialization and coastal erosion control projects on
the physical landscape. The beaches rimming the island’s seawall must be
nourished every eighteen months – without it, they would be scoured completely
away in just a few years. The ship channel must be dredged every two years or it
would quickly become impassable for large container ships. The bay is rimmed
with acres of constructed marshland – projects that began during the 1970s and
continue today to soften the region’s edge. One proponent of the Ike Dike argued
that “it’s an excuse to restore the natural environment we’ve lost over the last
century. If you haven’t noticed, people here are always saying we need to stop
the Ike Dike and save nature. I’m like, where the hell is nature? This is not a
pristine environment. Galveston Island is completely human-derived – the sand
we’re sitting on top of right now was pumped here over one hundred years ago.
The only way to get any of that naturalness back is to build a coastal spine – that
gives you the opportunity to integrate major restoration projects into the
defensive ones.”221 This, too, hints at the messianic quality often ascribed to the
Ike Dike by its adherents. They tend to frame it is an instrument for both saving
the island and for saving nature.
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The third philosophical underpinning of the Ike Dike is driven by the
resistance approach to resilience found in engineering. In this body of resilience
theory, fracture-critical design – which involves developing massive, singlepurpose, structural solutions to flood-risk reduction – is the primary mode of
operation. In Galveston, the affinity for this sort of coastal engineering has roots
in the success of the island’s great seawall. An engineer working on the Ike Dike
described its viability in Galveston by saying that “avoidance is always your first
line of defense. But it’s usually not politically feasible – and it certainly isn’t here.
Then folks will often turn to wetlands. But in our research, they’re really good at
reducing rainfall-based flood damage; not so much for surge-based
flooding…because when the surge comes, it’s usually preceded by a forerunner,
so that the water rises to submerge the wetland long before the real surge
comes. The same is true for near-shore reefs – they just can’t provide the
protection you need in a situation like this.222 Only a coastal spine can protect
this region – and it needs protection. Simple avoidance or landscape approaches
won’t be enough.”223
Support for the Ike Dike is mostly comprised of the technocrats who
developed the proposal and the local elites in a position to benefit from its
construction. Though there is a broad consensus in and around Galveston to
build some form of surge protection, that general reservoir of support is not
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specific to the Ike Dike – despite what its progenitors might claim. One of the
marine scientists who first proposed the coastal spine project, noted that “I truly
believe we ought to have a defense similar to what the Dutch have…I know that
they worked there and they have proven themselves over many, many years. I
don’t see a reason why we can’t do it [in Galveston].”224
Though the influence of the Dutch on American coastal planning is wellknown in New Orleans, New York, and even Norfolk, their outsized influence in
Galveston emerged unexpectedly over the course of this project. Much of this is
owed to the way that the USACE evaluates coastal defense projects and the
proclivity of Dutch-like surge barriers to score well within their cost-benefit
assessment framework. A local coastal engineer noted that “It’s just not very
expensive…to build a coastal barrier. The Ike Dike might cost ten billion dollars –
at the most – but it’s likely to only run about six billion…maybe even five if you let
it be leaky. That’s just a rounding error for the Corps.”225 All told, supporters of
the Ike Dike have invested nearly six million dollars in its development –
$400,000 from the city of Galveston on its initial study, just over $1,000,000 to
model its impacts in grant funding, and $5,000,000 to continue studying its
environmental impacts via the National Science Foundation. While the project’s
support is quite deep, it’s also very narrow – the Ike Dike is favored by a handful
of ardent proponents, viewed agnostically by a significant portion of the region,
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and greeted with hostility by a number of other scientists, public officials, and
community organizations in and around Galveston.
Opposition to the Ike Dike is driven by a coalition of pragmatists, who
believe the project is unrealistic, and environmentalists, who believe that the
project would obliterate the local fisheries and ecosystem services provided by
the bay. Some of it is being driven by the resilience politics of the region. A public
official in Galveston remarked that “To me, the Ike Dike is really fanciful…I know
how DC works. There’s no fucking way we’re getting the Ike Dike. One of the
things [its supporters] will say is that the defense industry is here and they’re
right. But if you go to the refineries where the defense industry has contracts for
fuel and petrochemicals, there are already dikes around them.”226
The opposition to the project also includes those who are skeptical of the
Corps’ ability to deliver it in a timely fashion. Another local elected official noted
that “The current path for the Ike Dike funding is through a USACE program that
has yet to produce a single funded project…I think they put it there just to get rid
of it…People here think that if we go to DC and just shake some hands and
make our case that there’s going to be some breakthrough – that a guy who’s
worked in a senate office for three years is going to champion this to their
boss…But I think the Ike Dike has as much a chance of happening as Disney
opening up a theme park in Galveston.”227
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Still others I met with over the course of my fieldwork expressed
considerable doubt about the technical and economic challenges of building an
island-wide barrier system. One marine scientist remarked that “the costeffectiveness of [the Ike Dike] is dramatically bad when you consider that most of
the high-value infrastructure in Galveston Bay has already mitigated its own
hazards. The refinery complexes are already protected, so taking them out of the
cost-benefit equation just makes it very unlikely that any analysis of structural
flood protection is going to prove viable.”228
Though the Ike Dike dominated the local discourse in the immediate
aftermath of Hurricane Ike, its support waned as other ideas began to percolate.
A GLO official remarked that “my cursory view is that the cost-benefit ratio of the
Ike Dike is about half of what the [Centennial Gate and Ring Levee] projects
show. Those would come in around 3.5 or 4.0 and the Ike Dike is about 1.7…But
even if we did more analysis and those ratios came out to be even, there’s still a
big environmental question with the Ike Dike that the others won’t face – and that
could be the deal-breaker on the Ike Dike.”229 Put another way, the Ike Dike is
unlikely to satisfy the USACE’s cost-benefit requirements for project selection
and, even if it does, it seems unlikely to pass an alternatives assessment
between it and other proposals for Galveston. The GLO official went on to say
that “I try to be as objective as I can about this…but one thing I’ll note is that I’m
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concerned about the Ike Dike being a single system solution – and a very
expensive one at that. You have to put together the funding to build the entire
system at once because you need the whole system for it to be effective. But the
alternatives are more discrete projects that you could prioritize and tackle in a
manageable way with some immediate impacts. The Ike Dike concept just won’t
allow that.”230
The Centennial Gate and the Recovery of Nature
I’ll tell you what’s really frustrating – the emphasis on or diversion of
attention that the structural hazard mitigation people have created
in the Ike Dike…despite the fact that non-structural methods are
more cost-effective and easier to implement in the short-term in
Galveston. But it’s hard to get any oxygen to those ideas because
they aren’t conventional and, at least so far, they haven’t had the
kind of financial backing that the Ike Dike has.231
Formulated in response to the ecologically destructive potential of the Ike Dike,
the Centennial Gate System adopts a radically different approach to coastal
resilience. Rather than armoring the coastline with a single, monolithic
infrastructural barrier, the Centennial Gate System relies on several smaller
elements across the region. At the mouth of the Houston Ship Channel, it
proposes a retractable flood gate akin to the Delta Works installation in Holland.
Elsewhere, it relies on nature-based strategies to reduce surge impacts and
restore the hydrological functions of the coastal zone. Developed using the
results of SLOSH232 modeling analyses, it places oyster reefs, wetlands, and new
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dune complexes in strategic places along the coast. Its cost estimates range
from about $3-4 billion.233
Developed by a team of engineers and lawyers at Rice University, the
Centennial Gate System treats much of Galveston Island and Bolivar Peninsula
as sacrificial zones for the broader region. Drawing from ecological resilience
theory, it uses the island as a buffer and shock absorber for the rest of the
region.234 Historically, this role has defined the relationship between barrier
islands and the mainland. But, of course, this precedent predates modern human
settlement and its applicability to the industrial, petrochemical nature of
Galveston is questionable at best. Nevertheless, the Centennial Gate System
departs in several key ways from the resistance logic of the Ike Dike. It does so
by focusing on increasing the storage and buffering capacity of the regional
landscape.
The concept’s coalition of support is mostly comprised of Houston-based
researchers and environmentalists working throughout the Galveston Bay region.
A planner in Galveston noted that “It’s mainly…the SSPEED Center that are
driving the Centennial Gate proposal…It includes the big gate at the ship
channel, but it also uses dredge material to create islands, making a mid-bay…to
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counter the Ike Dike. They’re also pushing for more conservation and naturebased strategies, most of which feed into what they’re calling the ‘Lone Star
National Recreation Area’ – a Texas version of the national seashore by the
Golden Gate Bridge.”235
But the Centennial Gate has its own ardent opposition. Some are critical
of the influence of researchers in Houston on the fate of Galveston Island. A
marine scientists in the region remarked that “Rice is just driven by money.
They’re funded by the Houston Endowment…they literally funded Rice just to
contradict the Ike Dike for personal and political reasons…So we’ve pitted [Rice
and Texas A&M] against each other and we’re wasting lots of time and money,
duplicating efforts, and keeping findings secret…We shouldn’t be surprised that a
bunch of folks in Houston want to use Galveston as a surge barrier for their city –
but that doesn’t mean we should accept it.”236
Others have been critical about the staunch, ideological opposition from
environmental groups who, they argue, would try to block any major public works
project in Galveston. “You have all these hardcore people…especially
environmental attorneys…who get a lot of money to fight things. They wouldn’t
make any money unless they were able to convince folks that we are out to
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destroy the world…But so far, nobody can tell me anything they’ve done that has
stuck.”237
Though the Centennial Gate is as conceptually and politically fraught as
the Ike Dike in most respects, it does have some economic advantages. Its
estimated cost-benefit ratio is nearly double that of the Ike Dike. It also spreads
improvements around the entire bay, rather than isolating them along the
Galveston Island waterfront.238
The Centennial Gate System is archetypal of two philosophical positions –
one derived from environmental thought and one from resilience theory. The first
views nature – or, in this case, nature-based strategies – as instruments of
healing and restoration. It views nature as a fallen thing to be recovered if
humanity is to be redeemed. Amongst landscape architects, this is a familiar
trope. Designers often deploy images of lush, verdant landscapes to win
contracts from clients and support from communities for their services.
But many of these frames ignore the material benefits of urban greening –
the ecosystem services that urban ecology can provide and, in flood-prone
areas, the reduction in property damage they can facilitate. In coastal zones, the
notion of restoration and healing – particularly in the petrochemical landscape of
Galveston – is a powerful metaphor. A coastal engineer working on restoration
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projects in the area noted that “Over the years, Galveston Bay has lost
thousands of acres of wetland…and our oyster fisheries have only recently
begun to recover some of what was lost when the oil industry set up shop
here…There’s a lot of support for the National Seashore [component of the
Centennial Gate System] because people can wrap their heads around it much
more than they can the Ike Dike. Plus, few folks down here would have strong
feelings against wider beaches, taller dunes, and better wetland and bay
fisheries – and that’s really the core of the Gate proposal.”239
The second philosophical position underpinning the Centennial Gate
System is driven by the approach to resilience found in systems ecology theory.
In this body of literature, design and policy interventions are considered optimal
when they expedite a city’s return to normalcy after a disaster. In Galveston, the
affinity for this approach to coastal resilience is a product of ecological nostalgia
– or a desire amongst some to restore landscapes lost to industrialization over
the last century. A planner in Galveston remarked that “The beaches here used
to be much wider…and lined by all sorts of tourism destinations – hotels,
restaurants, and that sort of thing. We still have some of that – but it’s all very
kitschy and removed from the waterfront now…to enjoy the beachfront, you have
to cross a six-lane highway, on foot, to get from most restaurants to the water.
There’s nothing romantic about that.”240
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The same goes for industry and economic concerns in Galveston. An
economic development official on the island argued that “People here used to
make a living on the water…but there aren’t many fisherman left in Galveston
and our port, despite huge subsidies propping it up, isn’t able to compete
anymore…Some people look at the [Centennial] Gate proposal and see a way to
bring some of that back.”241 In Galveston, support for the Centennial Gate
System is inextricable from a nostalgia for a landscape and an economy that
predates modernity.
The Ring Levee and the Control of Nature
That’s one of the weaknesses around the Ike Dike argument. The
Ike Dike is saying that we’re going to go out there and put up this
thing like they have in Holland to prevent the sea from coming in
again. Well, we have the seawall and it has done a very good job of
protecting us from the kind of flood the Ike Dike is designed to
prevent The thing is, during Hurricane Ike, the flooding came in
from the bayside. The Ike Dike can’t fix that. We can just do a ring
levee system around Galveston for about $250 million. The Ike
Dike will cost at least $7 billion. Austin can pull the ring levee off.
We need DC to pull the Ike Dike off – and I don’t see that
happening in Texas.242
Drawing on the popularity and success of Galveston Island’s century-old seawall,
the Ring Levee proposal adopts a resistance approach akin to that of the Ike
Dike. Unlike its more monolithic analog, however, the Ring Levee proposal does
not aim to protect the entire coast evenly. Rather, it adopts a more strategic,
nuanced posture by encircling the densest clusters of population with levees and
treating the interstitial landscape as a sacrificial zone. It is a low-cost alternative
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to the Ike Dike and Centennial Gate systems, relying on neither a complex floodgrate operation nor the inclusion of any non-structural or nature-based strategies
in its scheme. Instead, the Ring Levee system would simply raise and harden
Galveston’s coastal edge, transforming the area from a fluid coastal zone into a
static coastline. In a sense, this proposal is an implicit endorsement of the notion
that nature and humanity cannot coexist – it is an argument in favor of them
being harshly delineated.
If built, the Ring Levee system would be vulnerable to two sources of
failure. One is that e management of flood protection infrastructure is highly
decentralized in the US. The USACE builds and operates most major coastal
infrastructure projects while local governments are tasked with maintaining them.
The problem with this model of governance is that few, if any, local governments
possess the financial or technical capacity necessary to take on such
maintenance. It is what undermined the levees in New Orleans long before
Hurricane Katrina and it would likely undermine the Ring Levees in Galveston
too. This lack of capacity is what inspired the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100
Resilient Cities Initiative – a global grant-making program that provides
vulnerable cities with funding for Chief Resilience Officers to help marshal the
financial and technical resources necessary to adapt to climate change.
Though it is a concern in all three proposals, it presents unique challenges
to the Ring Levee System. Unlike the Ike Dike – which requires monitoring and
maintenance on a single, large piece of infrastructure – or the Centennial Gate
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System – which mostly requires that kind of attention on a single gate structure –
the Ring Levee System is a complex patchwork of levees, most of which are
disconnected from one another. Managing a multi-jurisdictional system is hard
enough when it all ties into the same piece of physical infrastructure. The lesson
from New Orleans is that, when those disparate parts are not tied together, such
maintenance is nearly impossible.
The second source of potential failure is a product of the method used by
the USACE to evaluate projects. Under this system, the Corps is forced to make
the economic benefits of a project its primary concern – commercial activity,
industrial operations, and property values specifically. The environmental impacts
of a project are only considered qualitatively and, often, as an ancillary concern.
Ecosystem services cannot be considered. Under this system, the only metric
that matters it the cost-benefit ratio – which means that the heights of the levees
in this proposal would not be determined by the amount of flood protection the
community desires, but by the point at which the marginal benefit of additional
height begins to decline. The result would be a cheaper, more economically
efficient project that provides less overall protection to the Galveston Bay region.
Though this would impact all three proposals, it would be particularly harmful to
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the Ring Levee System given its wholesale reliance upon levees for resiliencemaking.243
The Ring Levee system is a product of two design philosophies. One, like
the Ike Dike, is that nature is a wild, chaotic force in need of human control. In
Galveston, this ideology predominates the discourse on coastal planning – and
has for more than a century. A public official in Galveston noted that “This debate
has been going on since at least Hurricane Carlo in 1961. The USACE led a big
study that went on for more than a decade…and it zeroed in on a ring levee
system as the best solution for Galveston – which, by the way, was the initial
plan for protecting Galveston before the 1900 Storm hit. But the city fathers and
the business community saw the West End as their tax base and, because the
levees excluded all the vacation homes out there, they wouldn’t agree to
anything that left them unprotected. The Corps came back and said extending
the levees that far wouldn’t pencil out – that they wouldn’t spend federal money
just to protect rooftops. So the city passed on the ring levees a half-century ago
and now here we are again – it’s always Groundhog Day on this island.”244
The other is borne of a resistance-based approach to engineering
resilience – one in which a fail-safe system is put in place to protect Galveston. In
this regard, the Ring Levee system is also related to the Ike Dike – both
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approach the issue of coastal resilience as one of control through structural
interventions that keep water out at any cost. But as one city councilor noted,
“neither one will get built – we have a chance if we get behind the ring levee right
now. It’s an easier ask, a lower threshold, and it’s probably a better project – it’s
certainly more strategic than a big dumb wall or spine across the entire coast.
But until the next storm hits, neither one is going to get built.”245
Settling for Nature in Norfolk
Few cities are as exposed to the risks of sea level rise and climate change as
Norfolk. Though the region’s experience with tropical storm events pales in
comparison to Galveston, its mean elevation – eight feet in Norfolk, ten feet in
the Tidewater Region – puts millions of people and billions of dollars in military
and freight operations at risk of inundation by 2100. Along the east coast, only
New York and Miami face greater exposure to rising seas – both of which
possess significantly more people and higher wages than Norfolk.246 This
condition – along with declining wages and wealth – has dominated the climate
change adaptation discourse in the city. As a result, there are no major structural
interventions planned for Norfolk – just a series of small physical interventions
overshadowed by a major, policy-driven approach to adaptation aimed at
bolstering the coping capacity of the region’s residents.
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Much of this is because, unlike Galveston and New York, Norfolk lacks
any recent or significant experience with disaster and the crisis-driven
urbanization that often proceeds it. Over the last half-century, no presidentially
declared disaster has focused on Norfolk – though it is often included in such
declarations due to its proximity to the more exposed community of Virginia
Beach and the tendency of such declarations to include political, pork-barrel
funding alongside disaster recovery funds.
As in the prior section on Galveston, I aim to accomplish two goals here.
The first is to provide a clear context for the issues related to climate change that
are facing Norfolk. The low-lying landscape, the density of major federal and
freight operational assets, and the resilience politics of Norfolk are all essential to
understanding that context. The second is to describe, assess, and critique three
proposals for coastal resilience that emerged in Norfolk after Superstorm Sandy:
the Chesterfield Heights Redevelopment Project, the Vision 2100 City Plan, and
the Fingers of High Ground Proposal.
The Contemporary Context for Coastal Resilience in Norfolk
We don’t have the same kind of surge risk that, say, Virginia Beach
does…and certainly not what Miami or New Orleans have. Norfolk
mostly deals with N’oreasters – extratropical winter storms that
dumps tons of rain and bring lots of wind-driven surge into the
city…That’s our biggest risk – well, besides finding ourselves at the
bottom of a slowly-filling bathtub.247
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The Chesapeake Bay watershed represents the largest ecological system within
the Tidewater Region of Virginia – for which Norfolk is the principal city. More
than 1.6 million people reside in the region, making it the thirty-seventh largest
metropolitan area in the US.248 Most of those residents live in homes with a
finished floor elevation of fifteen feet or less –placing at least one million people
and billions of dollars in property in the surge zone rimming the bay. The model
storm surge height used by the USACE in its disaster planning work is fifteen
feet.
In Norfolk, the precariousness of living in a surge zone is already evident
during monthly high tide events – when the Bay spills into the streets of
downtown Norfolk as it pushes its way through sewer outfalls that, as a result of
sea level rise, are now below mean high tide. When those monthly high tides are
coupled with small rain events, downtown Norfolk becomes a literal extension of
the Chesapeake – kayakers routinely paddle through the streets when the city’s
sewer system becomes overwhelmed by these dual forces.
Though the slow overwhelming of Norfolk’s stormwater infrastructure
began reaching a critical point more than a decade ago, Superstorm Sandy
brought national attention to the city’s issues. This is how Norfolk came to
receive its first substantial round of climate change adaptation funding in 2013.
Superstorm Sandy – which ravaged the Northeast megaregion in October 2012 –
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left Norfolk relatively unscathed. But the post-Sandy disaster recovery
appropriations included funding for the USACE to conduct a surge and flood-risk
assessment for coastal communities along the majority of the eastern seaboard –
Maine to South Carolina. Known as NACCS – the North American Coast
Comprehensive Survey – the Corps’ work focused on two outcomes. One was to
measure and describe the risks posed by sea level rise along the east coast.
This amounted to a straightforward mapping exercise, in which various sea level
rise scenarios were overlaid with the results of SLOSH modeling to illustrate and
define which areas faced the greatest risk of regular inundation. The second was
to identify a series of design responses to those risks – a “project wish-list”, as
one member of the USACE described it.249 Though it focused heavily on the
conventional, grey infrastructure projects often associated with the Corps, it also
became the first major USACE study to explicitly call for the use of nature-based
strategies as instruments of flood-risk management. They received particular
emphasis in and around Norfolk. The aim of that list was to provide the USACE
Districts along the east coast with a rough work plan to guide their operations
over the next several decades.
The NACCS proved important for at least two reasons. One is that it
formally established nature-based strategies within the lexicon of the Corps.
Though other initiatives preceded it, this post-Sandy moment became the push
the USACE needed to begin considering an alternative approach to coastal
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resilience. “We really…had to have some hard conversations [in the Corps] about
what role some of our other, older projects might have played in making Sandy
worse for some communities and how we might expand the kinds of projects we
produce by considering non-structural protections like nature-based ones.”250
The other is that NACCS provided a roadmap for other coastal districts to identify
risk-mitigating projects going in the three-by-three-by-three era of the Corps. By
breaking regional surge protection projects into smaller, discrete projects,
NACCS allowed local districts to develop manageable work plans that avoided
the expense and time of requesting waivers – a procedure that would have been
necessary to design and construct any regional flood-risk management project
after the reforms took effect. Coastal Texas – a similarly scaled and ambitious
study of the state’s coast by the Corps – is modeled after NACCS and will
include project recommendations in and around Galveston.
As the NACCS began to take shape, two additional, Rockefeller
Foundation-funded initiatives began to focus on Norfolk: the Structures of
Coastal Resilience (SCR) program and the 100 Resilient Cities (100RC)
Initiative. Unlike the Rebuild by Design competition in New York, the SCR
program was organized around funding more conventional design research in
areas impacted by Superstorm Sandy. Built around four teams at Princeton
University, the University of Pennsylvania, City College of New York, and
Harvard University, it tasked interdisciplinary teams of engineers, scientists, and
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designers with developing prototypical ideas for climate adaptation in four urban
areas: Narragansett Bay (RI), Jamaica Bay (NY), Atlantic City (NJ), and Norfolk
(VA). In Norfolk, a Penn-led team developed a proposal known as Fingers of
High Ground – a strategic retreat concept in which areas of existing high ground
would be raised, reinforced, and then densely populated while low-lying areas in
the Tidewater Region were sacrificed. As a local marine scientist remarked, “it’s
what we would do if we planned for a retreat…Some version of this will probably
happen, it just won’t be this well-organized. It will be market-driven and ad
hoc.”251
The other intervention in Norfolk came via the 100RC initiative. The
Rockefeller Foundation recognized earlier than most that a limiting factor in
which cities would be able to adapt to climate change and which would not was
their capacity to marshal and analyze large and complex datasets. Put another
way, a key factor in determining which cities would successfully navigate the
subject of coastal resilience was their capacity – human and financial – to
effectively plan with uncertainty. As a result, the 100RC initiative sought to
identify cities in need of greater capacity and to provide them with the funding
necessary to hire a Chief Resilience Officer, whose principal duty would be to
work across local government agencies to develop a resilience plan for the city.
In Norfolk, the result of the Rockefeller Foundation’s investment came in the form
of Vision 2100 – a new city plan focused on the issue of sea level rise.
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Developed in concert with the USACE, the Dutch government, and experts in
academia and private practice, the plan ultimately eschewed the kinds of big,
structural interventions found in Galveston. Instead, Vision 2100 called for a
series of modest, grey-green hybrid interventions in Norfolk’s most vulnerable
neighborhoods and a much more ambitious programmatic agenda aimed at
raising incomes and individual coping capacity amongst the city’s residents. As
one of the planners who worked on the document described it, “Vision 2100
basically acknowledges that Norfolk is going under…and that the best thing we
can do for our residents is to give them each the best tools for navigating a
wetter, less certain future.”252
One of the first projects to be developed from Vision 2100 is what has
become known as the Chesterfield Heights Redevelopment Plan (CHRP).
Chesterfield Heights is a mostly African-American, mixed-income neighborhood
less than a mile from downtown Norfolk. Funded through a HUD appropriation as
part of the National Disaster Resilience Competition, CHRP is emblematic of the
broader resilience strategy in Norfolk: it primary focus is on parcel-level
interventions, though the bulk of the HUD appropriation will go towards building a
hybrid grey-green edge protection. As one of the architects of the plan described
it, “CHRP is a pilot for the governing philosophy we’d like to push here in Norfolk
– that resilience is best achieved here through individual actions…so we’d like to
use this as a way to demonstrate that property-owners can mitigate much of their
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own risk with a small subsidy and that [the government] should play a more
passive, facilitative role.”253
Together, these resilience strategies illustrate a key departure from the
conventional approach to coastal planning in Norfolk – the recognition that large,
structural protections cannot and should not be viewed as a panacea in flood risk
mitigation. In this regard, Norfolk represents a sharp break from Galveston and
the mega-projects dominating its planning efforts. Some of this is a product of the
difference in the risks facing each city. Galveston is mostly concerned about
storm surge – a product of both its recent experience with Hurricane Ike and its
position as a barrier island. Norfolk is both less experienced with storm events
and less exposed to wave energy – and thus it follows that its approach to
coastal resilience would be less dramatic.
The Fingers of High Ground and an Ordered Nature
The fingers of high ground proposal – we’ll probably never achieve
the level of implementation of effectiveness that’s in these
documents, but, nevertheless, a version of that is probably the only
practical way that one could manage the transition from what we
have today to a functioning, human-occupied coastline in
Norfolk.254
The proposal known as Fingers of High Ground is a strategic retreat concept that
draws upon the forms and processes endemic to the Tidewater Region to create
space for ecosystems to migrate and human settlements to shift from territories
of high risk to ones of relative protection. It operates across two scales. One is as
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a relatively modest prototype intended as a proof-of-concept intervention over the
short-term. At this scale, the proposal aims to identify areas of strategic high
ground – places that will be dry and tenable through 2100 – and to direct or
intensify new development towards them by raising or protecting them with new
forms of hard and soft infrastructure. Around those high points, Fingers then calls
for a variety of nature-based strategies in the lower-lying zones to restore
floodplain functions, enable ecosystem migration, and provide continued access
to the waterfront for Norfolk residents.
The second scale at which Fingers of High Ground proposes to operate
involves a diffusion of its best prototypes across the Virginia coast over the next
half-century. Because the concept is novel and viewed somewhat skeptically by
the USACE, the proposal’s authors – Anu Mathur and Dilip Di Cuhna – argued
that this prototyping approach is the best way create buy-in for the concept
before deploying it at a much larger scale. They also argue that, at least in
Virginia, this tactical, small-scale approach is necessary, given the complexity of
the coastline and the paucity of physical, infrastructural options available to
protect Norfolk. This proposal aims to coordinate those small actions into a
system of flood protection that is greater than the sum of its parts.
Conceptually, this proposal is mostly without an analog in the US. In
Galveston, the various proposals for coastal resilience are each predicated on
dampening storm energy and, as a result, comprised of large, structural
interventions. Many of New York’s RBD proposals are similarly designed. Those
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that are not – including the Living Breakwaters proposal – are focused on
restoring landscapes lost to urbanization over the last century, not creating a
new, novel ecology for a wetter world. Based on my interviews and review of the
public documents associated with the project, I believe this is the result of at least
two underlying premises. One is that Norfolk is going under – no project can
keep the city dry, not when its sewer outfalls are already sending seawater into
the streets at high tide. Norfolk will always flood and, as time goes on, those
floods will become more frequent and more severe as its stormwater
management infrastructure is overwhelmed. The second is that it would be futile
to work against the existing, crenulated landforms of the Virginia coast. The
Fingers of High Ground proposal is, in essence, a plan to accentuate the
peninsulas, spits, and ridges that traverse the Tidewater Region – to do for
Norfolk what nature and conventional engineering could not: build a lasting
refuge for human settlement on the coast.
The proposal is built around the idea that natural advantages can be
accentuated to build resilience in cities. For Norfolk and the Hampton Roads
Region, this means pursuing a two-part strategy along the coast. The first is
raise, reinforce, and structurally encase the existing – and somewhat sparse –
fingers of high elevation along the Virginia coastal plain. Akin to the cruder, early20th century grade-raising and seawall construction in Galveston, the success of
the Fingers proposal depends on the ability to re-engineer the region’s entire
coastal environment. Though the USACE has not placed the project into its
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larger, mid-Atlantic study plans, several of its officers expressed an admiration
for the project’s ambition – and skepticism, as a result of its extraordinary
expense, towards its feasibility. One member of the Corps remarked that “if
money weren’t an object…it’s probably the way we’d want to go. But there’s a
reason why managed retreats – and especially managed retreats…coupled with
big new infrastructure investments don’t get built much in this country: they’re
way too expensive. We can’t really justify including it in our alternative
assessment yet…because of that [high probable cost].”255
The second element of the Fingers strategy is equally ambitious – and
politically and economically fraught. It calls for abandoning the lowest-lying
portions of the Hampton Roads region, both as a mechanism for removing the
risk of living along the coast and for creating the housing demand necessary to
densely populate the new fingers of high ground it would create. It is a textbook
example of an avoidance approach to resilience – in which people are simply
removed from risky landscapes whenever possible.
Avoidance or managed retreats are quite good at reducing coastal risk.
But the reason they are rarely executed in the U.S. stems from their high
expense and their impact on cultural cohesion. Such efforts often require buyouts
or land swaps – policy instruments that involve the purchase of high-risk
properties by government agencies, which, as one can imagine, adds up rather
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quickly. For instance, the average home price in Norfolk is about $200,000. Just
to buyout a thousand homeowners along the coast – not to relocate nor to invest
in any of the other necessary upgrades – would cost at least $200 million. An
elected official in Norfolk remarked that “The thing about [Fingers of High
Ground] is that it would reset the land development market…and create a new
set of incentives for where to build and live in Norfolk.”256
That sort of mass relocation also disrupts years worth of social capital and
cohesion – a trait disaster researchers consider extraordinarily important to the
recovery and adaptation process.257 A marine scientist whose work focuses on
the Hampton Roads region noted that, “If you look at the current array of
residential development, commercial development, and topography, you can
pretty much figure out – no matter what we do to the shoreline – what parts will
be wet and which will be dry. So if we ask ourselves ‘what’s the best way to
manage or control that inundation’, then a managed retreat like [Fingers of High
Ground] is probably our best-case scenario…But it gets difficult when you realize
that whatever you do will be inequitable and will cause political problems – it will
create winners and losers across the Tidewater Region…Norfolk and Virginia
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Beach might be OK…but Hampton and Portsmouth will be screwed because
there’s no way we can coordinate an idea like this across such a large region.”258
But Fingers also taps into the fatalistic sentiments expressed in chapter
three. Norfolk is, for the most part, going to be inundated by sea level rise. The
questions that the city’s leaders must answer now are: how long can that
inundation be forestalled? Over the long-term, how can its impacts be
minimized? A marine scientist went on to note that “The simple answer is that our
landform is just not designed for massive defense structures. The shoreline is too
crenulated and everything is too low – it would take a truly massive structure to
defend it…something bigger than the Dutch or Brits have done…It also turns out
that doing something like that in Norfolk…just wouldn’t do much for N’oreasters,
which are the most common storm event here and which are mostly wind-driven
events, so water heights would still rise in the bay.”
Despite relatively unanimous praise for the concept as a creative and
high-performing work of coastal resilience, the policy-makers and technical
experts I spoke with in Norfolk did not view Fingers as a project that is likely to be
implemented. “The [proposal] is a planned version of the retreat we’ll have to
make – where we make thoughtful decisions about where to invest, divest, and
shift things around…The more likely scenario is that no such planning takes hold
and we’re left with an ad hoc version of Fingers of High Ground, where some
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retreat occurs by those who can afford to move and everyone else is left to fend
for themselves against rising seas.”259 This is less an indictment of the proposal
than of the politics of resilience, but it nevertheless underscores an important and
often overlooked issue with most coastal design proposals: they tend to be
agnostic towards the political actors, institutions, and economics that would
govern their implementation. Without a political strategy of commensurate
thoughtfulness and creativity, design intelligence cannot be translated from
renderings and conceptual plans into reality.
The Vision 2100 Plan, Chesterfield Heights, and Dystopian Natures
The simple solutions here are hard to find. They’re there – but only
if you’re willing to invest in things that might provide you with a
century’s worth of protection but that are ultimately doomed to
fail…low dykes or surge barriers in strategic places, for instance.
But it’s really tough – you have much more flood risk to work
against here than you do in Holland… the bottom line is that, for
Norfolk, the high point is about ten feet above sea level. The SLR
curves show about seven feet of rise by 2100, so the city is
effectively doomed.260
Norfolk’s Vision 2100 Plan – and the Chesterfield Heights Redevelopment Plan
(CHRP) that emerged from it – are products of this fatalistic outlook on the city’s
future. Developed by the city’s planning and public works staff, they are mostly
devoid of any major structural interventions – there are no Ike Dikes or Living
Breakwaters or Fingers of High Ground on the docket in Norfolk. Instead, the
Vision 2100 Plan and the CHRP are focused on policy interventions that are, in
essence, local anti-poverty programs. As a result, the plan has little to do with
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environmental philosophies regarding nature – other than to tacitly acknowledge
that humanity can neither fully understand nor fully control it. But its connection to
resilience theory is worthy of greater discussion.
No other proposal – in Norfolk, Galveston, or New York – is as tethered to
the principles of social resilience and coping capacity as Vision 2100 and the
CHRP. This body of resilience theory argues that social bonding and capital are
the most important factors in determining a community’s ability to cope with and
recover from disaster – and that strong, relatively stable or improving
neighborhoods are the best way to foster those relationships.
Vision 2100 focuses on those attributes by calling for new investments in
community development programs that include job training, housing affordability,
and strategic densification – all with the aim of providing residents with the tools
they need, at an individual level, to cope with rising seas. A public official in the
city remarked that “We’re basically looking at it and saying…there are areas that
should be left alone, because they’re fine as they are or because there’s nothing
we can do for them…but most of the city is in the middle, where we can make a
50- or 100-year investment in neighborhoods...from a public works perspective,
but where it’s critical that find ways to keep people in their homes as insurance
rates rise, the local economy changes, and the frequency of recurrent flooding
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goes up…it doesn’t do us any good to keep the water away if there aren’t any
people left.”261
Only a few small, strategic infrastructural projects are planned. An
engineer in Norfolk noted that “Where you’ll see [the city] doing work in Norfolk
will be with nature-based strategies in areas tied to restoring floodplain function.
So it will be in areas where models are predicting inundation or tidal inundation
zones…where we can make a simple case around national economic benefit.”262
Norfolk’s Vision 2100 Plan is built around the idea that neighborhood effects are
key to promoting social resilience, and that social resilience is the key to
producing urban resilience across the entire city. Only a few small, strategic
infrastructural projects are planned.
The CHRP is an extension of that logic. Developed during Norfolk’s Dutch
Dialogues, the CHRP received $120 million in HUD funding through the National
Disaster Resilience Competition in the spring of 2016 – one of the largest awards
appropriated. “Basically, we’re going to use that money to raise a couple of
roads, raise the edge, and that will wipe out most of the grant. But we also have
a living shoreline in the proposal and about $20 million set aside for an incentive
program to encourage homeowners to do parcel-level water management with
on-site green infrastructure…rain gardens, green roofs, that sort of thing.”263 A
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microcosm of the city’s Vision 2100 Plan, the CHRP calls for a few minor
structural protections buttressed by a much more ambitious, policy-driven
intervention at the individual scale. “The hope is that Chesterfield Heights can
become a pilot for the rest of the city…where we find a way to blend parcel-level
stormwater management…with some strategic, nature-based strategies along
the edge…that give us one-hundred years of protection.”264
If the Fingers proposal suffers from an excess of ambition, then these two
risk setting the bar for success so low that it will not matter if Norfolk attains it.
Giving residents the tools – financial, social, and political – to cope with climate
change is vitally important. In fact, planners and designers in other cities would
be wise to learn that lesson from Norfolk.
But it cannot be the only thing – or, I would argue, the primary thing – that
they develop. Individual level resilience strategies will only get most cities so far.
At some point, more ambitious, physical design strategies must become part of
the plan. Whether in the form of levees or dunes, seawalls or seagrass, the
physical and social components of cities must come together to build resilience.
Natural Chaos in New York
The relationship between New York and Galveston and Norfolk, though
important, is less evident than the relationship between America’s largest city
and other coastal, global urban centers. Though there are clear political,
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regulatory, and risk-based parallels between the three cities, New York stands
apart for at least two reasons. One is that the stakes there are much higher.
There are eight million people in the city and twenty-two million in the
metropolitan region – 3.5 times larger than the Houston-Galveston region and
nearly 14 times larger than the Norfolk-Tidewater Region.
New York is also the world’s largest urban economy; Houston-Galveston
is 17th and Norfolk is unranked.265 Though New York will surely inform coastal
planning efforts in the US, its locus of influence will mostly extend beyond our
borders to other coastal, global cities outside of the US. What happens in New
York will not always matter in other cities along the East and Gulf coasts.
Though New York has experienced a variety of disruptive and catastrophic
events – the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center Attack chief among them –
none exposed the sort of existential threat to the city that Superstorm Sandy did
in 2012. Sandy – a massive and slow-moving, extratropical storm – made clear
to the public what prior planning and design competitions had shown: the city’s
population centers and primary economic assets were all highly exposed to rising
seas and storm surge. It triggered an intense phase of crisis-driven urbanization
– that forced public officials and residents to reconsider how New York’s
relationship with the sea might evolve over the course of the next century. A
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variety of initiatives and efforts made up that process of reexamination, but two
are of particular relevance to this dissertation: the Special Initiative for Rebuilding
and Resiliency (SIRR) Report and the Rebuild by Design (RBD) competition.
This section aims to accomplish two goals. The first is to provide a fuller
context for the flood-related risks facing New York – which areas are most
vulnerable, what ideas about adaptation were circulating before Sandy, and how
did the RBD organizers hope to exploit the post-storm moment to transform the
city. The second is to describe, assess, and critique the three winning design
proposals that received funding through the RBD competition: the BIG U or
Dryline in Manhattan, Living Breakwaters in Staten Island, and Lifelines in the
Bronx. I use semi-structured interviews and public document analysis to do so.
The Contemporary Context for Coastal Resilience in New York
Before Sandy, no one [in New York] really gave much thought to
the risks posed by storm surge. Sure, we [and other designers] had
played around with the impacts of sea level rise, but even
that…was only loosely connected to reality. Sandy brought all that
to the fore for the city…we had to turn towards our waterfront in a
way that hadn’t been done since maybe the Dutch fortified
Manhattan in the eighteenth century.266
New York’s urban ecology is characterized by a constellation of small, elongated
islands, peninsulas, sounds strewn across the confluence of the Hudson River,
East River, and Atlantic Ocean. With twenty-two million residents, the New York
tristate area is the nation’s most populous metropolitan region.267 One might
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expect this to make the city a perpetual site for consternation and contemplation
about the fate of coastal US cities as global climate change sets in. But, until
recently, New York has not garnered the kind of attention on that subject that
cities like New Orleans, Miami, and even Norfolk have. This is due to the
relatively high mean elevation of New York – Manhattan in particular, where the
average finished floor elevation is more than twenty-two feet above mean high
tide. Recall that this elevation is six feet in Norfolk and eleven in Galveston.
The urgency facing those other cities simply was not present in New York
before Superstorm Sandy. New York City has both a higher mean elevation than
either Galveston or New York and much less experience with disaster than most
cities along the Gulf and East Coast. Despite a vast reservoir of technical
expertise and financial resources, New York placed relatively little emphasis on
preparing for sea level rise and storm surge risk in its planning documents. Other
aspects of climate change – including reducing urban heat and mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions – received the lion’s share of attention in those
documents.268
This vacuum of leadership on issues pertaining to coastal resilience and
adaptation created space for artists and designers to begin speculating on New
York’s relationship with rising seas. Their work became organized through the
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“On the Water” competition and the “Rising Currents” exhibition administered by
the Van Allen Institute in 2009 and the Museum of Modern Art 2010. Wild and
uninhibited by political, financial, or even technical constraints, the ideas
generated through these two initiatives nevertheless developed three core
principles that went on to frame all future work in the city: to soften the city’s
edges wherever possible through green infrastructure, to create more permeable
surface-level stormwater management in the city, and to restore and create a
robust marine ecosystem in Hudson River Estuary. Of course the tactics outlined
in On the Water and Rising Currents for meetings those goals proved somewhat
fanciful – it seems both unlikely and, from a feasibility and a risk reduction
perspective, unwise to invest in marshes along the southern tip of Manhattan or
oyster reefs in New York Harbor.
Those ideas proved as impractical as they were improbable – oyster reefs
might improve the water quality of the Harbor, but they would not impact the
effects of sea level rise or storm surge269, and the Manhattan waterfront lacks the
acreage necessary to build enough marshland to make a dent in either.270 As a
participant in those initiatives described, these proposals were “more about
Artists Against Climate Change than about solving any of the problems
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associated with it…we were there to draw attention to the issue…I don’t think any
of the proposals were particularly serious or effective works of resilience.”271 But
that frivolity was part of each initiative’s intent. They were not intended to result in
shovel-ready projects for New York officials to pick-up and implement. On the
Water and Rising Currents were designed to develop broad, thematic ideas
about how, where, and when the city should focus on preparing its coast for
climate change. In that regard, they should be viewed as highly successful and
as influential precursors to the post-Sandy RBD competition.
RBD launched in the summer of 2013 as a four-stage, interdisciplinary
design competition to “promote innovation by developing regionally scalable but
locally contextual solutions that increase resilience in the region.”272 The first
stage, an RFP, generated one hundred forty-eight submissions, from which ten
were chosen to proceed, including teams led by HR&A Associates, Sasaki and
Rutgers University, WXY and West 8, Bjarke Ingels Group, Olin and the
University of Pennsylvania, OMA, MIT’s Center for Advanced Urbanism,
Waggoner & Ball and unabridged, SCAPE, and Interboro partners. The second
stage provided each team with a unique site to research and the third stage
challenged those teams to develop a series of design propositions in response to
their respective sites. The fourth stage of the competition involved a juried review
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of those proposals and the selection of seven winners to receive a
disproportionate share of the $1 billion allocated to RBD. That jury – comprised
of international planning and design experts – made their selections in June
2014, marking the end of the competition. Their selections included proposals
from the Bjarke Ingels Group team (Manhattan), the Olin and Penn team (the
Bronx), the OMA team (Hoboken), the MIT team (the Meadowlands), the
Waggoner & Ball team (Bridgeport), the SCAPE team (Staten Island), and the
Interboro team (Long Island). Four of the winning teams – MIT, OMA, Waggoner
& Ball, and Interboro – focused on sites outside of New York. Three others –
SCAPE, Bjake Ingels Group, and Olin/Penn – were developed in one of New
York’s five boroughs. Those NYC projects are the subject of analysis in this
section.
The Dryline Proposal and Anti-Wildness in Manhattan
The big design flaw in RBD was that they did not find a mechanism
to, in a way, continue with actually rebuilding by design within any
of these proposals. There is very much a seizure between what
RBD was and what this next phase of project development is going
to be…and the rupture is proving to be really impactful…we don’t
know what will happen with any of our work of if we’ll even be able
to shape it going forward.273
The BIG U or Dryline proposal for Southern Manhattan is a surge barrier system
comprised of three key elements: (1) the Battery Berm, (2) the Bridging Berm,
and (3) a retractable floodwall running parallel to portions of FDR Drive. If
completed, the project would span some ten miles of waterfront, wrapping
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around the southern tip of Manhattan from East 40th street, across the Lower
East Side, the Village, and up to West 54th Street. Each berm would anchor a
sweeping system of green, coastal infrastructure aimed at integrating recreation
and risk reduction around one of the most densely populated and wealthy
enclaves in the United States. The retractable barriers would serve as a
connection between those earthen berms. Together, the three core elements of
the U-shaped system aim to completely reshape Manhattan’s waterfront by
creating a dry line of defense against future surge events. It also clearly builds
upon and draws from the “New Urban Ground” proposal developed by
dlandstudio during the “Rising Currents” exhibition. Susannah Drake, author of
that project, noted that New Urban Ground “is more than a response to the need
to control the input and outflow of water; it also provides an opportunity to
transform the urban experience.”274 In many ways, Drake’s soft-U for Manhattan
laid the intellectual groundwork for BIG to develop the Dryline. BIG’s proposal
received $335 million in RBD funding, the highest amount of any project funded
through the competition.275
But the project’s transformation of Southern Manhattan’s waterfront raises
some important concerns about the proposal – and, more generally, the RBD
competition. The first phase of the Dryline – a 2.5 mile segment running from
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Montgomery Street to East 23rd Street – is projected to cost more than $1 billion.
Implementing that one, small section of the Dryline will take years – building all or
most of the proposal is likely to take decades. This is problematic for at least
three reasons. One is that RBD failed to identify a long-term funding or
management strategy for its winning proposals. The more time that passes, the
less likely the City of New York or its federal partners are to prioritize funding for
the Dryline. Construction costs become more expensive, environmental
regulations become more stringent, and political support becomes less intense
as more time passes.
For this project in particular a partially built Dryline would be devastating
for residents of Southern Manhattan. One of the project’s designers remarked
that “the compartments [of the Dryline]…while something in and of themselves,
are connected to each other and create a system of flood protection that is
greater than the sum of all its parts.”276
The Dryline proposal is comprised of a several one-to-three mile long
compartments that, unless connected, cannot provide any real degree of flood
protection. That’s because the project is designed using a resistance-approach to
resilience, pushing water away from the neighborhoods protected by the Dryline.
All of that displaced water must go elsewhere and, until the entire U is
completed, that elsewhere will be the neighborhoods of Southern Manhattan that
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are adjacent to its completed segments. At its best, the Dryline will be of great
benefit to the residents of Southern Manhattan and incredible cost to their
neighbors. At its worst, it will protect a few wealthy pockets of people in and
around the Financial District and leave the rest of Manhattan to fend for itself.
Of course, some areas must receive the first round of protection over
others. But who receives it – and who does not – is a political choice, a product
of the resilience politics of coastal design. Giving that first round of protection to
the wealthiest enclave in Manhattan means that other, lower capacity
neighborhoods will remain exposed to storm surge and climate change longer –
and bear the considerable risk of being among the neighborhoods included in the
Dryline plan, but excluded from whatever portions of it are actually built. This is
not the fault of the designers, per se. City officials are the ones who will ultimately
make that decision. But the Dryline proposal – and its compartmentalized nature
– lends itself to this kind of political exploitation and, in that regard, presents a
cautionary tale for other designers.
The second issue is a product of the programmatic structure of the RBD
competition. Because only one team worked on the Southern Manhattan site,
New Yorkers have mostly been denied an opportunity to debate competing
proposals for how best to protect the borough. Though this became a
competition-wide issue, it is acutely troublesome for the Dryline given its high
cost – no other funded project is expected to approach its massive price tag. It is
also disappointing, given that, in all likelihood, whatever was proposed for
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Manhattan during the RBD competition would have been awarded substantial
public funding. There are simply too many people and too many commercial
assets there to leave unprotected. A designer from a competing RBD team noted
that “they were always going to build something there…that’s why so many
teams wanted the Southern Manhattan site. They knew they could propose
almost anything and it would get built…because that’s the locus of financial and
political power in this city and that’s who we all knew would get protection
first.”277 The notion of competition implies that, from a set of competing ideas and
arguments, the Dryline emerged from RBD as the best possible design concept
for Southern Manhattan, yet, the reality of the competition’s one team, one site
structure ensured that no such competitive process could occur.
The final challenge presented by the Dryline is both philosophical and
functional: it treats nature as an ornamental quality instead of an instrumental
process. By that I mean that the project is emblematic of the shift in design
culture to portray resilience and climate change adaptation as problems easily
solved through green-washing. Projects can certainly do both – project an image
that romanticizes nature and delivers on its promise of resilience. But that is a
fine line to walk.
Though verdant and socially vibrant renderings might appeal to clients and
portions of the public, they often elide past the more serious technical and
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functional issues that must be addressed in coastal resilience projects. A public
official in New York City noted that “Developers love [the Dryline] because it’s a
plan to completely redevelop the Lower East Side – that’s not the LES any of us
in New York know. They’re going to erase life as we know it and replace it with
architectural objects. It will beget a huge number of new higher-end residential
buildings, and yet the Governor and Mayor and the designers will all come to the
Alfred Smith houses to hold a press conference about the project…It’s not going
to work out well for their community partners…but they weren’t really interested
in them anyway. This is a tool for redevelopment, not resilience.”278
There is a playful frivolity is much of BIG’s other work, and they rely on
spectacle, style, and programmatic novelty to good effect. But it’s unclear how
well that approach will translate to New York’s waterfront. As its core, the Dryline
uses a fairly conventional approach to coastal protection. It employs berms and
floodwalls to reduce surge risk. That those structural protections are adorned
with lush landscape plantings, public art, and playful recreational programming
has less to do with coastal resilience and more to do with extending the long-held
desire of New York City’s planners to further amenitize the coast.
The greatest risk facing the Dryline, then, is that its core elements will be
built – in part of whole – while its other, more compelling components are
stripped away. It is easy to imagine the city or its federal partners cost-
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engineering away the parks, gardens, and architectural interventions in the
proposal and building a fairly simply – and droll – berm and wall system along the
coast. Because the proposal’s most compelling parts are layered on top of those
core, protective elements – rather than integrated into them – they risk being
discarded if and when the project’s costs become a political liability.
The Living Breakwaters Proposal and Re-Natured Coasts on Staten Island
The core idea of Living Breakwaters is taking the destructive force
out of wave action…Rebuild by Design did not ask anyone to
consider retreat. In other countries…that’s the first thing on the
table. That simply wasn’t part of our program. So I see this project
as stepping down risk and moving the loss of life from the
equation…So it’s resilient in a sense that there can be some stillwater flooding…but it will mean that you can just wear your Tevas
and walk around in it because the water will be cleaner and slower,
and one can recover from that condition much more easily.279
The SCAPE proposal for Staten Island is organized around a series of oyster
reefs and other designed ecologies along the shore. The reefs – first proposed
as a part of Kate Orff’s “Oyster-tecture” project in the “Rising Currents” exhibition
– are relatively simple propositions.280 The Living Breakwaters act to reduce
wave energy and to improve local water quality by using human-built reef
structures to attract oysters and shellfish that can both filter pollutants and
revitalize a long-lost fishing and eco-tourism-based recreation industry. The nearshore interventions are then coupled with architectural and programmatic
elements along the beach in an attempt to “stitch the culture and ecology of
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Staten Island’s waterfront together.”281 Those “water hubs” – or community and
recreational facilities along the shore – would act as social anchors, providing
waterborne recreation opportunities, new public space, and marine education
programming to the neighborhoods of Staten Island. One of the project’s
designers described it by saying that “the hope is that these core elements – the
breakwaters and the water hubs – could become like a toolkit…that the City of
New York could then take and distribute all along the outer boroughs…so that
this one small pilot in Staten Island becomes a blueprint for recovering a marine
ecology that used to thrive here.”282 SCAPE’s project is an exercise in
prototyping that is intended to spread, over time, across the coastal edge of the
Northeast. The Living Breakwaters proposal received $60 million in funding
through RBD.
It is certainly true that the modularity of SCAPE’s proposal hews closely to
one of the central tenets of resilience theory – that robust systems are comprised
of redundant, overlapping elements that each provide a multitude of functions. Its
creative use of shellfish as an organizing device also clearly fulfills the RBD
competition’s desire for design innovation. But the project’s reliance upon oysters
and other bivalves creates a troubling vulnerability in its logic. Ocean acidification
– a chemical process in which atmospheric CO2 is rapidly dissolved into the
ocean, raising its pH level – is one of the first global climate change effects to
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materialize. It is also one of the most difficult to address. It is already wreaking
havoc on the oyster and mussel fisheries of the Pacific Northwest and the North
Atlantic. There, increasing oceanic acidity is dissolving the shells of bivalves,
making it harder for them to live long enough to breed and to provide the kinds of
water quality benefits that are part and parcel to the Living Breakwaters
proposal.283 These effects are projected to escalate over the next century,
potentially collapsing the oyster and mussel fisheries of North America.284
Though there is merit in investing in solutions that buy communities 20 or 50years of protection – and Living Breakwaters may do that – this proposal is being
framed as a solution to flood risk, not an instrument for forestalling the inevitable.
Living Breakwaters also faces some vexing technical questions. I
interviewed more than a dozen marine scientists and engineers about the use of
near shore reefs to reduce storm-related flood risks, and their response to the
performative ability of such an idea was unanimous: it would provide some
shoreline stabilization benefits, but it would not do much to reduce surge risk.
This is mostly due to the hydrodynamic characteristics of coastal storm events.
Their maximum surge – the maximum flood height delivered by the storm – is
always preceded by a forerunner. A forerunner is the pre-surge – a dramatic
increase in wave heights that can reach as high as 75% of the maximum surge
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height and arrive days in advance. A marine scientist in New York noted that
“One of the reasons near shore reefs don’t do much for surge heights is that, by
the time the big surge arrives, they’ve been completely overwhelmed by the
forerunner…If the peak surge is fifteen feet, it’ll have a forerunner of at least
seven or eight…and as soon as you put that on top of a breakwater, it loses all of
its frictional qualities.”285
The marine science literature largely confirms this assertion. “Breakwaters
can provide a number of important services for coastal communities…they help
stabilize rapidly eroding shorelines…and when combined with ecosystem
restoration projects [like oyster beds] they can contribute to local water quality
improvements…But they are not well-suited to reducing surge-driven flood
risks.”286 Some coastal engineers argue that breakwaters can be a component of
a large surge suppression system, but the scientific literature is bereft of
evidence indicating that they can serve as the primary or sole instruments of
surge risk reduction.
Another marine scientist noted that “[breakwaters] can do a lot for you in
terms of reducing the everyday wave action…that’s driven by wind and tidal
action…That reduces coastal erosion, so you can certainly make an argument in
their favor that way…But they aren’t going to do you any good during a major
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storm event. When you run the SLOSH models, it’s like they’re not even
there.”287 A designer working in New York, but unaffiliated with the proposal, also
said that “I don’t think that oysters and mussels are going to save us. They don’t
live past the spat stage around Staten Island, so they don’t form those crusty
reefs that are shown in all of their drawings…and you’d need so much width or
horizontal area just to get a one or two foot reduction in surge heights…Besides,
the final proposal didn’t even place the reefs where ARCADIS told them would be
most optimal – about ¾ of a mile offshore – because it wouldn’t be as sexy.”288
The risk in this project, then, is less about whether enough of it can be
built to fulfill its mission than in whether it can actually perform as it has been
advertised. Staten Island would surely benefit from a more stable shoreline and
improved water quality. Though those are part of the justification for constructing
Living Breakwaters, suppressing surge risk is the stated goal of the project – and
a service that the scientific literature and the marine experts I interviewed for this
dissertation doubt it can perform.
The Lifelines Proposal and Social Natures in the Bronx
The Penn/Olin proposal for Hunts Point is comprised of four overlapping
elements: (1) The Flood Protection Levee Lab, a commercialization incubator for
testing new materials and methods of risk reduction; (2) the Livelihoods Initiative,
a local job-training program aimed at coupling new neighborhood development
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with a local, underemployed workforce; (3) the Maritime Emergency Supply Line
Hub, a ship-based logistics hub for coordinating relief efforts during future storm
events; and (4) the Cleanways tri-generation facility, a local and CO2 neutral
power generating plant.289 It also includes a series of modest levees aimed at
protecting the neighborhood’s food distribution center – a critical node in the
region’s food supply. Nearly twenty million people in and around New York
receive a portion of their daily food supply from Hunts Point – and it came within
about eighteen inches of being inundated during Sandy. The Lifelines proposal
received $20 million through RBD – the least amount amongst the six winning
projects.290
The Penn/Olin project’s blend of physical infrastructure, social and
economic policy, and energy production clearly delivers on the principal aim of
RBD: to create innovative design solutions to the problem of climate change in
New York’s most vulnerable neighborhoods. But it also suffers from three unique
issues that threaten to derail the proposal.
One is that the Levee Lab creates organizational tensions between the
community members, the city, and the academic institutions that might
administer it. This is because the proposal never resolved the management or
operational questions that such a facility engenders, such as who might manage

289

Rebuild by Design. “Finalists.” Available at: http://www.rebuildbydesign.org/winners-and-finalists/.
Hunts Point is a working-class community in The Bronx and is home to the New York Region’s primary
food distribution center. Every perishable food item available to the region’s 22-million residents passes
through this center.
290
Ibid.

238

the conventional flood-control systems protecting Hunts Point, who might direct
the Lab’s research agenda, and how those two disparate systems might
intersect.
A second is that the proposal’s workforce development recommendations
will be difficult to square, both financially and contractually with local labor
unions. As one of the project’s designers remarked, “tying the success of new
development in a community to the wealth and health of its residents is the only
way to ensure that whatever physical improvements are made [in the Bronx]
actually benefit its inhabitants…and aren’t just another instrument of
displacement.”291
The third and final concern is a product of the competition’s insistence on
producing ideas that are regionally scalable yet contextually appropriate. No
other proposal generated during RBD was as attuned to its community as
Lifelines. An administrator of the competition remarked that “no one did it better
than in Hunts Point…there are plenty of things we’d probably change about it
now, but they were as engaged with their community…and as responsive to their
needs as any of us could have hoped.”292 But Lifelines exposed the paradoxical
nature of RBD’s aim – its local focus meant that few of the proposal’s ideas could
be transferrable to other neighborhoods.
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Remaking the Coast
Forging new ground – in this case, literally and intellectually – brings with it a
certain unevenness of execution; a blend of incredible innovation and incredible
failure. This is certainly true of the resilience propositions under consideration in
these three cities. Design often takes its cues from science, and the science of
resilience is relatively new. We should not expect the first wave of resilience
propositions in the U.S. to be perfect. But to ensure that future projects are closer
to that ideal, it is important to articulate which elements of these nine proposals
are of use to future design projects, which are not, and why.
It is important to begin that act of parsing by reiterating the differences in
flood risk and experience with flood-related disasters in each city. As the first
chapter of this dissertation explains in some detail, these three cities were
chosen because they represent critical points along the spectrum of high-risk and
low-to-high experience cities in the U.S. Galveston is the most experienced city
of the three with flood related disasters – with at least one major tropical storm
making landfall on or near the island each decade since 1900. New York City
occupies a middle-ground between the two, while Norfolk has the least amount of
experience with flood-related disaster.
That difference in experience helps to explain some of the differences in
the approach to resilience-making being considered in each city. In many ways,
the projects under consideration in Galveston are the most ambitious. The Ike
Dike is, at its most basic level, an island-wide barrier – a literal fortification

240

against the sea. The Centennial Gate and Ring Levee Systems, though less
intensive along the edge, are of similar scale and scope in their desire to reengineer the ecology of Galveston Bay. This is not a coincidence. Rather, it is an
indication of the urgency and the imperative created in recent years by
Hurricanes Ike and Rita set against a centuries-long backdrop of storm surge and
destruction. The residents of Galveston Bay are organizing around some or all of
these proposals because the risk of becoming complacent is coupled with the
risk of erasure. Whether or not they build one of these projects, future storms are
coming – and everyone there knows it.
Norfolk’s comparatively modest proposals reflect the city’s limited
experience with disaster. It would be strange – remarkable even – if the city were
contemplating projects similar to those in Galveston. But, with the exception of
the Fingers of High Ground proposal, Norfolk’s proposals rely on parcel-level
interventions and are intended to simply manage – not mitigate – future flood
risks. If crises beget action, it is easy to see why the proposals for coastal
adaptation in Norfolk remain programmatic elements of a city plan instead of the
inter-jurisdictional, complex infrastructure projects proposed in Galveston.
New York City, far greater in size and much more diverse in its geography
than either Galveston or Norfolk, boasts proposals spanning the spectrum of
ambition – from the massive and complex Dryline in Southern Manhattan to the
relatively Spartan Living Breakwaters proposal along Staten Island. Though
some of the city’s projects are now elements of its comprehensive plan – PlaNYC
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– they began in both the RBD competition and in the city-led SIRR exercise. If
nothing else, New York City’s model of using a design competition to generate
ideas that are then incorporated into a comprehensive plan – which carries
significant legal weight and opens up new financial instruments – is a useful one
for other American cities to consider. The projects in Galveston, which span
multiple jurisdictions, will require approval from the USACE and remain largely
outside the city’s control. Those in Norfolk risk meeting a common fate –
collecting dust on a shelf, never to be built – amongst elements of
comprehensive plans.
But they also face different kinds of risks which, in turn, require different
kinds of responses. Galveston and New York face considerable surge-related
risks. As a result, each of the proposals under consideration there employs some
form of large, resistance-based infrastructure – there is both a need to deflect
surge energy and a lack of horizontal space to consider doing so through
wetlands, mangroves, or other green infrastructural strategies. The densely
settled waterfronts of Galveston and New York City demand a performative
quality to their coastal infrastructure that only walls and other barriers can
provide.
In Norfolk, the risk is borne almost entirely of sea level rise and climate
change. The city is well-protected for storm surge, but it has a very low
topographic profile – the mean elevation of Norfolk is less than ten feet. Nearly all
of its sewer outfalls, which empty into the Elizabeth and Lafayette Rivers, are
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now below the monthly high tide line. This means that, for at least a brief window
every month, seawater is bubbling up through Norfolk’s stormwater system and
into its streets. When that is coupled with rainfall, the city’s streets fill up like a
bathtub. This issue will only grow worse as sea levels rise and precipitationdriven flooding intensifies. The city’s physical geography is not suited to the big,
structural proposals found in Galveston and New York City. The water cannot be
kept out of Norfolk. Instead, the city’s plan to develop a patchwork of inland
green infrastructure to help manage the problem reflects the nature of the risks
facing Virginia’s coast – and the options available to a city without the focusing
power of a crisis.
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I turn away from the politics of
resilience and toward its performative qualities that help differentiate where – and
when – nature-based strategies merit serious consideration in coastal cities.
From this, I begin to develop an evidence-based approach to resilience-making.
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Image Library: Chapter 4

Figure 33: The Experience-Exposure Matrix (author). These matrices show where the
cities outlined in chapter one fall along the experience-exposure spectrum. Galveston,
Norfolk, and New York City hold similar levels of exposure to and differing degrees of
experience with disaster.
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Figure 34: The Ike Dike (Texas A&M-Galveston). This image shows the conceptual plan
for the Ike Dike – a coastal barrier running the length of the region’s beachfront.
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Figure 35: The Ike Dike (Texas A&M-Galveston). This image shows some of the more
detailed features of the proposal – including how the barrier system and tie-ins would
work.
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Figure 36: The Centennial Gate System (Rice University). This diagram shows the
interventions called for in this particular proposal. It includes the construction of a
massive surge barrier (Bolivar Roads Gate), a new mid-bay of oyster reefs and sand
spits (Mid-Bay Gate), and an emergency gate at the port of Houston (HSC Gate).
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Figure 37: The Ring Levee System (GCCPRD). This diagram shows the layout and
proposed elevation for the network of levees in and around Galveston.
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Figure 38: The Ring Levee System (Gulf Coast Counties Surge Protection District). This
map highlights the restoration components of the levee plan for Galveston.
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Figure 39: The Fingers of High Ground Proposal (Structures of Coastal Resilience). This
diagram illustrates how the existing strips of high ground in and around Norfolk could be
accentuated and repurposed as sea levels rise.
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Figure 40: The Fingers of High Ground Proposal (Structures of Coastal Resilience). This
diagram illustrates how the proposal would be used to strategically hold flood water and
relocate critical assets and people in Lambert’s Point, a community just outside of
Norfolk.
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Figure 41: The Fingers of High Ground Proposal (Structures of Coastal Resilience). This
diagram illustrates how the proposal would be used at Willoughby Point, a sparsely
populated sand spit on the outskirts of Norfolk.
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Figure 42: The Fingers of High Ground Proposal (Structures of Coastal Resilience). This
maps shows how and where Mathur and Di Cuhna envisioned executing their design
strategy.
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Figure 43: The Vision 2100 Plan for Norfolk (City of Norfolk). This maps shows the city’s
vision for migrating its densest development inland and connecting it via new green and
transit infrastructure.
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Figure 44: The Chesterfield Heights Redevelopment Plan Concept (City of Norfolk). This
drawing shows a sketch-level plan for where to build new, parcel-level green
infrastructure (green) and where flooding is expected to be stored (blue).
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Figure 45: The Rebuild by Design Competition Footprint (author).
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Figure 46: The Dryline Conceptual Plan (Rebuild by Design). This rendering shows the
proposal wrapping around the southern tip of Manhattan, with the yellow line indicating
areas of raised/structural protections.
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Figure 47: The Dryline Conceptual Plan (Rebuild by Design). This rendering shows the
reshaped Manhattan waterfront, including the raised berms and new museum and public
buildings.
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Figure 48: The Dryline Conceptual Plan (Rebuild by Design). This rendering shows the
proposed height and construction methods for the proposal’s berm system.
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Figure 49: The Living Breakwaters Conceptual Diagram (Rebuild by Design). This
rendering shows the construction methods and ecological features of the proposal.

Figure 50: The Living Breakwaters Conceptual Plan (Rebuild by Design). This rendering
shows the proposed locations of breakwaters and on-shore water hubs in the SCAPE
plan.
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Figure 51: The Lifelines Proposal (Rebuild by Design). This maps shows where the
structural protections (yellow) would be used to protect the critical assets of Hunts Point.

Figure 52: The Lifelines Proposal (Rebuild by Design). These renderings show the
proposed waterfront condition for Hunts Point.
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CHAPTER 5 — The Beginning: Coastal Green Infrastructure and a
Naturalized American Coast
In this final chapter, I lay out what I believe can serve as a framework for building
nature-based strategies and resilience, together, along the American coast. I
begin metaphorically, discussing the notion of naturalization in other, unrelated
fields and how it can apply to resilience-making along the coast. Next, I discuss
the ways in which Galveston, Norfolk, and New York City’s lessons can apply to
other cities. Then, I draw from the cutting edge of marine science and coastal
engineering to describe how, where, and why nature-based strategies can
become a more effective part of coastal resilience planning. Finally, I speculate
on the prospects of naturalizing the American coast or, as I call it, making space
for the sea.
But first it is important to place this framework within the broader context
of coastal development in the U.S. – to insert it into the debate between
designers, planners, engineers, and scientists. One of the greatest tensions
amongst landscape architects, city planners, and policy-makers is embedded in
the conversation between restoration ecology and novel ecology.293 It is, in a
sense, a continuation of the debate between nature and culture, naturalness and
unnaturalness that defined four prior centuries of American development. The
former tends to focus on recovering landscapes lost to climate change and
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urbanization during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In coastal zones,
restoration ecology often means rebuilding the marsh and wetland habitat filled in
by the Corps or slowly inundated by sea level rise. As I wrote in chapter three,
the Corps own system of wetland regulation is premised on this idea of
restoration and balance along the coast.
One can imagine this kind of work as analogous to that of FEMA in postdisaster planning: rebuilding, in place, using slightly improved construction
methods and materials. Galveston’s Centennial Gate System – especially the
oyster beds and shoreline amendments – is emblematic of this approach. So too
is Staten Island’s Living Breakwaters project. There, the designers explicitly call
for restoring oyster beds and marine habitat lost during the nineteenth and
twentieth century around New York. However well-intentioned efforts like these
are, that approach, in those locations, misunderstands what it means to be
natural or unnatural in the Anthropocene. As I discussed in chapter four, the
conditions that enabled shellfish to thrive near Staten Island during the colonial
and pre-industrial periods of American history are no longer present. Even if
near-shore breakwaters could reduce storm surge – and the evidence is stacked
against that assertion – it is unlikely that a sufficient population of mature
shellfish can survive off the island’ coast under current conditions.294 This
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challenge will only grow as the effects of ocean acidification continue to, quite
literally, erode the viability of shellfish in the Mid- and North-Atlantic.
The latter group – urban ecological designers and novel ecologists – are
often less entangled in the nostalgic and romanticized tropes of nature. Their
work is characterized by a focus on performance and function, and on developing
an aesthetic language that breaks from the picturesque tradition of landscape
design. Galveston’s Ike Dike and Manhattan’s Dryline are both emblematic of this
approach. In each city, the proposals aim to restore a coastal floodplain function
through new, designed means. The Ike Dike aims to rethink the region’s onceprevalent dune system, replacing it with a technological landscape of walls,
levees, dunes, and seagrass. The Dryline does much of the same, proposing
retractable flood walls, berms, and sponge parks along the tip of Southern
Manhattan – an area that used to serve as a buffer for the rest of the island from
coastal flooding. Nature and technology are inseparable in these projects
because their distinction is artificial. Even the Corps’ moniker, nature-based
strategies, implies this. They are not natural strategies, which might imply a
nostalgic or restoration-driven approach to intervention. Rather, they are based
on natural landscape systems and recreating the functional and performative
attributes it can provide.
One of the key contributions from this dissertation’s case study work is
that, in an era of resilience and adaptation, a novel approach – and not a
nostalgic one – is key to helping cities, landscapes, and the people who inhabit
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them to stay in place. But design culture tends to interpret arguments in favor of
novelty and innovation as antithetical to notions of generalizability and
standardization. They are not. The question to the urban and design professions
going forward is not whether we must choose between invention and nostalgia or
whether there is room for art and science alongside one another. Those are old
debates with old, predictable answers.
Despite calls from some scholars about the need to renew these
conversations – and to pit the establishment of a landscape science against the
provision of designed wonderment – there is very little to be gained from such
discussions for the professions and for the people we purport to serve.295 There
is no art or science – nor is there a true divide between the poetics or
performance – of resilience.
Instead, the challenge for designers, planners, and policy-makers is to do
now for coastal resilience what we have long-struggled to accomplish in
sustainability: to develop a set of principles and strategies for integrating naturebased strategies into the marine environment. Put another way, we must move
beyond the rhetoric of resilience and into its production across the coastal
landscape of the US.
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Metaphors: Naturalizing the Coast
The metaphor of naturalization is a potential source of power for planners and
designers working on coastal resilience projects. In literal terms, to naturalize
something is to convert it to or into something else by a custom or habit that is
natural or familiar to a person.296 In horticultural science, the term is used to
describe the habitat range of plants. It connotes the geographic area in which
one could reasonably expect to find unplanted trees, shrubs, or herbaceous
plants. Take the Southern Magnolia, for example. The dense, broadleaf
evergreen tree has a native range that is fairly small – it only includes small
portions of the coastal plain in the Southeast US. But the US Department of
Agriculture estimates that its natural range extends much further and includes
portions of the Piedmont in the Carolinas, much of the Ouachita foothills in
Arkansas, and nearly all of the Appalachian Mountains in Tennessee. The
Magnolia’s natural range is defined as the geography in which a coalescence of
fires, forestry management, and climate change have allowed it to spread into
new, once-unsuitable areas.
The north and westward drift of the Southern Magnolia is instructive
here for at least two reasons. One is that it dismantles the sanctity of
naturalness that is embedded in the language and practice of restorationdriven resilience. Coastal environments are dynamic, evolving places,
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many of which are at the forefront of planetary climate change – they are
the sites currently experiencing dramatic and irrevocable change. As such,
coastal communities are the last territories on Earth where designers
should spend their time and expertise endeavoring the restore a
landscape of generations-past. No feat of engineering or investment of
design intelligence can counteract the changes underway. Instead,
planners and designers should be looking for new ways to restore the
functions of those landscapes – the nature-based flood risk reduction, the
benefits to human health, and the economic benefits of a thriving
landscape.297
The other takeaway from horticultural science is that it speaks to
the idea of exportability in ways that are useful to design. Though RBD
aimed to accomplish this goal in New York City, much of its work became
less about exportability as the competition wore on. Developing a set of
principles and strategies for coastal resilience-making that can still be
applied in highly nuanced ways is critical to naturalizing the coast. Design
is – and must remain – attuned to the eccentricities of the sites in which it
operates. But it can be organized around a broad set of principles or
values that flow from the science of poetics of resilience.

297

J. Gruhn and P. White. 2011. “Magnolia grandiflora L. Range Expansion: A Case Study in a North
Carolina Piedmont Forest.” Southeastern Naturalist, 10(2): 275-288.

267

A similar analogy can be drawn from the process of naturalization
that is enforced in the US by the Citizenship and Immigration Services
branch of the Department of Homeland Security. There, it is defined as a
legal status given to foreign citizens once a series of requirements are
fulfilled. If we think about how that might extend to coastal resilience – a
field far from that of immigration policy – it’s useful to begin with the idea
of rule-making and performative benchmarking as instruments for
establishing naturalness.
One way to do this would be to establish a set of performative
standards that coastal communities could achieve to earn a naturalized
designation – a status that could grant them access to special funds or
financing that is targeted towards the most vulnerable places in the US.
Much as there are National Parks, National Seashores, and US Forests,
there could also be special designations and appropriations for
Naturalized Coasts. Those standards would have to include metrics for
monitoring the reduction of flood risk. But they could also include
measures that tracked the creation or restoration of other ecosystem
services: water quality improvements, recreational opportunities, and
broader improvements in human health, including reductions in chronic
and environment-dependent disease incidence. Naturalization, then, could
be both a metaphor for designing novel, coastal landscapes and a
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regulatory distinction aimed at channeling the necessary federal
investments into resilience and adaptation strategies along the coast.
Naturalizing the American coast, then, could come through three
mechanisms. One involves stripping the nostalgia and green-washing
from designed and engineered resilience projects. Restoration implies a
past, ideal condition – a tenet which stands inapposite to everything we
now know about ecological science and ecosystem services. Rebuilding
marshland and oyster beds for the sake of rebuilding them is not enough.
Restoring the services they once provided, however, is. It is the functional
or performative qualities, rather than the physical landscapes themselves,
that designers must focus on going forward. The Dutch Sand Engine – a
project that involves creating massive, near-shore sandbars that slowly
erode and replenish the region’s beachfront – is archetypal of this
function-driven approach.
The second is that designers must become better consumers and
instruments of the science behind coastal resilience-making. Design
culture must do more than simply call for better science – the reality is that
much of what designers need to know about coastal resilience is already
known. But we must be willing to seek it out and, if necessary, to change
the way we operate in coastal environments. An example that I have
discussed at length in this dissertation is worth revisiting here: the Living
Breakwaters project on Staten Island. The use of oyster reefs as a nature-
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based approach to resilience-making is, in some cases, an excellent idea.
In the placid waters of coastal estuaries or along the edge of most fore
and mid-bays, oyster reefs can reduce shoreline erosion and filter
pollutants from the water column. But along the more exposed, seaward
edge of the coast, their ability to suppress surge-related risks has been
vastly overstated. any reliance on a reef to suppress storm surge is likely
to end in disaster. Worse, it squanders what may be the only chance
designers are given to lead coastal resilience projects by undermining
their credibility on the subject.
The final mechanism is cultural – designers and planners cannot
continue maintain an agnostic posture towards the politics of coastal
resilience and design. We must instead wade, neck deep, into them. If
readers take nothing else from this dissertation, it should be that no
amount of persistence, creativity, or charisma can overwhelm the ability of
the Corps to thwart resilience. Dsigners have much to offer politically. It is
simply up to them to take more risks and engage in a world once – and
mistakenly – deemed outside of our profession.
Exports: Reshaping the Coast in the Image of Galveston, Norfolk, and New
York
A central challenge for any case study research is grappling with how the
knowledge gained from focusing on a particular place might be
transferrable to other places. As a result, I must now ask: what about
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Galveston, Norfolk, and New York matters for other coastal cities?
sociological scholars have developed methods aimed at precisely this
issue referred to as grounded theory.298 For this dissertation, that
response must take at least two forms. The first requires that I begin at the
level of each individual city. Galveston is a barrier island at the entrance to
large estuary, rimmed with industrial facilities and constantly traversed by
global shipping and logistics operations. Its approach to resilience and
nature-based adaptation strategies should find relevance in similar
geographies across the American coast: North Carolina’s Outer Banks,
Sandy Hook and Ocean City off the coast of New Jersey, Ana Maria
Island along Western Florida, and many others. Norfolk is a low-lying,
industrial hub – a blue-collar city that depends on its proximity to and
relationship with the sea. Its lessons should find an audience in places like
Biloxi, Mississippi, Corpus Christ, Texas, and Newark, New Jersey,
among others. Finally, New York is a global financial center and, though
its approach should certainly inform cities like Miami and Boston in the
US, its audience is more international: Shanghai and Fuzhou in China,
Barannquilla in Colombia, and Alexandria, Egypt.299
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So what does my analysis of Galveston hold for other barrier island
and industrial communities along the Gulf and East Coasts? One
important takeaway for those communities is a recognition of the political
power behind massive works of infrastructural protections in the US – both
in their durability over time and in the culture of technology that they
engender. More than a century after the Great Storm of 1900 and the
massive upgrades that followed, Galveston remains committed to the idea
of resistance-based coastal resilience. Locals still refer to themselves as
BOIs – born on island. They place the moniker on their business cards,
their homes, and they infuse it into their language – all in the service of
creating a non-island-born other, whose ideas and culture can be readily
dismissed as not of this place. “It is not uncommon to meet people
here…who tell you stories about how their great-grandparents built the
seawall…and how magnificent it is. That wall is as much about the
protection it provides as about the pride and culture that emanates from
it.”300 Cultural and ecological legacies are hard things to discard – and
perhaps they should be.
The challenge, then, to Galveston, the Outer Banks, New Jersey’s
barrier islands, and other similarly situated communities along the
American coast is in finding ways to inflect their coastal and infrastructural
trajectories away from massive works of grey infrastructure and towards
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more nature-based and hybridized systems of protection. The Ike Dike,
whatever its other flaws, is a good example for them to follow. It is both
easily recognizable as a technological instrument to the BOIs living there,
and an experiment in nature-based strategies – a structural non-structure,
if such an attack on the English language might be permitted. But, at the
moment, the Ike Dike is an un-nuanced work of coastal infrastructure – a
massive, resistance-based barrier occasionally adorned with vegetation.
If done differently, the Ike Dike has the power to demonstrate the
performative value of nature-based strategies, without asking communities
to abandon their more familiar, resistance-based approaches before they
are ready. A towering, coastal spine integrated with dunes, reefs,
wetlands, and new beachheads could begin to shape a new culture
around the idea that natural features are more than ornamentation. If done
right, the Ike Dike – and projects like it across the East and Gulf coasts –
can create their own legacy of high-performing, risk reduction landscapes.
In so doing, they can create a new constituency for coastal green
infrastructure. Defensive structures do not have to be pure structures –
and their non-structural components do not have to be viewed as frivolous
or decorate contributions to the more serious work of risk reduction. They
can – and, in fact, they must – be all of those things at once.
In Norfolk, we must ask: what insight does its fatalistic approach to
coastal resilience provide for other industrial and logistical hubs along the
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East and Gulf Coasts? A key takeaway for those cities it that, in most
instances, there are no solutions to the challenge of sea level rise – at
least not in the way that designers and engineers often frame them.
Rather, coastal cities of Norfolk’s ilk will have to find methods of
forestalling and, ultimately, relocating. Their interventions will have to
focus on minimizing the impacts of rising seas and providing communities
with the time they need to cope with the coming coastal erasure. After all,
you cannot build a wall across the entirety of the American coast’s
population centers, nor can you do as Galveston did a century ago and
raise their elevations with dredge material. Some places are simply going
under – all that designers and planners can do is find a way to intervene
and slow that process down to open new pathways for human and
ecological migration. Though its practicality remains a valid concern, the
Fingers of High Ground Proposal certainly exemplifies this approach.
Nature-based strategies can certainly do that work. Softened edges
– be it with marshland or dunes – can provide space for habitats to
migrate and slow down the everyday, erosive tidal forces. Parcel-level
green infrastructure – the kind that Norfolk is emphasizing so heavily in its
Vision 2100 plan – can also help to lessen the burden on cities’ antiquated
storm-water management infrastructure. The Fingers of High Ground
proposal certainly flows from this logic, too. But where Norfolk’s use of
nature-based strategies may be most important for designers is in shifting
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the professions’ conversations away from notions of problem-solving and
certainty and towards less messianic narratives. Put another way, naturebased strategies can become a method for talking about timescales in a
more generative way. The parcel-level green infrastructure in Norfolk may
be a 20- or 30-year solution for the city’s storm-water management – but it
is not the solution to flooding there. It is an instrument for forestalling the
inevitable, not for solving sea level rise and moving on.
The focus on growing the coping capacity of individuals through
well-tested instruments of social and economic mobility may also prove
useful to Norfolk’s peer cities – and, I would argue, all cities facing new
risks as a result of sea level rise. They are particularly salient for those
cities that choose to abandon the idea of fortification and resign
themselves to a wetter, less certain future. Even in cities where a proposal
like Norfolk’s Fingers of High ground is implemented, it will require a
complete reorganization of the region’s social and ecological systems.
People moving to higher ground will do so at the expense of diminished
social capital – some will lose that social cohesion and still find
themselves in high-risk landscapes. Design must find ways – whether
through memorialization or other means - to lessen that burden. The
challenge is, and will remain, that cities like Norfolk and Biloxi simply are
not of a scale appropriate for dealing with climate change – and there are
no national or state institutions willing or able to fill that gap.
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What, then, of New York City? The proposals developed during
RBD were developed to be exported across the region and, then, the
nation – but can they? At a basic, conceptual level, the answer is yes, with
some caveats. Other global capitals will turn to the BIG U or Dryline and
its luxury take on resistance-based resilience to encircle their most critical
assets. They are likely the only other places that could afford such a
massive, architecturally adorned project. Some places will require massive
structures like the Dryline. Wall Street cannot relocate, nor can the
commercial hearts of Shanghai or Barranquilla. There are massive, sunk
costs associated with those districts and it will almost always be cheaper
to build walls around them than it might be to move them elsewhere.
But the concern with such an approach must be that, in most of
those global capitals, housing markets already price out low- and middleincome residents. They are, as others have noted, “sites of luxury…and
commercialized products for the global elites…and no one else.”301 One of
the Dryline’s own designers acknowledged it would likely trigger a new
round of displacement during our conversations about the project. City
officials in Galveston discussed the same in regard to the Ike Dike. That is
not to say that cities like New York should avoid investments in big,
infrastructural upgrades like the BIG U. I simply mean to reiterate the
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designers must abandon their agnosticism towards politics and policy, and
create proposals that are more than just physical objects detached from
the sociological realities of a place. For all the bluster amongst design
scholars regarding the importance of understanding and drawing upon the
idiosyncrasies of a site, the professions remain enamored with the idea of
transporting physical design responses between cities. It is why postindustrial cities continue to chase casino and sports stadium projects and
it is why coastal cities continue to pursue aesthetically pleasing
fortifications along their waterfronts.302
Another concern must be that other cities – of considerable size
and wealth, but nowhere near that of New York – will adopt the resistancebased approach of the Dryline when investing in their coasts. Global cities
like New York are uniquely positioned to build luxury design projects –
whether they should do so is another question. But New Yorkers – and the
designer who operate within it – often view themselves as a model for the
rest of the nation, if not the world. There is real danger in the veterans of
RBD and its related events attempting to export their ideas and plans from
New York to cities like Baltimore, Tampa, New Orleans, and Charleston –
places without the financial or technical capacity of a global city. One
could argue that no American city needs a project as expensive and highly
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designed as the Dryline to make it resilient. All should recognize that, if it
belongs anywhere, the only arguable location for such a project is the
Financial District of New York City.
But there is some potential in exporting the concepts founds in the
Living Breakwaters and Lifelines proposals. Though the latter deploys
shellfish and oyster reefs in ways incongruous to the local context of
Staten Island, there is undeniable merit in pushing bayside communities to
invest in near-shore, living breakwaters. They improve local water quality,
they help stabilize shorelines, and the bolster marine fisheries – which, in
turn, bolster local economies. They just cannot be the primary instrument
of resilience in any of those communities – ocean acidification threatens
the viability of most shellfish, making the long-term applicability of these
concept questionable at best. When one considers that Living
Breakwaters is located in an area of New York where shellfish do not
typically reach maturity and that it cannot perform the surge-reduction
function on which it was marketed to the public, you could actually argue
that it is the most portable concept to come out of RBD. Ironically, it may
be less appropriate for New York than it is for other communities along the
East and Gulf coasts where the marine life associated with its structures
have a far higher probability of flourishing.
Lifelines, like the Vision 2100 plan in Norfolk, is as much about
social mobility and individual coping capacity as it is about big, structural
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resilience infrastructures. Though it represents a break from the
convention of designed resilience projects –especially those that are
funneled through international design competitions – I hope that it signals
a shift in the way that our professions think about what it means to live
with risk. Lifelines breaks from the idea of design as an instrument of real
estate speculation and, instead, treats it as an investment in the Bronx
residents. “Ultimately…we knew that whatever investments were made
here – if they went through the conventional channels – that the people
living [in Hunts Point] would not be the ones to benefit…Without
mechanisms for keeping them there and ensuring that the benefits of
whatever is built flow to them and not some future population…you have
to invest in both the physical assets and the people themselves.”303
A second response to the question of how Galveston, Norfolk, and
New York’s lessons might be exported requires treating them as a set –
or, rather, something approximating one case rather than three. Though
there are important variations between the three – their biophysical
conditions, their ecological legacies, and their political and design cultures
– they underscore a critical contribution from this dissertation: that coastal
adaptation and resilience is not a question of science or design or politics.
They are questions of science and design and politics – at all times and in
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all places. Reforming the policy framework within which coastal resilience
projects are developed is therefore just as critical as exporting ideas from
the design projects proposed in each city.
The most important reform to initiate involves an overhaul of the
USACE’s operations along the American coast. As chapter three of this
dissertation makes clear, the Corps’ process for assessing and delivering
coastal resilience projects is not working. There are three critical reforms
to their project development process that must be enacted if coastal cities
hope to receive the resources they need to adapt to climate change.
The first is that the Corps must modernize its approach to costbenefit evaluation. Though others have advocated a risk-based approach
to project assessment, such a shift is unlikely in the US. That is because a
risk-based approach is a form of the precautionary principle employed by
most European nations in regulating risk. It calls for setting very high
standards of risk mitigation and enforcing it – no matter the cost – on
polluters and commercial enterprise.304 However reasonable that sounds,
it stands little chance of being realized in the US – where private property
rights are sacrosanct and where the mythology of rugged individualism is
considered a core national value.

304

Committee on the US Army Corps of Engineers Water Resources, Science, Engineering, and Planning:
Coastal Risk Reduction. 2014. Reducing Coastal Risk on the East and Gulf Coasts. Washington, DC:
National Academies Press.

280

Instead, the Corps should simply amend its existing cost-benefit
method to include ecosystem services – also known as ecological
economics – in its calculations. This would involve assigning an economic
value to four categories of ecological benefits that coastal resilience
projects can provide: provisioning services or the products of an
ecosystem, which might include boosts to local fisheries; regulating
services, which might include improvements in water quality as well as
reductions in flood risk; cultural services, which might include a boost to
tourism and recreational revenues; and supporting services, which might
include fixing synthetic nitrogen flowing into a bay through a river’s tailwaters.
Twenty years ago, an argument could have been made that the
science behind such an idea was too new and unproven. That is no longer
the case. Ecosystem services are now a mainstream idea and a wellestablished method of assessing planning and design projects. The US
Green Building Council assesses them through the SITES program305, the
scientific literature on the subject has grown so large there is now an
international journal for ecological economics306, and even President
Obama’s White House issued guidance to the Corps on how to integrate
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the calculation into its efforts.307 The time has come for the Corps to
modernize its methods and integrate ecological economics into its
evaluative process. Doing so would radically shift the balance of their work
away from grey infrastructure – which scores well under the current
system – and towards green infrastructure and nature-based strategies –
the benefits of which are not currently captured by the Corps. The Corps –
and their Congressional overseers – could choose to remedy this by
creating an experimental component to their work. In it, the Corps could
invest small amounts in new, nature-based projects along the East and
Gulf coasts, hire coastal researchers to monitor and assess them, and fold
the results of that work into a more progressive approach to their coastal
resilience work. The green revolution has permeated nearly every other
aspect of American life. It is well past time for it to sweep through the
Corps, too.
The second reform to the Corps’ evaluative process should be to
abolish the three-by-three-by-three reforms that took effect in 2013.
Though well-intentioned, the imposition of such draconian limits on the
USACE – which was already struggling to manage complex projects –
effectively ended its ability to take on large-scale, resilience-driven work
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along the coast. It also contributes to the Corp’s struggle to build naturebased alternatives to safer, conventional grey infrastructure projects. This
is because alternative projects are less established, and the Crops – like
all other large institutions – operates through a series of well-established
norms and behaviors. Though they are well-established and effective and
delivering physical works of grey infrastructure, the Corps has not yet
established a set of norms around building coastal green infrastructure.
That means it will need more time to engineer, design, and assess naturebased strategies along the coast – and the three-by-three-by-three
reforms inhibit their ability to do so.
The third and final reform to the Corps’ coastal operations ought to
come in the way that projects are funded. The existing system places odd
and arbitrary limits on the number of projects that can be underway at any
given time by all of the Corps’ districts – a literal hard-cap on how many
studies or projects can be going on, in total. That means that a flurry of
projects along the Gulf Coast limits the number of projects that can be
initiated along the East and West Coasts. While reasonable in theory, this
approach is incongruous with the decentralized nature of the Corps – and
the federalist devolution of federal power to the states in the US. A
regional cap might be more suitable, if limiting the scale and scope of the
Corps’ work is a sacred principle amongst its overseers in Congress. But a
better approach would be to simply abolish the cap, on the off chance that
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the needs of coastal communities vary from year-to-year and location-tolocation.
Even with these reforms in place, the questions about how to build
coastal resilience would still inevitably turn towards two subjects: how to
fund and finance their implementation, and how and when to best use
them. The former is a question best left to experts in public finance.
However, there are a number of compelling proposals to consider. Some
are based on state-level, revolving infrastructure bank funds in which low
or no-interest loans are provided to local governments to help fund small
projects and to cover the cost-sharing burden often associated with larger,
federal projects. This seems like a reasonable approach for building
coastal green infrastructure too. The money necessary to capitalize the
revolving funds could come from a variety of sources: a state or regional
carbon-market, akin to RGGI in the Northeast308; a new levy on oil and
gas businesses doing extractive work along the coast; or an incremental
increase on hotel and motel taxes in establishments located in the NOAAdefined coastal management zone.
The latter is a question of performance – and the science of
resilience and nature-based strategies along the coast. Though less
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established than the broader literature on ecosystem services, this
growing body of knowledge is precisely what designers and planners need
to more effectively intervene in coastal cities.309 It is the focus of the next
section.
Principles: The Performative Potential of Nature-Based Strategies
The necessity of integrating the science of resilience within the practice of
coastal planning and design has never been more important. A century of
mismanagement and misguided interventions by engineers along the
coast has created a unique opportunity for landscape architects and
planners to take on a leadership position in the re-making of our nation’s
shore. That means that our professions must do two relatively simple
things over the next decade: we must be honest brokers in the resiliencemaking efforts along the coast, and we must change the way we operate
within those territories.
The former requires a concerted effort amongst the profession to
better understand what we know – and what we do not – about what
makes cities resilient and what role nature-based strategies have to play.
So what can the science of resilience and performative landscapes tell us
about how to design the coast? The first, and perhaps most important,
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step is to understand how, in economic terms, structural and nature-based
strategies for risk reduction compare. The structural, resistance-based
approach to coastal resilience employs seawalls, bulkheads, jetties,
revetments, groins, and levees.310 They are generally viewed by coastal
managers and the USACE as the easiest kinds of projects to implement.
There is a long history of building coastal grey infrastructure in the US and
our tools for evaluating, designing, and constructing it are wellestablished.311
That long, grey legacy also means that we know a considerable
amount about the costs and benefits associated with such projects. For
instance, we know that, depending on project specifications and local
constraints, the capital cost a vertical seawall can range from $600,000 to
$44 million per mile, the cost of a levee averages $28 million per mile, and
that the average cost for a bare-bones barrier system is more than $100
million. The operational costs for such systems range from $3 million per
year to as much as much as $20 million – a heavy burden for the local
governments saddled with the cost. It’s important to note that barrier
systems should be evaluated per mile, as they must be built in their
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entirety or they offer little to no protection.312 That is why systems like the
BIG U are only viable in very densely settled areas – the cost-benefit ratio
of a massive barrier system just does not compute in less developed
zones.
We also know that, in addition to their high economic costs, there
are major environmental and spillover effects associated with coastal grey
infrastructure. It is associated with coastal ecosystem denudation and
habitat loss, contributing to the rise of invasive species in the intertidal
zone. They also create scouring effects along the shore, eating away at
beachfronts and, over time, undermining their own geo-engineered
foundations. As a result, the USACE now recommends using seawalls
and barrier systems only in areas already experiencing very high
erosion.313 Levees and barriers in particular “change the hydrodynamics of
an estuarine system and can decrease the accommodation space for
floodwaters, increasing the likelihood of flooding in adjacent areas.”314
Part of those spillover effects includes the moral hazard of building
large, structural protections without an ability to regulate land development
around them – a process which often induces dense development behind
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seawalls and barriers that, without exception, will catastrophically fail
during major storm events. I do not mean to minimize the economic
benefits of such projects. That value is real and important and, in many
places, coastal grey infrastructure should be the form of protection that
communities opt to construct. The challenge at present is that there is very
little choice available to coastal cities.
As I have noted ad nausea in this dissertation, many of the
environmental and spillover effects are not considered by the Corps.
When they are, they are often given less weight than the basic capital and
commercial cost-benefit calculations. Even when the spillover and
ecological impacts are assessed by the Corps, they are measured
qualitatively and, thus, de-emphasized in their decision-making process.
The Corps simply is not equipped to build much of anything beyond
coastal grey infrastructure, despite what we also know about the
performative value of nature-based strategies.
The interventions typically included in the Corps’ definition of
nature-based strategies include beach nourishment programs, dune
restoration and construction, and the conservation, restoration, and design
of salt marshes, seagrass, mangroves, and oyster reefs. They are
generally viewed by coastal managers as exceptionally difficult projects to
construct – though that is mostly a function of the regulatory framework
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and not the engineering or literal construction work.315 Though their costs
and other characteristics are less established, they too have some
operational principles worth considering in any discussion regarding
coastal resilience.
The capital costs for nature-based strategies that provide levels of
protection comparable to more structural alternatives are often
significantly lower. But they do not always provide the same kinds of risk
reduction or ecosystem services as grey infrastructure. In fact, only dune
restorations and beach nourishment projects are able to provide that
service to communities – marshes, mangroves, reefs, and the others
cannot. Building to the same 100-year flood standard used in the
structural estimates above, we know that beach nourishment projects
average $4 million per mile – and building entire beachheads can cost up
to $18 million per mile. This is slightly less than the capital cost seawalls
and substantially less than that of levees or surge barriers. But it is the
operating and maintenance costs that provide the clearest advantage for
this sort of nature-based approach to resistance-driven resilience – often
requiring a half-million dollars or less each year.316
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However, there are a number of complications to such a strategy.
Dunes and beaches do not typically perform as well in areas with
significant port traffic. Space is more limited there, meaning the dunes and
beaches are unable to be built large and wide enough to provide a level of
protection that is comparable to structural alternatives. There are also
major ecological challenges to this approach. They can also alter nearshore sediment transport and marine fisheries.317 It is not as simple as
merely replacing seawalls and levees with dunes and beaches. Rather, it
is a question of finding a better balance between where and how those
measures are deployed.
After all, dunes and beaches provide a vast array of benefits that
their structural relatives do not. Widened beaches create habitat for
migratory and terrestrial birds, macrofauna, and invertebrates. They can
also bolster the recreational and tourism opportunities for communities – a
point to which I will return shortly. The opportunity in dunes and beaches
for designers is that most of these second-order benefits – those outside
of flood risk reduction – are of little concern to engineers. Most
constructed dunes and beaches in the US do not properly integrate or
accentuate those kinds of services. Yet they are often the most important
consideration for local decision-makers – and a skill uniquely possessed
by landscape architects and planners. Working with coastal engineers to
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find the proper sites for these nature-based alternatives is only the
beginning. After that, the task for designers is finding ways to enhance the
ecosystem services those projects can provide, but often do not.
The other, nature-based strategies available to designers have not
been shown to have a significant effect on surge and storm-driven risk
reduction. Though they are relatively cheap – in the low-to-mid six-figures
per mile to build or restore – the central challenge to using salt marshes,
wetlands, reefs, and seagrass beds for that purpose is two-fold. One is
that storm surge is always preceded by a forerunner – meaning that, by
the time the actual surge makes landfall, the shore zone will already be
under several feet of water. That effectively eliminates the frictional
qualities of these interventions – which is the source of their ability to
attenuate tidal wave action.
The second is that these kinds of nature-based strategies require
incredible amounts of surface area to be effective. Rather than deflecting
wave energy as dunes and levees might, reefs, wetlands, seagrass, and
marshes absorb it through surface friction. Deploying any of them as the
primary source of surge risk reduction is dangerous and disingenuous –
there is simply no evidence that any of them can perform that particular
service.
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But they are particularly useful instruments of coastal resilience
outside the desire to reduce storm-driven damages. Designing,
conserving, and restoring salt marshes and seagrass beds are excellent
ways to minimize tidally and wind-influenced shoreline erosion. They are
relatively cheap to construct – $13 million per mile of seagrass and $14
million per mile of salt marsh – and cost almost nothing to properly
maintain. This is a major strategic advantage for these nature-based
strategies over structural solutions like revetments, groins, and other
stabilization projects. The structural ones are significantly more expensive
to maintain and nearly all of that cost is borne by local governments – the
level of government least able to marshal the financial and technical
resources necessary for such a task. Cities like Norfolk – with large,
crenulated shorelines and high exposure to N’oreasters and tidal events –
should find them especially useful.318 Given the properties that impact
their ability to perform shoreline stabilization services, their principal
challenge will always be spatial – as in finding enough room to build or
restore a large enough salt marsh that it can have a meaningful effect.
Oyster and shellfish reefs can provide a similar service – though
their effects are less pronounced. Evidence shows that near-shore
breakwaters – oyster-populated or not – can have a small effect on
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coastal erosion. They also provide significant, local improvements in water
quality when located in estuarine environments.319 But there are significant
challenges to siting and constructing them properly. One is that any reef
close enough to shore to help with stabilization will have other
unanticipated effects in the sediment transport zone along the coast. Put
another way, reefs stabilizing one section of a community’s coast will often
destabilize others. Also, despite advocacy for oyster and shellfish reefs in
coastal resilience projects like Living Breakwaters, the evidence shows
that “oyster reefs are quickly overtopped during storms and are not
effective at dealing with the storm surge and wave heights common in
tropical storms…and they can modify the geomorphology and bathymetry
of surrounding areas…creating more downstream risks.”320 Shellfish reefs
are also much more expensive than other nature-based strategies –
ranging from as little as $25 million per mile to as much as $34 million.
Their highest use will likely be in bay cities like Galveston.
So if one of the central tenets of a resilience-based design practice
includes integrating knowledge from the scientific frontier into our work,
what exactly do we know about the usefulness of nature-based strategies
along the coast? For dunes and beaches, the evidence is clear that, in all
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but the densest of cities, they provide a reasonable alternative or
supplement to the more conventional seawalls, levees, and grey
infrastructure favored by the Corps. They may not be suitable for cities like
New York and Miami, but Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and others
could benefit greatly from their inclusion in the coastal landscape.
Landscape architects and planners are uniquely positioned to
develop these kinds of projects, given that their primary advantage over
structural protections is their ability to provide comparable degrees of
surge risk reduction and a suite of complimentary ecosystem services. In
cities like Galveston, these kinds of vertical nature-based strategies also
provide a form of psychological congruency with the seawalls and
structural barriers built there a century ago. It is also less jarring – and
likely more politically acceptable – to build dunes and beaches there than
to move towards a radical, horizontal-only intervention that cuts against a
century’s worth of faith in technology and barriers.
Somewhat ironically, beach nourishment projects are a frequent
source of derision amongst landscape architects and ardent
environmentalists.321 Their motivations are understandable – it can seem
preposterous to support a process in which sediment is continuously
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pumped and dispersed along the nation’s coast to keep pace with
shoreline erosion. But this elides past a few of the critical benefits that
such nourishment efforts provide. One is that most small and mediumsized communities along the East and Gulf coasts rely on their beaches
as a source of revenue from tourists. In many of those communities, that
revenue is the only thing keeping their local economy together. Designers
can certainly engage in a theoretical discussion about the merits of
building a local economy on such a wobbly pillar, but it begs an important
question: what would their alternative be? To end the nourishment
program and watch as those communities’ beachfronts – and economies –
rapidly erode? Is plunging those places into deep poverty worth whatever
self-righteous point we’d like to make about what is natural – and what is
not? Going down such a path would undermine the very resilience
designers and planners purport to desire.
The other key point regarding nourishment projects is that nearly all
of the material used in them is recycled. It is not as if the Corps is involved
in some bizarre shell game of moving sand between Florida and New
Jersey and Texas to try and balance things out. Most of that material
comes from two sources: offshore sand pits, which were created by the
Corps when they began dumping dredge material there; and dredge-andpump operations, which take material from ship channels and waterways
that have to be dredged regularly anyway and send it to eroding local
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beaches. Sending that dredge material to beaches instead of the open
ocean is precisely the sort of loop-closing, systems-thinking approach to
resilience that designers should be engaging.
Those horizontal strategies – salt marshes, oyster reefs, and
seagrass beds – cannot be the primary focus of any credible resilience
strategy that purports to reduce surge-related risks. They can and should,
however, be at the heart of any project that aims to stabilize wind and tidedrive shoreline erosion, to restore estuarine ecosystems, to enable upland
habitat migration as sea levels rise, and to deliver a series benefits that
more conventional projects – like groins, revetments, and bulkheads –
cannot. These are the kinds of strategies that will be most effective where
storm surge is not a major risk. Cities like Norfolk and Savannah – wellprotected, estuarine cities whose primary risks are via wind-driven flooding
from N’oreasters and increasing backflow and flooding through their
stormwater management systems as sea levels rise – should be the
primary sites for these kinds of projects.
Using an evidence-based approach to coastal resilience is critical –
both to the future of the American coast and to the relevance of landscape
architecture and planning. Designers may only get one chance to lead the
resilience era in this country. If we squander that by investing time,
money, and political capital in ideas that we know will not work, we will
only have ourselves to blame when our position and authority diminishes.
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This seems particularly important for landscape architects – a profession
that spends a considerable amount of time and energy asserting its
societal importance and relevance. Though those assertions are not
always aligned with reality, the profession does have a unique and
valuable role to play in leading coastal resilience efforts.
Getting it right means moving away from a model of practice that
prioritizes luxury and wonderment as the primary contribution of landscape
architects to the planet. There can and should be room for such
endeavors in the profession. But placing them at the forefront of our
coastal operations risks trivializing the very real challenges and
devastation our cities and coasts can expect to face over the next century.
Recall that one of the participants in MoMA’s Rising Currents and the RBD
competition framed them as little more than “exhibitions that should have
been titled ‘Artists against Climate Change.’”322 This cannot be framework
in which designers and planners operate going forward. As I have
discussed throughout this dissertation, I do not mean to imply that
landscape architects alone can save the coast. Indeed, it seems clear to
me that there is no saving the coast. It is going to be transformed radically
by sea level rise and climate change. The task before us now is to find
ways to forestall that transformation – to make the transition more gradual
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and manageable; to give communities the time they need to cope with that
coming erasure; and to give decision-makers and scientists the time they
need to devise a longer-term approach to rising seas. If we fail to meet
this moment, we risk becoming marginalized in the broader project of
resilience-making along the American coast.
Prospects: Towards a Naturalized Coast
Naturalizing the American coast will not be easy. But, now more than ever,
it is necessary to conserve and enhance the vitality of this nation’s cultural
and economic engines: its coastal communities.
Simply extending the logic of the twentieth-century’s hard, linear
coastal infrastructure will not be enough to meet the challenges of the
twenty-first. That approach is prohibitively expensive, is time-consuming
construct, and is nearly impossible to maintain. Worse, the evidence
shows that it can create more risk than it actually removes by inducing
new development and creating a moral hazard along the coast. Grey
infrastructure will always have a role to play in coastal resilience and
adaptation planning. But the time has come for its hegemony to dissolve
and for a softer, nature-based strategy to proliferate.
That is because a coast that is better balanced between structures
and nature-based interventions is better-suited to the challenges posed by
sea level rise and climate change. To borrow from the language of Ian
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McHarg and landscape ecology, there is fitness or competitive niche
component to nature-based strategies that simply cannot exist in the
inertness of coastal grey infrastructure.
Prior to the 2016 Presidential Election, the scientific community was
skeptical as to how much climate change mitigation might be possible
over the next century. Given that the critical 400 parts per million threshold
was crossed late that year, it seemed unlikely that humanity would be able
to geo-engineer or fuel-switch its way out of this mess. That’s in part
because carbon dioxide takes more than one-hundred years to dissolve
from the atmosphere, meaning that the incredible volumes we have
emitted since the Industrial Revolution are not going anywhere anytime
soon. It is also because such a Herculean task would require tremendous
cultural shifts away from high rates of resource consumption – something
Western nations have, thus far, proved unwilling to do. But, especially
after signing on to the Paris COP-21 agreement, there remained a fain
glimmer of hope that there might be a pathway for this nation and the
West to stave off the worst impacts of climate change.
The election of Donald Trump extinguished that hope. Within days
of being sworn in as the forty-fifth President of the United States, Trump
announced that the US would be withdrawing from COP-21 – ending any
hope for an international effort to mitigate climate change. Whatever
efforts continue on that front will be localized and incremental – admirable,
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yes, but completely out of scale with problem at hand. That approach is
derived from the framework of sustainable development which, this
dissertation argues, is ill-equipped to face the challenges of the new
century.
Adaptation to climate change is all that is left now – and it is where
designers’ efforts should be focused. Derived through the framework of
resilience, climate change adaptation is better-suited to the challenge of
coping with – rather than trying to offset – the effects of climate change.
Fortunately, the American system of governance is designed precisely for
such an approach. The federalist system is premised upon a devolution of
power to the states. The challenge for planners, designers, and policymakers now will rest in devising a series of tactics and strategies suited to
the task of coastal climate change adaptation. To borrow from the
horticultural and policy language introduced in this chapter, their task is to
find ways to naturalize the American coast. Nature-based strategies must
become part and parcel to such efforts.
Not only would a naturalized coast restore and create ecosystem
services lost to a century’s worth of industrialization, but they can create
the time and space needed to allow for the migration of marine ecologies,
the reorganization of cities around risk reduction, and the adaptation of the
American coast more broadly. Recall that, in Holland, a similar process
took place along the watershed of the Rhine River. The Dutch sought to
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blend structural and nature-based strategies together in the service of
restoring floodplain functions lost to urbanization. The plan, known as
“Room for the River”, reorganized the entire watershed around that
purpose.
The same can be done along the American coast. But rather than
making room for a river, planners and designers operating in those
communities must make “Space for the Sea.” But how much space? The
answer to that question have several parts. The Gulf and Atlantic Coasts
span some 46,650 miles including the tidal zone.323 Around 510 miles of
that belongs to Galveston, with 328 and 520 to Norfolk and New York City,
respectively. That comes to nearly, 1,400 miles of coast between them. If
you include the other twenty-four cities that I considered as a part of this
dissertation – which represent all of the coastal communities in which we
might expect there to be a need and ongoing work on resilience strategies
– that figures climbs to nearly 13,000 miles of tidally influenced coastline.
To estimate the cost of fully armoring those coastal communities,
we can use the rule-of-thumb calculations discussed earlier in this
chapter. If seawalls run between $600,000 and $44 million per mile, the
cost of investing in such an approach along the East and Gulf Coasts
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would run between $7.8 billion and $572 billion. Levees and floodwalls,
which run between $8.4 million and $28 million per mile, would cost
between $109.2 billion and $364 billion to construct. Surge barriers
systems would bleed top $1 trillion. None of these figures include the
costs of the engineering studies and plan-making necessary to develop
them, nor do they include the annual operations and maintenance costs.
Comparable investments in nature-based strategies would be
considerably less. Beach nourishment and dune construction, which run
between $6.3 million and $18 million per mile to develop, would range
from $81.9 billion and $234 billion to complete. Seagrass beds and salt
marshes cost around $14 million per mile to construct, requiring an
investment of $182 billion. Reefs are the most expensive nature-based
strategy. They cost between $25 million and $34 million per mile to
complete, for a total investment of somewhere between $325 billion and
$442 billion.324 The economic and ecological benefits of investing in
nature-based strategies are clear.
Of course, this is not an either-or proposition. We must invest in
both forms of infrastructure – grey and green, hard and soft, alongside one
another. As this chapter makes clear, there are some contexts in which
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nature-based strategies simply are not an option. Whether due to high
density development or large-scale port operations, some communities
will need to invest in walls and barriers in lieu of dunes and beaches.
The World Wildlife Fund and Allianz Insurance estimate that $7.4
trillion in assets – including homes, businesses, public lands, and
infrastructure – along the northeastern coast of the U.S. are at risk of loss
or damage due to sea level rise and coastal storms over the next
century.325 Trillions more are at risk along the Gulf Coast – in cities like
Houston, New Orleans, Biloxi, and Pensacola – and the mid-Atlantic
coast, in cities like Savannah, Charleston, Norfolk, and Baltimore. If we
conservatively estimate that $15 trillion in assets along the East and Gulf
coasts must be protected through government-led, physical resilience
projects – and we assume the standard cost-sharing agreement of a sixtyfive, thirty-five percent split between federal and local sponsors – then we
can estimate that the Corps will need nearly $10 trillion to construct these
projects and local governments will need just less than $5 trillion. This, of
course, ignores the fact that significant, pre-construction expenditures are
required to study, plan, and design the projects and that the Corps does
the majority of its work inland, along rivers and reservoirs, instead of the
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coast. It is a daunting, yet necessary, challenge for the Corps, their local
partners, and designers to meet.
But the task before designers, planners, and policy-makers now is
to seek out those areas where a nature-based or hybridized approach to
coastal resilience is viable, to reform the Corps and other coastal
management institutions to enable their construction, and to get on with
the vital work of naturalizing the American coast. Sea level rise, like death,
is coming for us all. Nature-based strategies represent our last best hope
for adapting to the coming flood and making Space for the Sea.
Image Library: Chapter 5
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Figure 53: The increase in Average Annual Losses (AAL) due to climate change (Nature
Climate Change). This map illustrates the global cities most at risk – as measured by
projected annual commercial and economic losses – as a result of sea level rise and
climate change.
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